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 ABSTRACT 
David Levy 
Dissertation Advisor: Christopher Bruell 
 
Socrates’ Praise and Blame of Eros 
 
 It is only in “erotic matters” that Plato’s Socrates is wise, or so he claims at least 
on several occasions, and since his Socrates makes this claim, it is necessary for Plato’s 
readers to investigate the content of Socrates’ wisdom about eros.  This dissertation 
undertakes such an investigation.  Plato does not, however, make Socrates’ view of eros 
easy to grasp.  So diverse are Socrates’ treatments of eros in different dialogues and even 
within the same dialogue that doubt may arise as to whether he has a consistent view of 
eros; Socrates subjects eros to relentless criticism throughout the Republic and his first 
speech in the Phaedrus, and then offers eros his highest praise in his second speech in the 
Phaedrus and a somewhat lesser praise in the Symposium.  This dissertation takes the 
question of why Socrates treats eros in such divergent ways as its guiding thread and 
offers an account of the ambiguity in eros’ character that renders it both blameworthy and 
praiseworthy in Socrates’ estimation. 
 The investigation is primarily of eros in its ordinary sense of romantic love for 
another human being, for Socrates’ most extensive discussions of eros, those of the 
Phaedrus and Symposium, are primarily about romantic love.  Furthermore, as this 
investigation makes clear, despite his references to other kinds of eros, Socrates 
distinguishes a precise meaning of eros, according to which eros is always love of 
another human being.  Socrates’ view of romantic love is then assessed through studies of 
the Republic, Phaedrus, and Symposium.  These studies present a unified Socratic 
understanding of eros; despite their apparent differences, Socrates’ treatment of eros in 
each dialogue confirms and supplements that of the others, each providing further insight 
into Socrates’ complete view.   
In the Republic, Socrates’ opposition to eros, as displayed in both his discussion 
of the communism of the family in book five and his account of the tyrannic soul in book 
nine, is traced to irrational religious beliefs to which he suggests eros is connected.  
Socrates then explains this connection by presenting romantic love as a source of such 
beliefs in the Phaedrus and Symposium.  Because eros is such a source, this dissertation 
argues that philosophy is incompatible with eros in its precise sense, as Socrates subtly 
indicates even within his laudatory treatments of eros in the Phaedrus and Symposium.  
Thus, as a source of irrational beliefs, eros is blameworthy.  Yet eros is also 
praiseworthy.  Despite his indication that the philosopher would be free of eros in the 
precise sense, Socrates also argues that the experience of eros can be of great benefit in 
the education of a potential philosopher.  Precisely as a source of irrational religious 
belief, the erotic experience includes a greater awareness of the longing for immortality 
and hence the concern with mortality that Socrates believes is characteristic of human 
beings, and by bringing lovers to a greater awareness of this concern, eros provides a first 
step towards the self-knowledge characteristic of the philosophic life.            
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Introduction: Eros and Plato’s Politics 
 
 It is not immediately apparent that Plato’s understanding of eros, eros in the 
ordinary sense of romantic love between human beings, is of great relevance to political 
science.  As Ludwig’s Eros and Polis has convincingly shown, ancient Greek political 
thinkers, including Plato, also used the term eros in a broader sense, a sense according to 
which eros may be for one’s city or imperial conquest, and such eros is clearly of 
political importance (2002).1  But Plato’s most extensive treatments of eros, those of his 
Phaedrus and Symposium, are focused, at least primarily, on romantic love; political 
concerns are given relatively little attention.  If we wish to study Plato’s most sustained 
treatments of eros, it seems we must begin with eros in its ordinary sense.   
Since Socrates’ treatments of eros ascend in each case from love of other human 
beings to philosophy, we may hope to gain some clarity about his understanding of 
philosophy by following his treatments of ordinary eros, and in philosophy we find a 
topic which Plato at least presents as being of fundamental political importance, insofar 
as his discussion of philosopher kings is meant to clarify the nature of political life (cf. 
Republic 473c11-e5).2  However, the politics of the philosopher king are highly 
                                                          
1
 See Ludwig (2002) especially pages 121-169, 319-380. 
2
 Cf. Strauss (1964, 138). All references to Plato are to Burnet’s edition (1901-5).  All translations are my 
own, although I have frequently consulted Pangle’s translation of the Laws (1988), Bloom’s translation of 
the Republic (1968), Nichols’ translation of the Phaedrus (1998), and Bendardete’s (1993) and Lamb’s 
(2001) translations of the Symposium.  In the introduction, all unspecified references to Plato are to the 
Laws; in the first chapter, all unspecified references to Plato are to the Republic (hereafter also referred to 
as Rep.); in chapter two, they are to the Phaedrus (hereafter Phdr.); in chapter three to the Symposium 
(hereafter Symp.).  All italics in translations from the Greek are my emphasis, and they are meant to bring 
out the point I wish to emphasize rather than to indicate the tone of the Greek.  
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paradoxical, and therefore their relevance to actual political life too cannot be readily 
ascertained.   
Yet the notorious restraints imposed on eros, in both Plato’s Republic and his 
Laws, suggest that in Plato’s view, at any rate, eros is of political importance.  
Furthermore, it seems probable that the contemporary belief that the study of eros is not 
of fundamental importance to political science stems, at least in part, from the belief that 
eros is a private matter with which the political community, its laws and statesmen, ought 
not to meddle.  Seen from this contemporary perspective, Plato’s suggestion that the 
regime should regulate and guide erotic life appears as merely one more consequence of 
his illiberal view of good political life.  In other words, Plato’s illiberal treatment of eros 
seems at first sight to stem from his understanding of politics in general, according to 
which a healthy regime must regulate all areas of life (cf. Laws 631d2-632d1, 780a1-7), 
and not from his understanding of eros in particular.  Still, Plato’s suggestions for healthy 
political life allegedly stem from his understanding of human nature, and therefore his 
suggestion that the city should regulate all areas of life seems to be based on his 
assessment of what political arrangements would be most conducive to human happiness 
and would in this sense accord with human nature (631b3-6).  Then, since Plato regards 
human nature as erotic (Symp. 206c1-4), it remains possible that Plato’s illiberal view of 
healthy political life stems in part from his assessment of our erotic nature.   
 The studies below of Socrates’ treatment of eros in the Republic, Phaedrus, and 
Symposium offer considerable evidence in support of the above suggestion: Plato’s 
understanding of eros provides some basis for the view that a regime should and to some 
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extent necessarily will direct its citizens towards a view of virtue and the gods, for the 
sake of which some regulation of eros would be justified.  To make this thesis seem more 
credible, however, it is helpful to begin with a brief discussion of the treatment of eros in 
Plato’s Laws.  In the Laws, we are confronted not with the paradoxical politics of the 
philosopher king, which, as Plato makes explicit in this work, are not suited to human 
nature and hence not possible for human beings, but with Plato’s “second best city” 
(739a-e), and thus we are more likely to find in the Laws the practical political 
recommendations that stem from Plato’s view of eros.   
 Near the outset of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger instructs his two interlocutors 
in the task of the lawgiver, making clear that eros will be subject to legal regulation.  The 
lawgiver aims to secure happiness for the citizens, and this happiness depends on the 
lawgiver’s providing for the good things, human and divine (631b3-7).  The possession 
of the human goods, health, strength, beauty, and wealth is to be assured through the 
attainment of the divine goods or the virtues: prudence, moderation, justice, and courage 
(631b7-d2, cf. 630d9-631a4).  The aim of the city is thus its citizens’ happiness.  Virtue is 
presented as the key to the attainment of happiness, and the attainment of virtue, the 
Athenian next suggests, requires the thorough regulation of the citizens’ lives.  Careful 
watch must be kept over marriage, the birth and rearing of children, and erotic longings 
(631d6-632a2).  Illiberal laws are justified by the pursuit of the citizens’ virtue and 
happiness. 
 We must note that the Athenian does not think the thorough regulation of the 
citizens’ lives that he demands need be enforced by laws with definite penalties.  Rather, 
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he suggests enforcement by the apportionment of honor and dishonor through the praise 
and blame contained in the laws themselves (631e1-2, 632a2, cf. 632b1-c1).  That is, the 
city’s laws should indicate the praiseworthy and blameworthy practices for all the 
citizens throughout all of life.  When we turn to the Athenian’s full articulation of the 
marriage law that he recommends, we find that it contains a mixture: a fine is imposed on 
anyone who refuses to marry by the appointed age, and an exhortation is included which 
is to encourage citizens to choose spouses not with an aim to increasing their wealth or 
merely private pleasure but with a view to their spouses’ character, the good of the city, 
and the good of their children (772d5-774c2).  Praise and blame will be used to 
encourage the right matches; force will not be used as the attempt to compel citizens to 
choose certain spouses would only arouse resentment and make the law appear ridiculous 
(773c3-8).   
 The law cannot retain the respect the Athenian demands for it, if it directly 
compels citizens to satisfy their eros in the manner most precisely suited to the city’s 
needs, but it also cannot leave eros entirely unregulated.  The exhortation added to the 
marriage law helps us see why eros needs regulation.  In marrying, one begins to form a 
new household to replace that of one’s parents, and the Athenian has carefully limited 
both the number of households and the range of wealth permitted to them, forbidding 
poverty and excessive wealth, and teaching the citizens that the land, which is their 
principle source of wealth, has been allotted to each for his caretaking by divine sanction 
(737e1-3, 740a-745b).  These provisions serve not merely to discourage faction and 
encourage friendship among the citizens (743c5-6, 744d3-5), for they also promote the 
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piety (740a6-b1, b8-c1, 741b5-6), justice (742e4-743c4), moderation (743e6-744a3), and, 
by making them adhere to the rule of an intelligent legislator (742c6-d2), prudence of the 
citizens; i.e., they promote virtue.  The marriage law then aims to help maintain this 
delicate order by exhorting citizens to choose a spouse whose marriage will, by balancing 
the characters and wealth of the citizens, promote the virtue of the children and maintain 
the distribution of wealth in the city within moderate limits.  The Athenian’s regulations 
regarding children, both those demanding that excess male children be given up for 
adoption to households lacking a male son and otherwise regulating the size of the 
population (740c2-741a4), and those describing the city’s mandatory educational system 
(through books seven and eight), likewise promote the maintenance of the city’s delicate 
arrangement. 
 We can see then in the marriage laws that because erotic relations affect the 
character of the citizens, both that of the husbands and wives and that of their children, 
the Athenian’s concern for the virtue of the citizens requires some regulation of eros.  But 
we have not yet seen that Plato’s understanding of eros contributes in any way to his view 
that the city must be concerned with virtue; the concern with virtue seems simply to 
demand eros’ limitation.  Recalling that the Athenian seeks virtue for the city on the 
grounds that it provides for the citizens’ happiness, we note that we have not seen any 
evidence that such happiness as virtue offers is not outweighed by the irritation caused by 
the restraint of eros. 
 If, however, we turn back from the Athenian’s discussion of the full marriage law 
in book six to his first discussion of marriage laws in book four, we can begin to see a 
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way in which the city’s strict legal code not only restrains but also supports eros, in 
helping lovers obtain what their eros leads them to desire.  In book four, the Athenian 
offers as an example of a “prelude,” or an explanation that is to be attached to each law,3 
a discussion of the purpose of marriage.  This discussion does not contain an exhortation 
to seek a spouse with regard to the city’s needs, but rather explains why men should want 
to marry.  According to this prelude, everyone by nature desires immortality; the desire 
not to lie nameless after death is such a desire; and the human species attains immortality 
by generating children (721b7-c6).  The suggestion is that through marriage men may 
have a share of immortality by leaving a child behind them who lives on after their death.  
By noting that men, unlike women, can only be confident in having progeny to live on 
after their death, if they are in the first place sure that the child their mate tells them is 
their own is in fact their own, i.e., if they can trust their mate, we can understand why this 
law and indeed the full marriage law articulated in book six are addressed only to men 
(cf. 721b1-2, 6-7, 772d5-e2, 774a5 with 785b2-4).4  For marriage, by binding husband 
and wife together before the city and the gods, would greatly increase the husband’s trust 
in his wife and therefore his confidence about his offspring in a city where there is strict 
obedience to the laws (cf. 835c-842a).5   
The Athenian’s discussion of human life prior to the emergence of cities with 
written legal codes in book three, where he stresses primitive man’s virtue or natural 
                                                          
3
 See England for a discussion of the general significance of preludes (1921, 1-3).  See Pangle on the 
precise reasons given in this context for preludes and the reason the marriage law is the example given 
(1988, 445-449, 472-473). 
4
 See Stauffer (2005, 63-65, 70).   
5
 See Stauffer (2005, 64). 
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innocence (678a-680e),6 could lead one to think that marriages, or at least the fidelity of a 
mate, would be secure without the city keeping guard.  But what the Athenian more 
quietly intimates about that pre-political condition suggests that men might not find their 
mates so reliable under such conditions.  The Athenian likens primitive life to that among 
Homer’s Cyclops, “where each asserts his right over children and wives, and they do not 
care for one another,” and when one of his interlocutors suggests that Homer’s 
description is one of savagery, the Athenian confirms this view (680b1-d5, cf. Odyssey 
XI. 112-115). 7  In such savage conditions men may take their women by force (cf. 
680e6-681a4), and neither women taken by force nor rival men who care nothing about 
one another are likely to permit much assurance of spousal fidelity.8  In the city whose 
legislation the Athenian is describing, on the other hand, marital fidelity is supported by 
reverence for the law and the gods who support the law, and concern for the praise 
presented in the law (cf. 841c4-5).  
Finally, the Athenian indicates that the protection of marriage is at least among 
the most important purposes of the city’s piety.  This is suggested in the following way.  
After his discussion of marriage laws the Athenian turns to a description of the household 
of the married couple (776b5), and in the midst of this description, while calling attention 
to the correctness of the order in which he proceeds (778a9-10, b4-6), he offers a 
discussion of housing plans.  In this discussion, he speaks, as Strauss points out, not 
primarily of private homes, but “above all of temples, most extensively, of the city 
                                                          
6
 Cf. Strauss (1975, 39-40); Pangle (1988, 423-426). 
7
 Cf. Strauss (1975, 40-41); Pangle (1988, 427-428). 
8
 See Stauffer (2005, 71-73). 
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walls,” and the private homes are treated only insofar as they may be arranged so as to 
serve as a wall (1975, 96; 778a-779d).  The Athenian then concludes the passage by 
confirming that he has been speaking of matters pertaining to marriage (779d5-6).  The 
walls discussed in this passage presumably pertain to marriages insofar as they protect 
the married couples, and given this context, we are then entitled to suspect that the 
Athenian here intends to suggest that the temples too are being built in support of 
marriage.9  The watchful eyes of the gods supplement those of the city in guarding 
against marital infidelity.  Thus, the Athenian later even suggests that only a god (835c1-
2), or the belief in the impiety of marital infidelity (838a9-c7), would suffice to prevent 
promiscuity among the citizens.   
 We can see then that while eros may be restrained by the city’s laws in some 
respects, other aspects of human eros may be served by the laws.  The laws, by 
supporting marriage, permit stronger attachments between husbands and wives and 
fathers and children than is possible under other conditions (cf. 839b1).  Lovers may then 
be expected not only to chafe under the strict laws the Athenian would impose upon 
them, but also to find their erotic concern for their descendents better fulfilled in a 
community bound by such laws.  And, since the relationship between eros and such legal 
codes as would restrain it is not as straightforward as it might at first seem, we may then 
wonder if there are not more and deeper ways in which the eros of the citizens leads to 
their support of the laws.10 The subsequent studies of eros will show that it does support 
                                                          
9
 See Stauffer (2005, 82-83); cf. Strauss (1975, 96); Pangle (1988, 471-472).  
10
 In this regard, consider also Stauffer’s argument that the common meals for women that the Athenian 
proposes are impossible in part due to the concern of fathers for their wives and children (2005, 63-65, 71-
74, 82-87, 100-104, 116-119, 177, 184-188, 192-197, 206-208).   
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the laws, and it does so, must fundamentally, in a way the Athenian only hints at in the 
Laws.  That is, the Athenian hints that eros in particular encourages the citizens’ piety.  
He does this not only by charging those who abstain from marriage with impiety in 
addition to recommending that they be fined (721c6-7), but also by asserting that for the 
legislator what is first “according to nature” is the marriage law (720e10-11),11 shortly 
after suggesting that the legislator should begin his instruction of the citizens with an 
exhortation to religious worship (715e4-717b5).12  For if eros somehow provides 
encouragement for the citizens’ piety, it can lay a claim to being a natural starting point 
for worship.  We shall have to wait for the studies below of Plato’s more sustained 
treatments of eros in his Republic, Phaedrus and Symposium in order to confirm and 
clarify the connection between eros and religious belief suggested here.  
Before we turn to these studies, however, it is helpful to bring out why, in Plato’s 
view, the citizens’ piety should be of great concern to the lawgiver and also why this 
concern with the citizens’ piety requires a strict legal code more generally.  By so doing, 
we can begin to see how important eros, as a natural foundation for piety, may be to 
Plato’s understanding of political life.  The importance of piety is brought out most 
clearly and succinctly by the Athenian’s discussion of corrupt regimes in book three, 
where he describes the decay of ancient Athens into a state of excessive freedom (693e5-
7, 698b-701c).  By comparing the decayed city to its prior, healthy state, we see what the 
gain of freedom or the loss of strict legal restraint implies.  With this change in view, we 
may then see more clearly a fundamental, not to say by itself decisive, advantage of the 
                                                          
11
 For the translation of 720e11, see England (1921, 463). 
12
 See Strauss (1975, 63).  
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piety that the Athenian would seek to foster among citizens and of the kind of illiberal 
regime which he believes would foster it.   
Before its decay, the Athenian tells us, the Athenians were law-abiding out of 
sense of piety, which he characterizes here as awe.  Athens was ruled, he emphasizes, by 
a “despotic mistress, Awe,” because of which its citizens were willingly enslaved to the 
law (698b5-6).  In this respect, the Athenian notes, ancient Athens was ruled in the 
manner he generally recommends to cities (699c2-6), for it is by awe, which he also calls 
“divine fear” (671d2-3), that the laws come to be taken as having the divine support that 
the Athenian demands (cf. 671d-672d, 713e1-714a6).13  Along with the Athenians’ awe 
came hope; when the Athenians faced an overwhelming Persian invasion, their awe-
inspiring way of life permitted them hope, hope in their own resources and hope for 
divine assistance, which helped them stick together and thereby prevail (699b6-d2).  
Finally, the Athenian notes that the city before its corruption had well regulated music, 
many forms of which were devoted to the gods (700a7-b7).   
The decay of Athens then began with a decay of music.  Whereas music had been 
subject to the qualified judgment of the educated, the poets themselves came to be the 
judges, despite their incompetence (700c1-d5).  The poets defended their usurpation by 
denying the existence of any correct standard and by appealing to the pleasure that their 
music gave to each (700e1-4).  This appeal, however, led the many to appoint their own 
taste as the judge, believing that they themselves were competent (700e5-6).  Having 
taken this step, and therefore having come to consider themselves adequate judges of 
                                                          
13
 See Pangle (1988, 402). 
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music, the many then drew the further conclusion that “everyone is wise in everything” 
(701a6), a plausible conclusion if one supposes the many’s competence in music, which 
pertains to the highest matters, the gods.   Along with holding each to be wise, the many 
became fearless and therefore lacked also that divine fear or awe which had ruled and 
which implied recognizing an authority higher than themselves (701a6-7).  Finally, 
lacking awe, the people came to reject paternal and familial authority, and ultimately to 
disregard oaths and any other concern for the gods (701b5-c4).  The excessive freedom of 
Athens led to the loss of awe before the laws and then all piety.   
The Athenian thus brings out through a contrast of the older Athens with the 
newer, free Athens that the pious awe characteristic of the older community was 
inseparable from its illiberal laws.14  And this awe serves not merely to promote 
friendliness within the city or to encourage it in times of war (699c1-d2), for awe also 
permits hope for help from the gods, and if we turn again to the Athenian’s first 
discussion of the marriage law, we can see how important this hope may be at any time.  
The Athenian suggests there that human beings pursue immortality through their 
progeny, but by referring to this as “a desire” for immortality and saying that everyone by 
nature desires immortality “in every way” he suggests that there are other ways in which 
one may pursue immortality (721b6-c1).  And by making clear that the desire is for 
personal immortality and indicating that only the species is truly preserved through one’s 
progeny (721c1-6), the Athenian allows that there may be better ways of pursuing 
                                                          
14
 Which is not to say that the complete absence of freedom is desirable: the discussion of the corrupt 
Persian regime, which “in a way suffered the same thing” as the Athenian (699e1-2), seems to show that 
awe is also not possible in a regime with too little freedom (cf. 697d6-698a3). 
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immortality, ways of pursuing one’s own immortality.15 Then, when we consider that the 
hopes furnished by awe may provide some measure of confidence not only in divine 
protection for one’s family (729c5-8, 931eff.), but also, for those unable to follow proofs 
about the immortality of the soul (cf. 892dff.), in the possibility of attaining personal 
immortality through divine assistance (671d-672d, 790d2-791b1, 907b5-7, 944d5-7),16 
we can see that humans may be able to feel far more hope of fulfilling the natural wish 
for immortality in a community whose strict legal observance commands awe.  
Furthermore, in providing such support for its citizens’ hope for immortality, we may see 
something of how the kind of city which Plato seems to prefer, for all practical purposes, 
would provide for the happiness of its citizens, which is its ultimate end.  Finally, if eros 
is, as we have suggested, a natural source of the citizens’ piety, we can see now more 
fully why Plato would have thought the understanding of eros of vital importance to 
politics.   
 
From this brief consideration of the Laws, I wish to have offered some support for 
my suggestion that Plato’s understanding of healthy political life stems in part from his 
understanding of the erotic nature of human beings.  If this suggestion is true, and I 
believe the following studies of Plato’s treatment of eros in the Republic, Phaedrus, and 
Symposium confirm that it is, then the interpretation of Plato’s view of politics requires 
the interpretation of his treatments of eros.  Furthermore, by this brief discussion of 
Plato’s Laws, I wish also to have provided, in a preliminary way, some sense of what 
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 See Strauss (1975, 63-64); Pangle (1988, 448); Stauffer (2005; 66-68). 
16
 See Stauffer’s discussion of Poseidon’s providing Kainis with immortality (2005, 156-158). 
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may be at stake for political science in Plato’s understanding of eros: the possibility that 
Plato’s view of eros led him to think not only that a healthy community would seek, by 
means of praise and blame, to restrain eros in some respects, but also that his 
understanding of our erotic nature is one reason that he regarded a relatively strict, pious, 
illiberal community as the kind of community most in accord with human nature.  If man 
is by nature erotic, he is not naturally an isolated individual, but finds his fulfillment best 
in or through attachment to other human beings, and I wish to have suggested by the 
interpretation of the Laws above and to confirm and clarify by the studies of eros below, 
that this erotic attachment to other human beings is, in Plato’s view, related in important 
ways to the awe before the laws and the gods characteristic of the virtuous illiberal 
community described in the Laws.  In studying Plato’s treatments of eros, we may hope 
to prepare ourselves ultimately to consider whether anything may be said on behalf of 
Plato’s view of healthy political life, the illiberality of which surely disturbs us today.   
That is, we may hope that the interpretation of Plato’s view of eros will help us better 
determine whether the freedom we take for granted today, which is also or especially 
freedom from illiberal views, represents in all respects a genuine advance, or whether, 
along with such great goods as it provides, it does not also mask a genuine need, a need 
rooted in our nature, a need which may be better met by a community whose horizon is 
firmly delimited by sacred awe, and a need which we may address by first recovering a 
more complete awareness of it through the study of Plato’s thought. 
Thus the following study takes up the question of Plato’s understanding of eros.  
We do not approach each dialogue asking only the question or questions that this 
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preliminary discussion of the Laws has occasioned, for to do so would incline us to 
overlook important details which do not appear immediately relevant.  We seek to 
understand eros as Plato sought to teach us about it through his dialogues.  Then, 
however, we must face the difficulty that there may not be a unified Platonic teaching 
about eros.  Plato’s Socrates seems to treat eros differently in different dialogues, or, in 
the case of the Phaedrus, within the same dialogue; in the Republic, eros is harshly 
blamed as it is again in Socrates’ first speech in the Phaedrus, but it is given his highest 
praise in his second speech there, the palinode, and a somewhat more qualified praise in 
his Symposium speech, if his concluding remarks in each case are to be trusted (cf. Phdr. 
257a3-4 with Symp. 212c1-3).  Thus, each dialogue in the following study is treated 
separately, using a minimum of reference to the other dialogues in the interpretation of 
each, so as to assess whether Plato’s dialogues do present a coherent teaching about eros.   
The guiding thread for the study is found in the puzzle we have noted, that 
Socrates gives eros both great blame and high praise, and in the indication given in the 
Phaedrus that Socrates is only able to blame and then praise eros alternately because of 
something in eros’ character which renders it disputable (Phdr. 263b-d).  We seek to 
determine whether understanding this ambiguous aspect of eros’ character permits us to 
grasp the unity of Plato’s most prominent treatments of eros.  There follow chapters on 
Socrates’ two most extensive discussions of eros, those of the Phaedrus and Symposium, 
which are primarily laudatory of eros, and a chapter on Socrates’ treatment of eros in the 
Republic, where, in his discussion of the city in speech and his discussion of the worst 
way of life, that of the tyrannic soul, Socrates seems inclined to view eros in the harshest 
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light.  The treatment of the Republic thus makes a helpful counterweight to that of the 
Symposium and especially the Phaedrus, where the rhetorical aspect of Socrates’ 
discussions could obscure some of the harsher considerations about eros. 
To anticipate the conclusion, there does seem to be a unified understanding of 
eros at work in the three dialogues studied, an understanding which confirms what we 
have suggested on the basis of the Laws.  Eros is blamed in the Republic for the religious 
beliefs to which it gives rise, for these religious beliefs tend to be irrational and oppose 
philosophic rule.  This tendency of eros to lead lovers towards irrational religious belief 
is then acknowledged in the Phaedrus and Symposium, and yet eros is praised in these 
dialogues for nearly this very reason; eros, by the same means that it inclines us towards 
irrational religious belief, also begins to awaken us to self-knowledge and may therefore 
be of great help in leading us to what Plato and his Socrates regard as the highest human 
possibility: the philosophic life.  Thus, in addition to helping clarify the tremendous 
political implications which in Plato’s view derive from our erotic nature, the following 
study also sheds some light on Plato’s view of philosophy.  It is only by understanding 
Plato’s view of this best way of life, or the life most fulfilling of human nature, that we 
can approach a more complete assessment of the way and degree to which Plato believed 
life in such cities as that whose founding is described in the Laws could be truly natural. 
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Chapter One: The Republic’s Blame of Eros 
 
 In the Republic, Socrates treats eros quite harshly.  This treatment is most 
prominent in book five’s sexual legislation, where Socrates’ proposals entail the 
destruction of the private family, and in book nine’s treatment of the tyrannic soul, where 
the soul’s greatest corruption is traced to eros.  Accordingly, we divide our study of 
Socrates’ treatment of eros in the Republic into two parts, the first centered around book 
five and the second around book nine.  The interpretation of book five’s attack on the 
private family helps clarify book nine’s treatment of the tyrannic soul, and the 
interpretation of book nine in turn provides some confirmation of our treatment of book 
five.   
  
Part One: On the Purpose of Socrates’ Sexual Legislation in Book Five  
  
 Our interest in the Republic’s treatment of eros is first aroused not by its brief 
explicit treatments of that subject, but by its shocking disregard of eros or the thorough 
subordination of the claims of eros to the demands of the city, i.e., the city being founded 
by Socrates along with Glaucon and Adeimantus, in book five.  The Republic’s 
communism of women and children, if not also its endorsement of sexual equality within 
the guardian class, probably shocks us today as it did Glaucon, and, we infer, Greeks in 
general, when Socrates first pronounced it (457b-d, 452b-c).  And this shock is doubtless 
due, at least in part, to the way the proposed legislation undermines ordinary erotic 
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relationships.1  Our task is to discern for what purpose Socrates will so subordinate eros 
and why that purpose requires this subordination.   
 This task is immediately complicated, however, by the multitude of justifications 
Socrates gives for the proposed legislation, and these justifications seem to be in some 
tension with one another and with the earlier education of the guardians.  To indicate this 
simply and preliminarily, the equality of women is justified by Socrates’ claim that the 
women of the guardian class will in this way be made best and that nothing is better for 
the city than having the best possible men and women (456e), but, according to the 
defense of communism of women and children, the best thing for the city is unity which 
communism aids by removing distinctions between the guardians (462a-b, 464a).  The 
principle of the first argument, the promotion of excellence, runs counter to that of the 
second, sharing as much as possible in common, for excellence will only belong to some 
(cf. 456d5-6).2  Indeed, to the extent that the communism makes the guardians a stronger 
class, it will further increase their superiority to the other classes, thus threatening the 
city’s unity.  Finally, the communism is allegedly to make the guardians as much as 
possible like parts of a single human body (462c-d), but this aim seems at odds with the 
earlier education’s aim of self-sufficiency and independence from others (387d11-e1), to 
say nothing of the concern with love of the beautiful with which the music education 
concludes (403c).  
                                                          
1
 If evidence is needed for this common sense observation that communism of women and children as well 
as coed naked gymnastics undermine ordinary erotic attachment, see Phaedrus 250e-251a, 254a-255a, 
256d, and Symposium 192d-e, 206c-207a, 208e. See also Ludwig (2007, 207-208).    
2
 See Nendza (1988, 345, 347-348). 
18 
 
 Noting the discrepancies in Socrates’ arguments and noting the comical 
atmosphere he cultivates in the midst of offering his proposals, one may, as many have, 
draw the conclusion that Socrates is not making these proposals in complete seriousness.3  
Considering the difficulties attending the argument for communism in particular—both 
the difficulties attending its justification and those which render its implementation, at 
best, a most unlikely occurrence (473c-e)—some have argued that Socrates’ radical 
reform of traditional family life is carried out not because Socrates thinks it best but in 
order to show, in one way or another, the tension between political life, with its demand 
for unity among the citizens, and eros.4  Such a reading supposes that the justification for 
communism would be the city’s demand for unity, as Socrates claims, and that by 
showing us the ridiculousness and impossibility of the consequence of complete 
adherence to this demand, Socrates loosens its hold on us.  To the extent that cities may 
dream of attaining such unity and freedom from faction, Socrates’ argument may well 
have this effect, but the very fact that Socrates suggests that cities have ends other than 
unity in the very context in which he is discussing communism suggests that perfect unity 
may not be the primary end of cities.  In this case, Socrates’ reason for proposing 
communism may extend beyond illuminating the tension between the city’s demand for 
unity and the demands of eros.  
  Indeed, book five makes a new beginning in the Republic’s founding of a city 
which had seemed complete in book four (450a8, 427c6-d1), and this new beginning’s 
                                                          
3
 For examples, see Bloom (1968, 380-381); Sallis (1975, 371-378); see especially Saxonhouse (1978). 
4
 For examples, see Sallis (1975, 378); Saxonhouse (1976, 211); Nichols (1984, 252, 254). Compare 
Ludwig’s account of the tension arguments, which he only partially follows (2007, 203-217).    
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most fundamental addition to the original is the philosopher king, who enters the dialogue 
as a mere means to the realization of the regime, but who appears ultimately to be the 
highest end of the city, for whose sake the prior legislation is necessary (473b-c; 497bf., 
502b, 520a-b, 540b5-6, 543d1).5  Thus we turn to the details of Socrates’ proposals, 
seeking in particular to discover whether these reforms are not in fact somehow necessary 
for philosophic rule.  If the sexual legislation should turn out to be necessary for the 
acceptance of philosophic rule, then it would seem that the tension is not so much 
between eros and politics as between ordinary eros and philosophy, or, more cautiously, 
ordinary eros and the highly paradoxical politics of the philosopher king.6 
  
Equality 
  
 It is not immediately obvious why Socrates introduces equality amongst the 
guardians as his first proposal in book five.  He had been asked only to clarify the 
character of his earlier proposal that the women and the children of the guardians would 
be held in common (449c, 423e).  His earlier suggestion referred explicitly only to the 
                                                          
5
 See Bruell (1994), especially pgs. 266 n.5, 271, 274.  The following chapter and indeed the whole 
dissertation is much indebted to his argument there about the structure of the Republic, as well as the many 
conversations I have had with the author about the matter; I hope here to develop and verify the link 
suggested on pg. 274 between the sexual legislation and philosophy.  I also have made much use in this 
chapter of unpublished notes from a class on The Republic taught in 1988 at the University of Chicago by 
David Bolotin; it is hard to discover anything in my interpretation of the Republic which he did not in some 
way anticipate, which is of course not to say he would agree with my interpretations.  
6
 That Socrates already has philosophic rule in mind at the beginning and throughout his discussion of the 
sexual legislation is indicated both by his reflection on the limits pertaining to the sharing of thoughts 
which he makes immediately before entering into the legislation (450d-451b), and his suggested 
rationalizations of the city’s otherwise irrational views of the ridiculous, noble, and sacred which he makes 
throughout the discussion (452d6-7,e1; 457b4-5; 458e3-4); these rationalizations, by supplanting traditional 
views with those based on benefit, reflect the philosophic view of the superiority of the good to the noble 
(505a-b; cf. 504d4-5, 493c1-6).    
20 
 
maximal possible sharing of “women, marriage, and child-procreation” (423e7), and this 
was introduced as a means of preserving the education of the guardians, whom Socrates 
then explicitly limited to males (andres) (423e-424a, cf. 395d5-6).  When, however, 
Socrates first proposes equality, it is after having added a concern with the “use” (chreia) 
of women to the concern with their possession (451c), and he will now propose to use 
women for the same things as men (451d-e).   
 In fact, this is not the first addition Socrates makes to his task, for he earlier 
replaced his listeners’ request for a description of the communism with the more pointed 
questions of its possibility and its goodness (449c-450c).7  And we therefore wonder if it 
is not the addition of these questions that leads Socrates to take up the question of 
women’s equality.  It seems unlikely, however, that the goodness of communism is 
improved by the equality within the guardian class, especially since, as we have seen, the 
arguments for the goodness of these institutions seem to be in some tension with one 
another.  Nor would adding the equality of women in the military make Socrates’ reforms 
seem better to his listeners, although arousing a comic atmosphere in making this 
argument and overcoming some of his listeners’ shame may help soften the shock of the 
communism.  Furthermore, we should consider that the goodness of the proposed 
communism would surely have been in question regardless of Socrates’ making this 
explicit at the beginning of book five, because the discussion of each institution of the 
city concerned its goodness as it was instituted (cf. 420b7-8).  Thus, the question of 
possibility is Socrates’ main addition to the request of his interlocutors, and perhaps then 
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 See Strauss (1964, 116). 
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it is the newly aroused concern with the possibility of communism that leads Socrates to 
argue for equality.  This suggestion is given further support, as I shall discuss 
subsequently, when Socrates says the law of communism “follows” the law of equality 
(457c7), since this suggests that equality may be a useful or necessary precursor to the 
communism.  It surely suggests the two laws are linked more deeply than by the fact that 
they are both concerned with women. 
    The argument for equality is quite brief.  No concern for women’s rights is 
apparent, as Glaucon’s ready acceptance of women in the guardian class seems motivated 
simply by the idea that this would be a better use of the women for the city; the two 
activities which women would presumably otherwise take up, child bearing and rearing, 
are simply discarded without discussion (451d-e).  This is similar to the final argument in 
defense of equality.  There, Socrates argues that women educated as guardians will be 
better (for the city) than the other women, although no alternative tasks for women are 
suggested for comparison, as shoemakers were opposed to the male guardians (456b-
457a).  What is clearly missing from this justification of equality in terms of the 
usefulness of the greater number of guardians which it would permit is an argument for 
the suitability of guardianship to female nature.  It is this consideration which Socrates 
seems to defend in the course of his argument for the possibility of equality.  That is, 
Socrates presents his argument for the possibility of equality as an argument that equality 
accords with woman’s nature (452e-453b, 456b-c).  Socrates first mentions female nature 
as that which would determine the limits or range of possibilities for any woman, and 
thus, determining if equality is natural in this sense would simply demonstrate equality’s 
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possibility (452e6-453a3).  Yet Socrates turns, without explanation, to another meaning 
of nature, according to which what is natural is what most fulfills or is best for a certain 
kind of being; Socrates reminds us that the entire regime is to have been founded in 
accordance with nature (453b4-5, cf. 433a4-6), as none of the present regimes have been 
(cf. 452a7-8).  Thus we see that many things have come into being, at least among human 
institutions, that are not, in this sense, natural, and it is the naturalness of equality in this 
second sense that Socrates proceeds to defend.   
Socrates’ apparent conflation of these two meanings of nature thus jeopardizes the 
rigor of his defense of equality in a way which will become clearer in the discussion of 
communism.  In the meanwhile, we should note a way in which the naturalness of 
equality in the second sense, as what is best or fulfilling for women, implies the 
possibility of equality in a higher or more rigorous sense, provided that what seems to be 
most fitting to a given nature is not opposed by other aspects of its nature.  What accords 
with nature would be most stable and hence able to remain in existence, because it would 
not be opposed by any natural inclinations.  Thus the regime founded in accordance with 
nature would not be driven to reform or overturn its institutions as other regimes are 
driven to overturn institutions that are not natural (424a, 433a-b, cf. 422e-423a, 426e, 
501e).  Furthermore, while unnatural regimes can and do come into existence, there 
cannot be perfect adherence to their laws and orders due to human nature’s opposition to 
them.  To the extent that we identify a regime with its authoritative laws (cf. 338e1-3, 
551a12), and the authority of the laws implies obedience to them, a regime with unnatural 
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laws is never fully possible.  Thus a regime’s possible existence is assured by its 
naturalness.8   
 Now, while Socrates does give the appearance of arguing for the naturalness of 
equality, his use of nature as a standard seems primarily to highlight what his argument 
lacks.9  The argument Socrates gives is not for the natural fitness of women to any 
particular task nor the fitness of some women for the task of guardianship, although this 
is subsequently asserted without argument (456a), but rather, Socrates argues that women 
are generally inferior at all tasks (455c-d).  In such a case, it seems doubtful that there 
would be enough exceptional women sufficiently fit for the tasks of the guardians, 
especially since these require sufficient bodily strength for war, and bodily strength is the 
one quality Socrates and Glaucon consistently note that women lack (451e1-2, 455e1-2, 
456a10-11, 457a9-10).  Yet, despite singling out war as a questionable task for woman’s 
nature (453a3-4), and despite mentioning in this context the need for adequate bodily 
strength if a nature is to be suited to a task (455b9), Socrates offers no argument that 
woman’s nature or her bodily strength is suited to war.   
 The inappropriateness of putting women in battle is brought out again in book 
five’s later treatment of war.  There, Socrates refers to men (andras) and then fathers 
                                                          
8
 Although there is still another use of nature in the Republic according to which what is natural would 
never come into being (501b1-4, cf. 473a1-2, and cf. 597a4-9 with c1-d3).  This use refers to various ideals 
which exist “by nature”, but which transcend humanity’s capacity for implementation.  Such ideals seem to 
be objects of human aspiration, but even their goodness is quietly called into question by Socrates’ remarks 
concerning possibility and goodness in his discussion of communism (458a1-b3), as I discuss below. 
Socrates only introduces such ideals after conspicuously failing to defend the naturalness of communism; 
he only turns to these after his regime has failed the more rigorous standard of possibility (cf. 472d-473b).     
9
 See Saxonhouse (1976, 199-200); (1978, 888 n.2); Nendza (1988, 339-340). 
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(pateres) without mentioning women or mothers leading their children in battle (467c).10  
Glaucon, apparently taking Socrates’ hint, concludes the discussion of war by suggesting 
that women might not participate in battle, and if they did, they would be in the rear 
(471d).  Socrates lets this go without correction.11  Socrates’ remarks which refer only to 
the participation of men in warfare immediately follow Glaucon’s question as to whether 
bringing all the guardians’ children to battle does not constitute too great a risk, as the 
city could be unable to recover if all its children were lost (467b2-4).  Glaucon’s concern, 
however, could well apply also to bringing the women to war, for far fewer men than 
women need survive to populate another generation.12  Perhaps then Socrates’ omission 
of women at war is not due only to concern about the strength of women but also to 
concern about their usefulness as child-bearers. 
 Yet it is this use of women which Socrates most conspicuously overlooks as he 
knowingly offers an inadequate argument for female equality within the guardian class.  
The basic point of Socrates’ argument is the inferiority of women in all tasks, and this of 
course includes the bearing and rearing of children, which Socrates had earlier proposed 
as the alternative to female equality (451d6-8).  Whatever the case with rearing may be, 
women certainly excel all men at child-bearing,13 and thus the task most suited to and 
indicative of the distinctively female nature would seem to be the perfection of bearing 
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 See also 460b1-3, where Socrates speaks of rewarding the young who excel in war with women but not 
men.   
11
 See Saxonhouse (1976, 195, 207). 
12
 See Strauss (1964, 118). 
13
 See Saxonhouse (1976, 199). 
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children.14  Socrates’ raising the question of woman’s nature and his subsequent 
argument which simply denies any natural female excellence, thus, when thought 
through, call attention to Socrates’ dismissal, without argument, of the female role as 
child-bearer, and to his unwillingness to make or leave this as women’s principle 
occupation.  The argument for the naturalness of equality thus calls our attention to at 
least one effect of the equality which is of particular importance to the communism of 
children: the denial that a guardian woman’s place may be in the home with the children. 
 Equality’s enforcement of the separation of woman from child is not its only 
connection with the subsequent communism.  When Socrates begins his description of 
the communist laws, he refers back to the laws for equality, arguing that the mixing of the 
sexes in all activities, especially naked exercise, and their living and dwelling in 
common, will inevitably lead to sexual relations cropping-up among them as determined 
by “erotic necessities” (458c6-d7, cf. 452a11-b1).15   Furthermore, these sexual relations 
are not likely to be highly monogamous, as is indicated by Socrates’ implication that they 
would be “irregular” without the city’s intervention (458d8-e1).  Equality thus takes 
women away from their children and puts them among the men, often without any 
clothes on.  Looking ahead to the impermanence of the marriages and the childlessness 
required by the city’s communism (459e-460d), the equality of women appears as a 
means by which to weaken the attachment of women to their children and to specific 
men, thus also weakening the attachment of men to their women and, since promiscuity 
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 See Laws 785b and 789eff for evidence that Plato could think the role of bearing children may be quite 
time consuming for women. 
15
 See Bruell (1994, 274).   
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would cause obscurity regarding who is the child of whom, to their children, which 
conditions are necessary for the acceptance of communism by the guardians.  It is in this 
way that the law of communism seems to “follow” that of equality (457c7).  This does 
not mean communism is simply a consequence of equality, for additional laws are needed 
to enforce the communism, but it does imply that equality prepares the way by 
weakening the family.   
 
Communism 
 
 Socrates introduces his discussion of the proposed communism of women and 
children with a ruse that attracts attention to the question of its goodness and thus allows 
Socrates to avoid the question of possibility.  That is, immediately after Glaucon 
expresses doubt regarding both the goodness and the possibility of such communism, 
Socrates suggests that its goodness is undisputed and that he has only the question of 
possibility to answer (457d4-9).  Quite naturally, this provokes Glaucon to object, and 
Socrates is compelled to answer the question of communism’s goodness (457e1-4).  That 
Socrates’ intent was in fact to draw Glaucon’s attention to the question of goodness and 
distract him from that of possibility is confirmed by the sequel, where Socrates seeks and 
obtains permission to consider the character and goodness of the communism while 
postponing the question of its possibility (458a-b).  Socrates then follows this order of 
inquiry, reversing the order suggested in his initial statement of the questions, and the 
order he followed in the discussion of equality (450c8-9, 456c, cf. 452e4-5).  To 
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understand the significance of Socrates’ avoidance of the question of possibility for the 
discussion of communism as a whole, we must follow this theme somewhat further.  
 Socrates characterizes his request to put off the question of possibility as that of 
an idle man seeking to avoid weariness in deliberating about the possibility of what he 
desires, and Socrates admits that this procedure will make one still idler (458a1-b1).  
Presumably this procedure makes one more idle by replacing the straining (and 
enjoyment) of seeking to fulfill a desire with that of fantasizing about its fulfillment 
(458a).  One was already idle before this, however, and Socrates apparently takes 
avoidance of the question of possibility as evidence of idleness.  In Socrates’ view, 
actively pursuing something is inseparable from consideration of that thing’s possibility; 
a thing’s goodness cannot be properly considered without ascertaining its possibility.  
Thus Socrates affirms the correctness of the original order of questions.  Socrates’ 
insistence on the appropriateness of this order, even if he will lead his audience away 
from it here, is intelligible if a thing’s goodness depends on its possibility.  This 
consideration in turn makes sense when one bears in mind that that the goodness in 
question is goodness of something for someone or some group (cf. 505a-b, d5-e1), for if 
the attainment of a supposed good thing is impossible then it cannot be good for that 
person.  Socrates’ subsequent account of the goodness of communism is thus rendered 
suspect by Socrates’ own admission.   
 The inadequacy of Socrates’ procedure is further suggested by comparing 
Socrates’ eventual treatment of communism’s possibility with his treatment of equality’s 
possibility, for Socrates replaces the question of possibility in terms of naturalness with 
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the lower and less rigorous question of whether and how it can come into being at all or 
even be merely approximated (466d6-8, 473a-b). It is true that at the conclusion of his 
discussion of communism Socrates asserts its accordance with nature (466d2-4), but if 
we examine his very next statement, we see that this is precisely what needs to be proven.  
For there, Socrates asks if the communist arrangements just described are also possible 
among humans as they are among lower animals (466d6-8), and, while this question 
explicitly asks only whether communism can come into being, the juxtaposition of what 
is possible among lower animals with a question about what is possible among humans 
cannot but raise the question of communism’s suitability to human nature (466d6-8).16  
Finally, Socrates’ raising of this question here accords with the utter lack of consideration 
of human nature within the discussion of communism. Socrates’ procedure thus renders 
communism’s goodness suspect, in particular, with respect to its suitability to human 
nature. 
 Socrates could have argued for communism among the guardians with a more or 
less identical argument to that which he used to defend equality, for there he argued that 
nothing was better for the city than producing the best possible men and women (456e), 
and here he could have argued that the eugenics program, which communism facilitates, 
would further this end (cf. 459d7-e3).  Instead, Socrates makes another argument, one 
which is in some tension with the earlier argument’s concern for excellence,17 and this 
argument especially brings out the difficulty communism poses for human nature.  
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 Cf. Sallis (1975, 373-374) 
17
 This tension between the city’s concern for excellence and its concern with unity also appears in 
Socrates’ use of a community of pleasure and pain as opposed to a shared view of virtue or nobility in his 
discussion of the unity provided by communism: the standards for the city concerned with unity must be 
lowered (462b4-6; cf. 403c4-7).  See Nendza (1988, 345). 
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Socrates argues that communism of women and children will help provide the greatest 
good to the city by making it most like a single human body which is unified in its 
awareness of pleasure and pain in any of its parts (464b1-3, 462c10-d5).  Yet while there 
seems to be no distinction between our feeling pain in our finger and our awareness that 
this pain and this finger are our own, the citizens need a community in which they must 
first think of others as their own and only then can they try to feel their pain (463e3-
464a2).  By likening the city to an individual human body, Socrates provokes the 
question of whether humans are the kind of beings whose selves can be so dissolved as to 
permit the thorough incorporation of each as a mere part of the city.  
 Socrates subsequent avoidance of the question of the naturalness of communism 
and his ultimate replacement of that question with the lower standard of whether the 
regime could be merely approximated, strongly suggests that Socrates is aware of its 
unnaturalness (471c-e; 473a-b).18  This suggestion is then further supported by Socrates’ 
remarks shortly after his argument for communism’s goodness for the city.  First, 
Socrates admits that the human body can never cease to be private or one’s own (464d8-
9), but one may easily wonder whether concern over the body can be limited to prevent 
seeking private possession of goods, women, and children.19  Socrates then tacitly 
suggests there can be no such limitation of concerns: he admits spirited fights will in fact 
occur with such frequency that their possibility will encourage all to remain fit for 
fighting, and Socrates only seeks to dissipate the spiritedness that encourages fighting as 
safely as possible (464e3-465a3).  Finally, even fathers will be beaten on occasion, and 
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such occasions will be unlikely only in part because of the shame one feels before his 
“fathers”, for fear of punishment is also needed (465a8-b3).  
 That the unity Socrates praises is unnatural and that Socrates is aware of this is 
confirmed by an addition he makes to the argument for communism, namely, that the 
communism is also good for the individual guardians (458b5-6, 465df.).  Consideration 
of the individual’s good was absent from the treatment of equality and the questions 
Socrates raised at the beginning of book five, but Socrates raises the question here, and 
he even draws attention to the fact that this is the first time he raises the question by 
reminding us that Adeimantus’ concern about the happiness of the individual guardians 
from the beginning of book four had hitherto gone unanswered (465e4-466a6).  After his 
argument that communism will unite the city such that all share equally in one another’s 
goods (464d3-5), one would expect that the individual benefits of communism would not 
be worth mentioning, but it is precisely here that Socrates first brings them up, thus 
implying the failure of communism to transform the individuals into mere parts of a 
greater whole.  Socrates even seems to highlight this failure by his praise of the 
guardian’s happiness, which he suggests surpasses that of the Olympic victors (465d2-3), 
for he thereby compares them favorably to a class whose members’ success sharply 
distinguishes them from all others. 
 Thus Socrates seems aware of the unnaturalness of the end by which he justifies 
communism.20  Because the unity for which communism is allegedly sought is not 
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 The above argument has indicated in particular the unnaturalness of the unity Socrates proposes to justify 
communism, and it only casts doubt on the naturalness of the communism itself insofar as communism 
requires one to give up the private (which it does to a large but not exhaustive extent: private honors 
remain).  I infer the unnaturalness of the communism in particular due to Socrates’ failure to argue for its 
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natural, it cannot be fully achieved, even if a tyrant could go some way towards attaining 
it.  Furthermore, Socrates does not even seem to have designed it well to achieve as much 
unity as possible.  Socrates’ admission that spirited rivalry will be present among the 
guardians reminds us that Socrates requires rewards, including sex, to be given to the 
better guardians, thus creating divisions from which faction may grow (465a1-3, 460b1-
5).  More fundamentally, however, one may doubt whether humans can be as attached to 
a crowd consisting of people who are family members only by law as each of them can 
be to a small family within which one develops close relationships.21  In particular, the 
law prohibits any women or child from being someone’s own and thus from being cared 
for as one’s own.  Each guardian is required to regard all the others in one way or another 
as a family member (463c5-7), but the law does not provide for the actions between 
lovers and family members that are, at least ordinarily, conducive to the formation of 
unifying bonds of kinship.  Socrates indicates that the mere names of kinship will not 
suffice to unify the city and adds laws which require good conduct towards “parents” and 
punish bad conduct (463c8-e2), but no law can be made to require fathers and mothers to 
nurture their children and thereby engender respect for themselves, since child-rearing is 
strictly regulated by independent officers (460b7-d5).  In fact, freedom from the trouble 
of rearing and financially supporting children is one noted benefit of communism for the 
guardians (465c2-3).  Finally, the regime forbids continuous cohabitation and mutual 
support between man and wife.  Perhaps then it is because of these short-comings in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
naturalness.  As I shall explain below,  Socrates’ admission in book ten that decent men will not be able to 
refrain from mourning for lost loved ones as opposed to his suggestion in book three that they would be 
unable to tolerate such mourning and would even laugh at it also implies the impossibility of communism 
(603e7-9, 388a1-2,d2-3).   
21
 See Ludwig (2007, 214-215).  
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law that Socrates, after attaining Glaucon’s agreement that merely mouthing the names of 
kinship would be ridiculous, concludes by saying that when anyone is doing well or 
badly all will “utter together” (sumphonesousin) the “saying” (rhema) that they are 
themselves doing well or badly, and does not say that all will feel the same way (463e3-
5). 
 Socrates therefore appears to be aware of both the unnaturalness of his proposed 
communism and the fact that the communism proposed would do more to weaken the 
attachments of each of the guardians to some others than it would to attach each of them 
to all the others. If we turn now, finally, to the details of the communism as Socrates 
describes them, it will appear that this weakening of the guardians’ erotic attachments to 
their spouses and their attachments to the most common product of eros, their children, is 
in fact Socrates’ primary purpose.  Since Socrates claims to outline the communism for 
the sake of his eugenics program, it could seem that this is his aim (459c-e), but Socrates 
does not even mention the eugenics program in his defense of communism’s goodness.  
And the discussion of the nuptial number at the beginning of book eight then confirms 
that Socrates does not take the eugenics program seriously.22   
 Socrates begins his description of communism after first obtaining Glaucon’s 
agreement that humans, like the lower animals, should be bred from only the best who 
are also in their prime (459a-b).  Given the needs of breeding, Socrates then notes that 
(unlike those breeding lower animals), the rulers will require elaborate deceptions to 
facilitate the breeding (459c8-d2).  Socrates then describes the city’s communism, and he 
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divides his discussion in two parts: the lies concerning breeding the best with the best 
(459d7-460d8), and the laws concerning breeding only those in their prime (460d8-
461e6).23 Socrates suggests the reason for this division when he asserts that the breeding 
of the best with the best must be kept secret to avoid factions (459e1-3), whereas the 
official ages in which reproduction is permitted are not kept secret (461a3-5).  It makes 
sense that the older could more easily accept their inferiority for reproductive purposes 
both because age is less deniable and more obviously inevitable than is badness, and 
because the old are compensated with freedom to have intercourse with whomever they 
wish, other than their ancestors and progeny (461b9-c3).   
 If the avoidance of all faction is the true purpose of the deceptions in the first part 
of the discussion, Socrates’ proposals seem questionable.  For, immediately after 
proposing the use of “subtle lots” to conceal the preference for the best in breeding and 
thereby permit the others to blame chance for their loss (460a8-9), Socrates proposes 
giving more frequent intercourse with women, along with other prizes, to the most 
excellent guardians (460b1-5).  By rewarding excellence with sex, it seems that Socrates 
will manifestly create distinctions among the guardians from which factions may arise, 
yet he refers to these rewards as a “pretext” (prophaseos) for producing the most children 
from these men.  The lots may serve to hide from the lesser men that sex is reserved 
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 Socrates indicates this division by beginning the first part of his discussion by referring only to breeding 
the best with the best (not mentioning those in their prime) and by marking its end with “let us go through 
the next point” (to ephexes dielthomen), after which he turns to the discussion of breeding ages (459d7-9, 
460d8).  It could seem that Socrates digresses from this outline by discussing the guardians’ child care 
center within the first part (460b7-d5), which specifies more details of the child-rearing than are required 
by Socrates’ introduction to this section, where he only refers to rearing the children of the best and not 
those of the worst (459d9-10), but he introduces both the beginning of the discussion of the child-care 
center and that part of the discussion following the discussion of rearing some children and not others by 
connecting them to the preceding with the expression “oukoun kai” (460b7, c8).  I will indicate the 
relevance of the child-rearing discussion to the first part of the discussion as a whole below.      
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primarily for the best, but the rewards utterly fail in this.  They serve as a pretext only for 
the eugenics program, hiding from all that the best are rewarded because only they are to 
be the fathers.  Socrates apparently hopes that the bitterness that may arise amongst those 
who are rewarded less often will be meliorated by their belief that those receiving the 
rewards did in fact merit them and that merit must be rewarded.  This implies, however, 
that the importance of rewarding merit is clearer to the guardians than the importance of 
the eugenics program, thus casting doubt on the strength of the arguments by which 
Socrates so easily persuaded Glaucon of the need for it (cf. 459b10-c1).  If, then, the 
eugenics program is not of such obvious value, we are compelled to look for other 
reasons for Socrates’ elaborate deceptions.  
 Those who never or rarely have sex will know that far fewer of the children are 
their own, so Socrates’ “pretext” does little to prevent less affection for the young on the 
part of slighted men or to meliorate any strong desire on their part to have children; it 
seems rather to serve to obscure the strong connection between the excellent and their 
young.  The excellent will not know that they are granted sex in order to produce more 
children and thus they will be less inclined to see the children as the offspring of their 
own particular virtue; furthermore, presuming the guardians discover that some of the 
children are not kept alive (460c3-5), those who are rewarded more frequently for 
excellence will not be able to deduce that their children are likely to be the survivors.  
That this detachment of parents from children is, in fact, Socrates’ primary concern in 
this section is then further indicated by his abrupt change of topic.  For, after his mention 
of using rewards as a pretext, he turns to the manner in which children will be separated 
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from parents, and raised apart from them, or, if they come from bad stock or are 
otherwise deformed, presumably killed (460b7-c5).  The parents, as mentioned, will not 
be notified of their child’s fate.  Socrates’ adds that while mothers will be used for milk, 
“every contrivance” will be used to prevent mothers from recognizing their children, and 
Socrates even notes that the mothers will be prevented from the prolonged nurturing of 
any child (460c8-d5).  It does not seem to be faction in general which Socrates tries to 
avoid in this section but rather particularly close relationships forming between parents 
and children.  
 Socrates’ attempt to sever the bond between parent and child is accompanied by 
an attempt to prevent excessive attachment between man and wife, and this becomes 
especially clear in the second part of Socrates’ description of communism.  By regulating 
coupling according to the city’s demands, Socrates assures that love affairs cannot be 
arranged in simple accordance with erotic inclinations nor prolonged by erotic desires, 
and Socrates draws attention to this in the second part of his discussion which is 
apparently dedicated to describing the limitation of reproduction to those in their prime 
(460d9-10).  Such a discussion could have been quite brief; Socrates could simply forbid 
reproduction or intercourse for those outside their prime.  Instead, Socrates makes several 
additions to the argument.  First, after describing the prohibition of “engaging in 
reproduction” (genneseon hapsetai) for those outside their prime (461a3-b2), Socrates 
adds that the same law prohibits men and women of “begetting age” (gennonton) from 
“intercourse” (haptetai) without the city’s sanction (461b4-7).  This addition is out of 
place in the discussion of the limitation of reproduction to those in their prime, for these 
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men and women are within their prime.  Furthermore, Socrates seems to make the law 
stricter for those in their prime; he particularly forbade reproduction (genneseon 
hapsetai) for those outside their prime, but he will not allow that those in their prime 
“haptetai”, which could mean as much as have sex and as little as touch.  If one thinks 
Socrates is using “reproduction” and “intercourse” synonymously, one need only look to 
the next passage, where Socrates allows those over “the begetting age” (ten helikian tou 
gennan) “to have intercourse” (suggignesthai) with whomever they wish, besides their 
ancestors and progeny (461b9-c4), although he had said and will repeat that they may not 
reproduce (461a3-b2, 461c4-7).  As Socrates’ warning to those past their prime confirms 
(461c4-7), the members of this class may still be capable of reproduction, and therefore 
the sexual freedom Socrates permits those past their prime cannot be explained as a 
consequence of his demand that children only be born of parents in their prime. Thus 
Socrates goes out of his way to indicate the restraints the city places on erotic desire, in 
particular by reminding us of the restraints on those in their prime and by making these 
the broadest. 
 The permission Socrates gives for voluntary intercourse to those who have passed 
their prime, which apparently violates the city’s repressive stance towards eros, perhaps 
most proves it, when we note that it is not also granted to those below their prime.  This 
permission is not granted merely because those past their prime are no longer capable of 
reproduction, for Socrates says they must be warned to avoid conception, and, if this 
fails, to abort, or failing this, to expose the child (461c4-7).  Since such means are 
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available to prevent reproduction,24 if Socrates’ purpose here is truly to limit childbirths 
to those in their prime, why does he not grant the same permission to those below their 
prime?  It seems that Socrates has something else in mind to which he calls attention by 
adding this permission for the old and not the young.  If we then recall Cephalus’ or 
Sophocles’ earlier suggestion that the old are relieved of sexual desires (329c5-7), 
Socrates’ permission here is intelligible if his purpose is in fact only to prevent the 
formation of erotic attachments among the guardians, for such attachments, lacking 
strong sexual motives, would be weak and rare among the old.25  Socrates’ unnecessary 
mention of the limits placed on those in their prime is then of a piece with the permission 
he grants to the old and not the young in calling to our attention his desire to free the 
guardian class from erotic attachments.   
 The two parts of Socrates’ description of communism thus serve to confirm that 
its likely effect, the weakening the guardians’ attachments to their children and spouses, 
is in fact Socrates’ primary purpose in proposing it, rather than providing perfect unity 
within the city or illustrating the monstrousness of such unity.  Then, again, we must ask, 
why is Socrates so intent on limiting eros within the guardian class?  I suggested at the 
outset that Socrates’ ultimate purpose is to indicate what would be necessary for the rule 
of philosopher kings, and one may perhaps suspect something of this by glancing at the 
beginning of Socrates’ description of the philosopher kings.  For there he claims that 
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 See also Laws 740d. 
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 Compare also Socrates’ later suggestions that all great labors belong to the young and that older men 
would be unlikely to share in the madness that may afflict youths when they first get a taste of dialectical 
refutations (536d3; 539c5-6, cf. 561a8-b1) with Socrates’ depiction of eros as madness in both the Republic 
and Phaedrus (573a-c, cf. 403a10, Phdr. 245b5ff.), and with the arduous toils eros demands of the lover in 
the Phaedrus and Symposium (Phdr. 252e5ff., Symp. 208c6-d2).    
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lovers love all members of the class of which they are lovers (474d-475c), and he thereby 
characterizes philosophy by an eros analogous to that which would be required of the 
guardians, who are not permitted to love some but not others.26  Yet this analogy, 
suggestive as it may be, is beset by troubles, not only because Socrates contradicts this 
description of eros elsewhere (cf. 475a9-b2 with 496b4-5), but also because almost none 
of the guardians could become philosophers, and it is unclear why making the guardians’ 
love similar to that of philosophers helps them fulfill their role in the city (cf. 495b2).  
  It would seem that before we can understand the role communism plays in 
facilitating philosophic rule, we must first understand more clearly the manner in which 
the guardians are to be ruled, and for this purpose we must look back to the earlier 
description of the guardians’ life and education in books two through four.  Of course, a 
study of these books is confronted by immense interpretive challenges, not least of which 
is discerning the details relevant to this study.  Socrates, however, has perhaps given a 
suggestion as to where to begin, for he added to his discussion of communism’s goodness 
the claim that communism accords with the entire regime and thus with that regime’s 
education of the guardian class (461e6-7, 464c5ff.).  But when Socrates defended this 
accordance, he indicated only communism’s accordance with the prior abolition of 
material possessions, and he only argued that both help promote the city’s unity (464b-d).  
Yet unity is not the true aim of the communism, and, as we noted at the outset, unity 
conflicts with the self-sufficiency and independence to which the guardians were to be 
educated (cf. 387d11-e1).  Having seen, however, that Socrates’ communism fails to 
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produce unity and in fact is designed to further detach the guardians from one another, a 
possible accord with the earlier education appears precisely where it had seemed to be in 
conflict.  For both the communism and the teaching of self-sufficiency would make the 
guardians more independent individuals.  It thus seems that we must turn to this earlier 
stage of the guardians’ education to see if we can better clarify Socrates’ purpose.  
 
 
Self-Sufficiency and the Music Education 
 
 Socrates’ suggestion that the guardians should be as self-sufficient and therefore 
as little in need of others as possible occurs early in his description of the guardians’ 
music education (387d11-e1), and, at the conclusion of this description, Socrates suggests 
that the purpose of the music education is to facilitate among the guardians a love (eros) 
of the noble or beautiful (kalon), which seems to include the endorsement of erotic affairs 
between the guardians (402d-403c).  The suggestion that the education to self-sufficiency 
accords with the communism’s attack on eros is thus confronted by the difficulty that the 
self-sufficiency itself seems to prepare or facilitate the proper eros.  We must therefore 
investigate Socrates’ description of such eros.   
 In the first place, it seems plausible that Socrates’ description of the music 
education and its purpose undergoes some modification over the course of the discussion, 
and that therefore its concluding endorsement of eros for the beautiful does not 
adequately explain every element of the discussion.  Such modification in the education’s 
purpose is itself intelligible, in particular, in light of Socrates’ indication that the 
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education must prepare two separate classes with two separate tasks.  That is, the 
education is primarily for the guardian class as a whole, who, as Socrates’ indicates, must 
be educated to be completely honest, but the rulers must also be educated, and rulers, of 
course, must lie (389b-c, cf. 382c7-10, 414b7ff.).  The rulers are to be philosophers, and 
some indication that Socrates’ permission of erotic affairs is offered more for the sake of 
the education of the philosophic rulers than for the guardians in general is suggested by 
Socrates’ indication that musicality is the crucial characteristic of those suited to such  
affairs (402d8-9), and his subsequent indication of the close connection between music 
and the proper cultivation of the philosophic nature or part of the soul, which he makes 
immediately prior to raising the question of who among the guardians will rule (410e1, 
411c4-5, e4-7, 412a4ff.).27   
 Secondly, we must note that the love affairs Socrates permits are quite limited; 
sustained voluntary relations with a single beloved are permitted, but they are to be no 
more erotic, at least in deed, than a father’s relationship with his son (403b4-6).  In 
contrast with the moderate and relatively chaste affairs endorsed by Socrates for non-
philosophers in the Phaedrus, Socrates here explicitly denies that any madness may be 
involved in the guardians’ erotic affairs (403a10, cf. Phdr. 256b7-d6 ).  Moreover, if one 
notes that Socrates limits himself to requiring only that one must not be reputed (doxei) to 
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 Consider also Socrates’ remark immediately prior to his discussion of these affairs, in which he seems to 
suggest that “those whom we say it is necessary for us to educate to be guardians” must be able to know the 
forms of each virtue (402c1-6); that is, Socrates singles out the group of concern to him here as those who 
may attain a knowledge of virtue which would seem to surpass what could be expected of all but the rulers.  
Bolotin makes a similar suggestion regarding Socrates’ reference to love affairs (1995), which he 
apparently supports by noting the general change in what the musical education is to depict, for it moves 
from the imitation of the gods’ and heroes’ speeches to only the good character of soul (90-91; cf. 401a5-b3 
with 398a8-b4).     
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go further with a beloved than a father with a son (403b7-c1), one must also note that the 
leniency apparently permitted to what escapes notice is mitigated not only by the 
subsequent removal of privacy from the guardians (416d2ff.), but also, within the 
education itself, by the demand for complete honesty of the guardians to the rulers and by 
Socrates’ censorship of such poetry as depicts Zeus’ secluded affairs with Hera (389b-c, 
390b5-c6).  Indeed, much of the education, more or less explicitly, seems to oppose the 
development of attachments among the guardians: Socrates’ tacit replacement of the 
desire to support one’s fellows in battle with obedience to rulers as a motivation for 
battlefield discipline (cf. 389e8-9 with Iliad 3.8 and 4.431); his censorship of Homeric 
depictions of sex among the gods (390b6-c7); his condemnation of Achilles’ “illiberal” 
and arrogant actions on behalf of Patroclus (390e-391c); and his prohibition of imitations 
of men in the grips of  “loves” (eroton), which Socrates treats as a misfortune like 
sickness or drunkenness (396d1-3), all seem to oppose the guardians’ forming 
attachments to one another.  Finally, one may wonder if censoring the musical modes 
appropriate to wailing, drunkenness, and symposia does not also weaken eros (398d-e).  
It thus seems that Socrates here rewards the guardians, and perhaps also somewhat 
placates his interlocutors, with erotic affairs for the noble, which the education as a 
whole, to say nothing of the subsequent communism, does not support.  
 What remains and appears then to be the central concern of Socrates’ conclusion 
to the music education is not the love affairs between beautiful guardians, but the nobility 
of the guardians, which Socrates suggests follows from the noble disposition produced by 
the musical education, and which renders the guardians lovable to musical men (402d1-4, 
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cf. 400d11-e3).  The noble disposition is to be formed from the guardians’ education in 
the virtues, especially courage and moderation (402c2-4, d1-4, 399c1-4, 399e8-11).  
Therefore, Socrates’ endorsement of such self-sufficiency as would render the guardians 
least in need of one another is made in the course of his educational proposals to cultivate 
the guardians’ devotion to virtue.  Thus, it seems, Socrates here opposes eros in the name 
of virtue.  In fact, Socrates’ endorsement of this self-sufficiency occurs immediately after 
his discussion of courage and shortly before his discussion of moderation, but it is most 
explicitly linked to his prohibition of mourning among the guardians (387d-388d).  This 
link between self-sufficiency and not mourning for lost loved ones further suggests the 
opposition between self-sufficiency and eros, but it is less clear why Socrates’ opposition 
to mourning belongs to the guardians’ education towards virtue, for, however much 
courage and moderation may seem to be virtues worth cultivating for their own sake, it is, 
no doubt, much less obvious why mourning must be so harshly prohibited.  It is therefore 
to this prohibition that we must now turn. 
 
Mourning 
 
 Socrates gives two reasons for his prohibition of mourning in book three.  The 
first, which follows from his prior treatment of courage, is that a decent (epieikas) man 
will not believe death is anything terrible for the decent, and consequently he will not 
believe his companion suffered something terrible (387d1-6).  The second reason, which 
is the primary object of our attention in this section, is that the decent man will be most 
self-sufficient and thus least in need of another (387d11-e1).  This second reason seems 
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to be required, because, even granting the adequacy of the first, according to which the 
dead suffer nothing terrible, the living still lose their companions and may otherwise feel 
this as a loss to themselves.  Socrates then characterizes the loss which the decent will 
least feel saying, “it is least terrible for him [the decent man] to be deprived of a son or 
brother, or money, or another thing of this sort” (387e3-4; my italics).  Perhaps 
anticipating the effects of his subsequent discussion of communism or perhaps avoiding 
mention of the losses most unlikely to be accepted by his interlocutors, Socrates does not 
mention the loss of a lover or friend, but his subsequent censorship of Achilles’ grief for 
Patroclus suffices to indicate that friends or lovers are also not to be mourned (388a7-b4).  
We see then that Socrates places the loss of loved ones in the same class as he places the 
loss of money, which seems to be the class of possessions, and we may thereby begin to 
glimpse something of the opposition Socrates sees between mourning and virtue.  It is, at 
the least, not shocking to require that virtue elevate one above concern with private 
possessions (cf. 547b2-7).  
 Socrates’ prohibition of mourning among the guardians requires the censorship of 
all examples of mourning by good men (387e9-388a1), and he continues his explanation 
of this prohibition by arguing that if the guardians hear depictions of such mourning they 
will not consider it unworthy (anaxion) of themselves (388d2-7, 388a1-3).  Considering 
this suggestion along with Socrates’ prior claim that the decent would be least in need of 
those things for which people mourn, we conclude that the guardians should consider 
mourning to be unworthy of themselves because the losses for which people mourn are 
losses of things which are themselves unworthy of the guardians.  This conclusion is 
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further supported in book ten, when Socrates re-raises the topic of mourning in the midst 
of his second treatment of poetry.  There, Socrates suggests that law, which commands 
men to live virtuously (cf. 590e1-2 in context), gives among its reasons for opposing 
mourning that nothing “among the human things is worthy of great seriousness” (604b11-
c1).  Harsh as it may seem, the greatest devotion to virtue or the strictest adherence to law 
apparently requires that one regard all other possessions or attachments as insignificant in 
comparison with the dignity of virtue or law.  Mourning encourages us to take our human 
attachments too seriously.  Socrates admits in book ten that a decent man will lament his 
significant losses (603e7-9), and this lament will betray his belief in the importance of 
what is lost, thereby indicating his belief that lawfulness or virtue is not an unqualifiedly 
sufficient good.  Lawfulness in this most strict sense demands that one regard obedience 
to the law as worthy of any sacrifice consistent with the law,28 and, by mourning, the 
decent man strengthens the conflict in his soul regarding this demand. 
 While Socrates does confirm in book ten the existence of an opposition between 
virtue and mourning, he does so while exposing a troubling difficulty with the education 
of the guardians, for he admits here that rigorous obedience to the prohibition against 
mourning will be impossible (603e7-9).  This admission was foreshadowed by his earlier 
suggestion that the guardians would find mourning an irresistible temptation if they were 
permitted to believe a good man ever mourned (388d2-7), for this suggestion in turn 
implied that the reasons given by Socrates for the ease with which the decent will accept 
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acutely aware when he confronts the death of another (cf. 606a6-b8, where Socrates argues that pitying 
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their losses—that death is nothing terrible and that they are self-sufficient (377d1-e1)—
were untrue.  Socrates’ admission that the decent will mourn indicates either that these 
beliefs are simply unacceptable, or, at least, that they are unacceptable for the 
guardians.29  Regarding the non-terribleness of death, belief in which is to support 
courage (386a-b), Socrates makes clear in book four that there is reason to have some 
question.  He does this by explicitly limiting the virtue of the guardians to “political” 
courage which is based on “lawful opinion” (doxas nomimou) as opposed to courage 
simply (429c1-2, 7-8, 430a1-3, 442c1-3, cf. 430c3-5).30 Socrates subsequently discusses 
courage in an individual as following from the obedience of the spirited part of the soul to 
the wise (sophoi), calculating part of the soul, which has knowledge (epistemen) 
(441d12-442c8), and it thus becomes clear that he is not educating the guardians towards 
true virtue.31  That the guardians are not being educated towards true virtue in turn puts in 
question their self-sufficiency, for that sufficiency was to be based on the sufficiency of 
their virtue, but this virtue is not genuine. 
 Even if Socrates’ education cannot instill true virtue in the guardian class, one 
may still suppose that Socrates recommends inculcating an approximation of this virtue 
in the guardians for the sake of making them relatively more virtuous in the service of 
their city and its laws.  This suggestion is, however, also beset by difficulties.  In the first 
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 That Socrates in book ten implicitly repeats the claims that death is nothing terrible and that the decent 
should be self-sufficient by putting the claim that human things are unworthy of seriousness in the mouth of 
law only and not reason suggests that these claims are simply inadequate, even for the philosopher (cf. 
604a10-11 with 604b9ff.).  See also Socrates’ argument beginning at 583b and my interpretation of it 
below.    
30
 See Bolotin (1995, 87).   
31
 Cf. 518d9-e3 where Socrates disparages all virtues save that of prudence, which, in the context is the 
virtue necessary to philosophy (and not political life), along with Bruell’s explanation of this passage 
(1994, 271). 
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place, the guardians’ self-sufficiency implies their independence from one another and 
the belief in the unworthiness of human things, but the law’s command not to take human 
things seriously is contradicted by its usual concern with benefiting humans (604b11-
c1).32  And Socrates shows that this is the usual purpose of law before his discussion of 
mourning in book ten, in his discussion of Homer’s failure to take virtue seriously, where 
he faults Homer for failing to have been a good lawgiver and thereby benefiting human 
beings (599a6-b1, d2-e1). Thus, encouraging such inhuman self-sufficiency among the 
guardians would make them less useful servants of their fellows.   
Furthermore, in the course of explaining exactly how poetry harms the decent, 
Socrates makes an argument which indicates how poetry is useful to cities, precisely 
because of the mourning it evokes.  That is, Socrates indicates a sense in which such 
mourning as law and reason oppose is “reasonable” (eulogoi) (605e7-606a1, cf. 604a10-
b1, 605e4-6), arguing that there is a part of the soul which “by nature” (phusei) seeks 
lament and which may satisfy this desire without shame while watching tragedy, directly 
pitying others rather than oneself (606a3-5).33  Socrates emphasizes in this passage the 
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 See Bolotin (1995, 92). 
33
 While Socrates claims in this passage that the soul by nature desires this lament, and in this section of the 
argument he adopts the first person plural thus apparently including himself among the group seeking 
lament (605c10ff.), we cannot believe that Socrates is among this group.  Rather, he seems to take up 
Glaucon’s perspective here, so as to soften his criticism, and he points to the naturalness of such lament to 
indicate that it will  necessarily exist in men who are not thoroughly educated, which is to say, in all men 
except a few philosophers.  Saying such lament is natural thus means that it is a permanent obstacle of 
which the law must take account.  Socrates makes allowance for his exceptional character by saying 
immediately before apparently including himself in the group of lament-seekers that some very few men 
escape corruption by poetry (605c7-8), and noting in this discussion that it is lack of education which 
permits such lament (606a7-8), and concluding the discussion by noting again that some few may, by 
calculation, avoid the temptation of poetry (606b5-7).  See also Socrates’ comment at 595b6-7, at the 
beginning of book ten’s discussion of poetry, that those with knowledge have a remedy against corruption 
by poetry.  Finally, compare Socrates’ description of the faction within the mind of the man whose 
sufferings are depicted in tragic poetry (603c10-d7) with his description of the faction-free state of the 
philosopher’s mind (586e4-5).       
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way tragic poetry leads us to pity men whom we see mourning, which means, strictly 
speaking, pitying those who are violating the law, or men we would be ashamed to 
resemble (605e5), but he also further suggests we might otherwise be disgusted 
(bdeluttesthai) by these men (605e6).  This disgust may suggest that the men pitied are 
not merely mourning but also denouncing or denying the gods, as may happen in tragedy.  
Poetry thus softens its audience towards such law-breakers, but if such criminality is 
inescapable, it is safer for the law that one fee pity primarily for others rather than for 
oneself in the midst of one’s own outbursts, for in the latter case one then lets oneself of 
the hook for breaking the law.  It is true that Socrates concludes this passage by arguing 
that pitying others will necessarily carry over to oneself (606b5-9), but the law could 
maintain its prohibition of mourning for oneself in public, which it could never stop in 
private, while allowing the natural inclination to mourn a place to vent at tragedies.  
Furthermore, by Socrates’ own account earlier in the Republic, what is done to excess is 
likely to provoke a great change in the opposite direction (563e9-564a1).  His primary 
example in this context is the movement from excessive freedom in democracy to 
tyranny (563e6-9), but it is not difficult to imagine an analogous movement against 
excessively repressive laws to excessive freedom.  The law, by exceeding the capacity of 
the soul in its opposition to mourning would run the risk of a great rebellion.  Permitting 
tragic poetry and the mourning that accompanies it may therefore alleviate some of this 
risk.   Finally, suggesting that Socrates wishes subtly to propose such a use of tragic 
poetry in this passage allows us also to explain his referring here to the part of the soul 
which seeks lament as seeking “to lament sufficiently (hikanos) and to be satisfied 
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(apoplesthenai)” and his indication that this part of the soul is “fulfilled” (pimplamenon) 
by poetry (606a4-6), when he had earlier portrayed this part as “insatiable” (aplestos) 
(604d9): even if the soul’s desire for lament may not be fundamentally satisfied, as 
Socrates indicates again by pointing to the way the satisfaction offered by poetry 
strengthens the fundamental longing (606b5-8), poetry allows a temporary purging which 
may be the safest course for the community.   
 Because Socrates’ prohibition of mourning among the guardians and his 
censorship of mourning in poetry neither promotes true virtue nor seems to be especially 
useful to a city, we return again to the question of why Socrates makes this proposal.  In 
book ten, Socrates indicates that it is both law and reason which oppose mourning 
(604a10-11), and if the demands of law do not suffice to justify Socrates’ proposal, it is 
perhaps in reason’s opposition to mourning that we must seek an explanation.  The 
reasons Socrates gave for opposing mourning in book three have come to appear 
questionable, and it is therefore no surprise that Socrates’ intimations of mourning’s 
unreasonableness in book ten are of a different character.  In giving new reasons for his 
opposition to mourning, however, Socrates also indicates more precisely exactly what 
mourning he wishes to restrain.  Surely Socrates does not consider all suffering or 
awareness of one’s suffering unreasonable;34 rather, in book ten, Socrates indicates 
reason’s opposition to both the lamentations and recollections of suffering (604d8-10) of 
decent men (603e3), who are of such a sort as to try to resist mourning (604a1-5), trying 
to obey the commands of law but evidently unable to hear the voice of reason (604a10-
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 Socrates indicates that there will be no end to evils for men starting at 473c9-d6 (cf. Strauss 1964, 127), 
and it would be unreasonable for men not to feel badly in some way while suffering evils.  
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b1, b6ff.).  That is, Socrates indicates, in particular, an opposition between reason and the 
mourning of the decent, law-abiding men who are incapable of living according to 
reason.  We shall come to see why the law-abidingness of these men is linked to their 
unreasonable lamentations. 
 Of course it is such men as these who will primarily constitute the guardian class, 
for few can be philosophers and it is only philosophers who live in thorough accord with 
reason (491a9-b2, 495b2, 534b3-d1, 582d7-13).  Therefore, the guardians will be 
susceptible to precisely that mourning which Socrates indicates is unreasonable.  Yet 
there is an obvious oddity attending the suggestion that Socrates opposes the mourning of 
such men in the name of reason: namely, this class of men, precisely as Socrates presents 
them, cannot become truly reasonable.  Socrates may only hope then, through his 
proposed education and institutional reforms, to make these men more like reasonable 
men.  That is, false or unreasonable beliefs, as would be inculcated through the music 
education, and compulsory arrangements, such as book five’s sexual legislation, would 
be necessary to make the men of the guardian class act more like reasonable men.35  After 
some elaboration of the way in which the mourning of the decent opposes reason, we 
shall see more clearly why Socrates would propose such a modification in their behavior. 
 Socrates’ indication of the unreasonableness of mourning occurs within his 
attempt in book ten to distinguish precisely “that [part or aspect] of thought” (dianoias 
touto) which is affected by imitative poetry, as opposed to that affected by painting 
(603b9-c1).  Thus, despite Socrates’ suggestions that poetry affects only the lower part of 
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 Cf. Bolotin (1995, 87). 
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the soul (604d8, 605a2-3, a10-b1), we see that Socrates’ concern is with the thoughts, 
opinions, or beliefs with which poetry is associated.36  The unreasonableness of the 
decent man’s mourning will then consist in its reliance upon and strengthening of 
unreasonable opinions.  Such opinions, being unreasonable, will contradict either each 
other or, at least, the true opinions, and Socrates makes quite prominent in this discussion 
a description of at least one contradiction in the opinions of the mourners.  That is, 
Socrates focuses on the way these men, in part, hold to the lawful opinions and wish to 
obey the law while also resisting the lawful opinions (604a10ff.).  Socrates makes 
explicit, however, only the claims of the law, leaving obscure what opinions exactly 
oppose these, and therefore it is to an examination of the lawful opinions that we must 
turn. 
 As Socrates presents it, the law gives four reasons for opposing mourning.  First, 
the good and bad things in such situations as prompt mourning are unclear (604b10-11); 
this presumably means that an apparent loss, for which one mourns, may turn out not to 
be a loss.  Second, the law claims, taking a loss badly is unproductive (604b11-12).  
Third, as we have already discussed, the human things are unworthy of great seriousness 
(604b12-c1).  Fourth, being in pain impedes deliberation about what is best in one’s new 
situation, which is the most needed thing (604c1-d2).  The fourth reason is the only one 
which Socrates explains (604c5-d2), and it is this reason which Socrates indicates the 
best would be willing to follow (604d5-6).  Thus, the fourth claim Socrates attributes to 
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 Cf. 603a1-8 where Socrates claims that it is a part of the soul other than the calculating part which 
opposes measure, but even here he admits that this “part” still opines (doxazon), and thus belongs to the 
opining part of the soul.   
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law must accord with reason, but Socrates’ indication of the superiority of the fourth 
allows or suggests the inferiority of the law’s remaining claims.   
This inferiority is then confirmed, for the law’s claims, upon scrutiny, contradict 
one another.  Now Socrates’ second claim accords well enough with the fourth, which 
may be taken as an explanation of the second claim.  That is, taking a loss badly is 
unproductive, in particular, because the pain of taking a loss badly impedes deliberation.  
Alternatively, the advice given in the second claim, for the mourner just to move on, may 
be a second best, for those incapable of sound deliberation, so that they can now follow 
the counsel of others.  Regardless of how one interprets the second claim, Socrates’ 
emphasis on the superiority of the fourth claim sets apart, in particular, the first and third 
claims.37  These two claims seem to be united in taking a superhuman view of mourning, 
for the first, in its denial that what has been felt to be a loss is actually a loss holds out the 
hope for some mysterious, presumably divine, compensation, while the third disparages 
human concerns directly. 
 Yet the first and third claims, united as they may be in their superhuman 
perspective, also oppose one another.  For the first claim asserts the obscurity of the good 
in such affairs while the third (along with the second and the fourth, if, in a different way) 
makes a fundamental claim about the good (namely, that it is something superior to 
human things).  The first claim does not deny the importance of human losses, but rather 
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 Cf. Benardete (1989, 220-221). Benardete notes the way the first and third claims belong together as do 
the second and fourth, and he indicates something of the tension between these claims, but I disagree both 
with his interpretation of the exact meaning of the third claim in particular, and his subsequent discussion 
(as far as I can understand it) of the significance of these claims.  To state the disagreement briefly, it seems 
to me that Benardete does not give due weight to Socrates’ attribution of these claims (especially the first 
and third) to law and not to reason.    
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denies that what is felt to be a loss is in fact one.  But on what basis could the law deny 
that all apparent losses are losses in fact?  The law could make this claim if it allows that 
human losses may ultimately be redeemed.  Thus, the law-abiding man, by obeying the 
claims Socrates attributes to law, holds contradictory opinions about the good, and, in 
particular, regarding the importance or goodness of human things.  To make this more 
concrete, it seems that the law-abiding man holds both that his apparent loss (of 
something human) may be compensated by divine assistance and that he must be above 
concern with such losses, devoted only to the (superhuman) law or virtue. 
 Socrates indicates, in this way, the contradictory opinions the law-abiding man 
holds, insofar as he obeys the law, but we have yet to see why his mourning, in particular, 
adds to or exacerbates these contradictions, such that Socrates seeks its prohibition.  
Bearing in mind the unreasonable character of his law-abidingness, let us turn to 
Socrates’ description of the decent man’s suffering.   Socrates’ description occurs within 
his characterization of what poetry imitates, in which the characteristics he attributes to 
the man imitated by poetry turn out to be those of a decent man suffering a significant 
loss (603c-e).  Once again, Socrates draws attention to the confusion of this man, for 
poetry imitates men performing forced or voluntary actions (603c5), supposing 
themselves to have done well or badly in these deeds (603c5-6), feeling pain or pleasure 
in both the deeds and suppositions (603c6-7), and, “in all these things,” Socrates asserts, 
this man is full of contrary opinions (603c10-d9).  It is not difficult to see a 
characterization of tragedy in these terms: a man supposes he did well, voluntarily seizing 
a throne or taking a wife, and is pleased; but he discovers that due to ignorance his action 
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was involuntary, and, supposing he has done badly, having violated sacred laws, he feels 
pain.  Yet this presentation is still too simple, for Socrates indicates that the man is 
confused throughout his deeds and during their aftermath, and he portrays the soul of 
such a man as fundamentally confused such that he cannot come to a final clear 
assessment of what has happened (603d5-7).  In actions that primarily seem forced, this 
man will wonder if something still could not be done, just as when he chooses to act he 
will wonder if all his efforts might not be thwarted by fate.  It is no surprise then, that he 
cannot resolve the question of what he has done well nor that his pains and pleasures are 
mixed. 
 The decent man who has suffered a significant loss will be in such a state of 
confusion, and this means that he will still be wondering if the loss, which in Socrates’ 
view occurred by chance (603e3), was not deserved and whether perhaps something can 
still be done about it.  He will wonder if his actions were virtuous and his pain will be 
mixed with some pleasure.  This mixture of pleasure with the pain of the loss on the part 
of the grieving seems strange, for mourning seems to be an expression of pain, but 
Socrates indicates that there is a pleasure in mourning.  Mourning is not presented as an 
automatic response to pain, for Socrates indicates that a part of the soul desires this 
mourning (604d8-9), and this part, perhaps always aware of the possibility of such losses, 
even seeks lament when no loss has recently occurred (606a3-4).  This part of the soul is 
drawn to the pain, against the pull of obedience to the law, by “the experience itself” 
(auto to pathos) (604a10-b1), which it remembers and about which it complains (604d8-
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9).  Something in the painful loss attracts the decent man to recollect the pain of the loss, 
both to complain about it but also just to remember it. 
 What the decent man undergoes at such a loss is thus something complicated.  It 
is complex, in the first place, because the decent man is torn between lawful restraint of 
his lament and his desire to lament.  But the desire to lament is further complicated, 
because the lament is about the pain, but something in his awareness of the loss attracts 
the decent man to remembrance of the loss.  Socrates characterizes the part that is 
attracted to the loss as “irrational, idle, and a friend of cowardice” (604d9-10).  We are 
trying to grasp precisely what is meant by its “irrationality,” and we shall have to wait 
until we return to book three and its suggestion of the connection between the prohibition 
of mourning and courage to explain the cowardice, but Socrates’ assertion of the idleness 
of this part of the soul may seem especially perplexing, given the lamentations and 
reminiscences it tirelessly provokes (cf. 604d9).  Recalling, however, Socrates’ 
understanding of idleness from book five, where the idle were characterized by their 
thoughts or fantasies of seemingly good things without consideration of their possibility 
(cf. 458a-b with pg. 27 above), we perhaps receive a clue regarding the attraction the 
decent man feels for mourning. 
 That is, the attraction to lament is explicable in terms of a certain idleness of soul 
that resists considerations of what is possible.  The lamentations of the decent would 
seem to include expressions of outrage at the injustice of their losses (605d6), which 
feeling is likely given their doubts as to whether the losses were merited, and this outrage 
may be made more severe due to their not knowing whether mysterious divine forces 
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have not thwarted them, causing the losses.  Even apart from the hope that the expression 
of outrage may improve one’s situation, there would be a feeling of pleasure in its 
expression, for, in condemning the gods’ injustice, one would be elevating oneself above 
them; even in complaining about one’s own guilt, as may also happen when one does not 
know the limits of one’s responsibility, one would feel pleasure in elevating oneself 
above oneself.  Furthermore, despite their outrage, these men also still hope for divine 
assistance, as is shown by their (partial) belief in the claims of law, and this still lurking 
hope leaves them wondering if something still might not be done, perhaps when the gods 
hear their cries of indignation.  These men would be drawn simply to recollect and 
express their sufferings, for such reminiscence would bring with it, along with the 
awareness of what was lost, the thought of their own and their loved one’s hitherto 
unrewarded virtue and therefore the hope that they may still be rewarded.  Not despite, 
but rather because of one’s tears—and the admission of the severity of the loss which 
they imply—the decent would maintain a, perhaps hidden, belief that just gods will 
compensate their loss.38  Such hopes may then be characterized as idle, for they are not 
accompanied by an investigation of the possibility of their fulfillment, as Socrates 
indicates by suggesting the irremediable confusion of the decent in such situations. 
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 It may be helpful to remind the reader here of my evidence that such hopes and concern with virtue 
belong to the decent mourner.  The first claim of law and Socrates’ indication that these men cannot know 
what is necessary and thus involuntary show that these men believe and are concerned with the possibility 
of supernatural assistance, which implies gods of some form or other.  The third claim of the law and 
Socrates’ indication that these law-abiding men are concerned with assessing how well they have done 
show their concern for virtue.  The direct link between a concern for virtue and divine hopes is, I admit, 
nowhere made perfectly explicit (although see 605b7-c4, which I interpret below, and see above all 361b5-
d3 and the request of Glaucon and Adeimantus at the outset of book two more generally); by suggesting 
such a link, however, we can both indicate a connection between the otherwise divergent first and third 
claims of law, and we can also understand the attractiveness of mourning to the decent man as Socrates 
describes him.     
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 We cannot answer here why Socrates would have regarded such hopes as 
impossible (cf. 382e2-3), but he has given sufficient indication of why the decent are to 
be regarded as not having carried out an investigation of their possibility.  Socrates 
portrays the decent as hoping that the gods will take care of humans and thus believing 
that humans are worthy of such care, while also indicating that they believe humans 
unworthy of such concern.  Furthermore, the denial of the worthiness of human things is 
made in the name of law or virtue, but it would seem that humans are especially worthy 
of divine aid precisely because of their devotion to virtue over all other concerns.  The 
virtue of the decent, which supports their hope in the gods, is thus undermined by that 
very hope, as it betrays the incompleteness of their devotion to virtue. 
 The poets imitate the character of a man who engages in such mourning (604e2), 
and seeing this imitation “arouses” and “nourishes” the part of the soul which seeks 
mourning (605b2-3).  Poetry does this, as Socrates goes on to say, by leading one to 
mourn for others (605d3-4).  Thus the act of mourning itself also strengthens the 
mourning part of the soul.  The decent man’s mourning is therefore prohibited because of 
the contradictory opinions rooted in hopes for divine assistance to which mourning gives 
expression and thereby strengthens.  It is in this way that we can understand Socrates’ 
conclusion to his discussion of the part of thought associated with poetry (cf. 603b10-c1), 
for here, Socrates says that poetry produces, “a bad regime in the private soul of each, 
gratifying the unintelligent part of it, which doesn’t distinguish the more and the less, but 
believes the same things are then great and then small, and which makes phantom images 
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(eidola eidolopoiounti) very far removed from the truth” (605b6-c4).39  Mourning harms 
the decent by strengthening their soul’s inability to consistently maintain either the 
greatness or smallness of some things, which incapacity belongs to the same part of the 
soul that makes false images.  From our previous interpretation, it seems that Socrates 
here confirms the incapacity of the decent to be consistent regarding the worth of human 
things, and this incapacity is directly linked to their fabrication of false images of gods.   
 We must return to book three to confirm that this is an adequate interpretation of 
Socrates’ prohibition of mourning, but, before doing so, let us note one further aspect of 
mourning which Socrates calls to our attention in book ten, for this is of some relevance 
to the study of eros as a whole.  After finishing his discussion of the part of thought 
associated with poetry, Socrates turns to an explanation of how exactly poetry harms the 
decent men (605c6).  Here, Socrates indicates that pity is the basic means by which tragic 
poetry affects these men; what is considered good poetry inspires the decent to “suffer 
with” (sumpaschontes) and “pity” (eleein) its suffering heroes (605d4, 606b3).  But 
Socrates further notes that the decent praise not only the poet as a good poet for causing 
them to share the hero’s sufferings, for they also praise the suffering man himself, despite 
his making great laments, which they would be ashamed to utter in public (605d4-5, e4-6, 
606b3).   
 It is of course most striking that the decent men praise the lamenting hero despite 
the fact that they would feel ashamed to imitate him.  Socrates indicates nothing about the 
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 Here, I follow the better attested text rather than Burnet’s edition, reading eidolopoiounti instead of 
eidolopoiounta at 605c3.  This translation not only has the advantage of following the better supported text, 
but also, by attributing the image making to the part of the soul which is influenced by poetry rather than to 
the poetry itself, it brings out more clearly Socrates’ objection to poetry in this passage, as I hope to have 
shown: namely, that the men influenced by poetry or mourning are led to produce false images of the gods.    
58 
 
hero outside the fact that he is greatly lamenting, but his indication that the poets are 
praised precisely for their ability to induce a certain suffering suggests that the decent 
may find something in the suffering itself praiseworthy,40 and that they praise the hero 
precisely for his lament.  We have indicated why mourning may be partially enjoyable 
but we have not yet explained its praiseworthiness.  Perhaps there is something 
praiseworthy in the strength or degree of feeling expressed, but this degree of feeling 
seems to have been something with which all the decent, at least those Socrates discusses, 
were familiar (cf. 604a6-8, 606a3-5), and thus not something very worthy of distinction.  
On the other hand, the mourning Socrates discusses is primarily mourning over the loss 
of another person (cf. 603e3-4).  Indeed, in this context he identifies the mourning part of 
the soul (tou threnodous) with the pitying part (to eleinon) (cf.606a3-5, a8-b1 with b7-8), 
and this mourning therefore expresses, in addition to his own sense of loss,41 the decent 
man’s devotion to another.  Such devotion may be opposed by the law insofar as it is 
devotion to another person, rather than to the law, but the law itself demands such 
devotion to itself ultimately for the sake of benefiting other humans (cf. 599d4-5, e2).  It 
is therefore no surprise if the mourner, in displaying his suffering at the loss of another, 
seems to display something of the selflessness demanded by law and thereby seems 
virtuous or praiseworthy.   
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 Cf. 605e6, where the object of the praise to which Socrates there refers is not perfectly clear.  He 
indicates that we see a man whom we would be ashamed to resemble, but, instead of disgust, the sight 
produces joy and praise.  Thus, Socrates most likely indicates that the praise is of the otherwise shameful 
deeds of lament.  At 605d4-5, Socrates indicates that we praise the poets for making us suffer with their 
heroes; then at e6 he suggests the praise is of the suffering itself, and finally, at 606b3, Socrates indicates 
that the praise is of the suffering man.  It is not a stretch to say the praise is of the man for his suffering.     
41
 As Socrates makes clear, the pity is both for others and for oneself (606b5-8), but pity comes first to sight 
as a feeling for others (606b3).        
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 Socrates argues here that pitying others in their mourning will ultimately 
strengthen one’s own mourning (606b5-7), and, as noted above, he here calls the 
mourning part of the soul its pitying part (606b7-8), thereby suggesting that the mourning 
of the decent, if not identical to pity, includes pity.  This pity is not merely for others, for 
Socrates says this pity will not be easily held down in “his own (autou) sufferings 
(pathesi)” (606b8), and he therefore does not limit the pity to the sight of others’ 
sufferings nor even to the sight of the sufferings of those loved ones for whom one 
mourns.42  Thus, the decent man’s mourning includes self-pity, and this self-pity implies 
his looking on himself and his sufferings as a spectator.  In this case, the decent, 
observing their own concern for others, are likely also, perhaps secretly, to praise 
themselves as they praise the heroes for their own sufferings, and by so praising 
themselves they betray the belief that the mourning or the suffering it expresses is itself 
virtuous.  The mourning of the decent may be opposed to reason therefore not only by the 
irrational hopes and view of virtue that accompany it, but also because the act of 
mourning may itself be experienced as such an act of virtue as would entail, for the 
decent, such irrational hopes.  In this case, book five’s communism can be explained as 
an attempt to remove not only those attachments which most commonly provoke 
mourning, but also those erotic attachments which inspire such devotion to another as 
would make mourning over the loss of that other seem most virtuous.  I have argued that 
the law’s demand of selfless devotion seems to be fulfilled, if not in devotion to the law, 
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 The decent man is always seeking lament (604d9, 606a3-5), even when no loss has recently occurred, 
and thus he apparently also seeks to lament possible future losses, which would include that of his own life. 
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then in one’s devotion to another person, and that this devotion may consequently take on 
the semblance of virtue.    
 
 
The Prohibition of Mourning in Book Three and its Place in the Education of the 
Guardians 
 
  
Mourning thus seems to be a response to one’s awareness of a loss, but it is an 
incomplete awareness, for it is coupled with irrational beliefs and hopes that the loss can 
somehow be avoided or mitigated.  These beliefs, when made explicit, entail hope for 
divine assistance, and it is to weaken such irrational hopes as these that, I suggest, 
Socrates seeks to prohibit mourning among the guardians.  Returning now to book three, 
we shall see that this suggestion is supported by Socrates there.  In the first place, all 
those examples Socrates gives from the Iliad of the mourning whose imitation he wishes 
to eliminate, when they are read within their context in the Iliad, betray such an 
incomplete awareness or acceptance of the loss on the part of the mourner.   
 Socrates’ first example is of Achilles, tossing and turning, unable to sleep, then 
pacing along the beach, mourning the death of Patroclos (388a7-b1); Achilles seems to 
feel the need to do something, but is incapable of finding something to do.  In the context, 
Homer tells us that Achilles still longs for Patroclos, while remembering the great deeds 
they performed together (Iliad 24.6-8), and, immediately after the passage quoted by 
Socrates, Achilles returns to dragging Hektor’s corpse, trying to deface it (24.14-21).  
Achilles thereby confirms that he does not accept the finality of death, in the first place of 
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Hektor’s, but presumably also his own and that of Patroclos.43  Before his second 
quotation, Socrates also mentions the need to censor the depiction of Achilles covering 
his head with ash (388b1-2).  If we consult the context of this reference, we find Achilles 
again lamenting the death of Patroclos (18.20ff).  His goddess mother, Thetis, hears this 
lament (18.35), which results in her own lament (18.37) and ultimately in her procuring 
new armor for her son (18.136-137).  Thus, in this case, Achilles’ lament is followed by 
divine assistance.   
 Socrates’ second quotation is of Priam mourning the loss of Hektor (388b6-7).  In 
the Iliad, Priam is depicted at this point begging the Trojans to let him try to recover 
Hektor’s corpse (22.413ff); he then expresses the wish that Hektor might have died in his 
arms so that he and his wife might satisfy themselves in mourning for him (22.426-428).  
Priam presumably believes that he could thus satisfy himself for the same reason that he 
wishes to recover the corpse, namely, because he could then provide it a proper funeral.  
Priam’s wish therefore implies his belief that his loss of Hektor is not something simply 
beyond his power to remedy, at least partially.44 
 Socrates’ final three quotations are of gods in the Iliad who lament the loss of 
mortals dear to them.  The third of the five quotations is especially instructive.  Here 
(388c1), Thetis is depicted after having heard Achilles’ own lament, (the second example 
of Achilles mourning, as discussed above), and she now laments her son’s sufferings and 
early death (18.54ff).  Her cries attract the attention of many goddesses who come to her 
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 Cf. Apollo’s comment that Achilles accomplishes nothing by dragging the corpse, although Achilles does 
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 For the connection between funerals and hopes for divine assistance in the afterlife in Homer and 
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side (18.37), but she says explicitly, despite her son’s many sorrows, “I can do nothing to 
help him” (18.62).45  Thus Thetis does not seem to experience such an incomplete 
acceptance of her loss.  Yet, only a few pages later in the Iliad, Thetis repeats this same 
lament (cf. 18.56-62 with 18.437-443), again asserting her impotence, as she begs 
Hephaestus to make armor for Achilles.  That is, Thetis repeats the lament and expresses 
her own impotence precisely in order to move a god to help her and her son.  
Furthermore, her lament also invokes her merit to receive such a reward, indicating her 
virtue as a mother (18.54) and the sacrifices she has made in obedience to Zeus’ will 
(18.429-434).  Thus, Socrates’ central quotation points to a case of self-pity in which the 
one pitying herself hopes thereby to receive divine aid. 
 Socrates’ final two quotations are both of Zeus, in the first case lamenting the loss 
of Hektor, in the second, Sarpedon, and in both cases Zeus laments shortly before the 
respective hero’s death (388c4-d1).  In the Iliad, Zeus is in each case depicted 
considering whether he should rescue the beloved mortal (16.435-438, 22.174-175), and 
he is in both cases rebuked by a goddess to whom he then assents (16.458, 22.185).  The 
rebuke in both cases reminds Zeus that he is mourning the death of a mortal and asks 
whether he wishes to rescue, “one long since doomed by his destiny from ill-sounding 
death” (16.441-442, 22.179-180).  Zeus’s lament and the wish accompanying it is thus 
rejected by asserting the inescapability of death. 
 The mourning which Socrates wishes to prohibit among the guardians thus does 
seem to be bound to an incomplete acceptance of death and hopes for help from the gods.  
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Bearing this in mind, we may now better understand Socrates’ previous censorship in 
book three of the Homeric myths regarding the afterlife, and thereby better understand 
the place of Socrates’ prohibition of mourning in book three’s education of the guardians.  
Adeimantus suggests and Socrates accepts that the censorship of Homeric depictions of 
mourning is necessary if the previous censorship of Homeric depictions of Hades was 
necessary, and Socrates appears then to add that the consideration of the reason for 
censoring the laments will confirm the necessity of censoring the afterlife (387d3-4).  But 
Socrates claims to oppose Homer’s depictions of Hades because the terrors presented 
there would render courage impossible (386b4ff.), not because of the hopes for an 
afterlife which these depictions might encourage and which motivate his prohibition of 
mourning.  Yet an examination of the examples of what should be censored again shows 
that for the Homeric heroes the afterlife was not merely awaited with terror.  In his list of 
Homeric depictions worthy of censorship, Socrates’ central example shows most clearly 
that Hades was not merely terrifying, for it shows that it is at least possible for one to be 
intelligent in Hades (386d7, cf. 386d5);46 and, the contexts in the Odyssey of Socrates’ 
first and last quotations (386c5-7, 387a5-8), present Achilles, despite his complaints, as 
experiencing happiness in Hades (Odyssey 11.540, 24.36).  In the first case, the happiness 
is due to his hearing of the excellence of his son (Odyssey 11.522-523, 540), and in the 
second case, it is due to his noble and glorious death and funeral (24.36ff).  Furthermore, 
two of the quotes point to the desire of Patroclos’ ghost for a funeral which would allow 
him to gain admission to Hades (386d4-5, 387a2-3; Iliad 23.70-76).   
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 The depictions of Hades which Socrates opposes are therefore not so simply 
terrible as he alleges, and this in turn explains why, as Socrates subsequently notes, these 
stories do not merely make the Homeric heroes cower in fear of death but also make them 
“hotter” than is desired (287c4-5).  That is, the Homeric Hades may cause excessive 
anger and the daring deeds rooted in that anger through the hopes they support in the 
afterlife.47  Socrates’ censorship of these depictions then belongs together with his 
censorship of examples of mourning as both may seek to promote a sort of courage in 
which the guardians would face death with less reliance on irrational hopes. 
 If we turn now to the beginning of the education, that is, the theological teaching 
which Socrates asserts is of the greatest importance (377e6-7), we see that such courage 
as would limit the hopes of the guardians for divine assistance would be necessary for 
their thorough acceptance of Socrates’ teaching.  To indicate the most decisive points, the 
guardians are not to believe that the gods ever harm men, even the evil (380b2-4), nor 
that the gods are concerned with benefiting any humans except, perhaps, the wise (cf. 
382c8-10 with 382e2-4).  Socrates introduces this theology with the admission that false 
tales will be used in education (377a4-5), but, as we see in his argument for the theology, 
truth becomes the standard which determines what is fit to be said of the gods (379a7-
8).48  Why does Socrates propose such a standard?  It is clear from our whole discussion 
that the truth of this theology will be impossible for the guardians genuinely to accept and 
that this theology is in some tension with the ordinary foundation of virtuous behavior.  
Based as it is on truth, it would seem that this theology is made with an eye to the 
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demands of philosophy.  It is not, however, that Socrates wishes to make all the guardians 
philosophers, but rather, that Socrates needs to make the guardian class, which holds the 
military force of the community, safe for the city (cf. 375c1-4), which means, above all, 
that the guardians must accept philosophic rule.   
 
Part One Conclusion 
 
Socrates indicates that philosophic liberation from the city’s, any city’s, view of 
the lawful and virtuous and therefore also its view of the gods inspires murderous hatred 
(492d5-7, 517a5-6).  For philosophers to rule as philosophers, with their claim to 
authority lying only in their reason, the guardian class as a whole would have to accept 
such a theology as requires the prohibition of mourning and ultimately the destruction of 
the familial attachments which inspire mourning.  Socrates knows and shows that this 
philosophic rule is impossible.  He indicates the impossibility of philosophic rule most 
clearly by his suggestion at the end of book seven, that philosophic rule would require 
first purging the city of all those older than ten (540d-541b);49 but he indicates the 
deepest impediment to philosophic rule through his concession in book ten that men such 
as the guardians are to be will necessarily mourn (603e3-9), for, as we have discussed, 
this concession implies the impossibility of their holding to the city’s theology.  The 
answer to the question of why Socrates responds to Glaucon and Adeimantus’ demand 
for a defense of justice by showing at such length the requirements and the impossibility 
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of philosophic rule would take us quite far beyond our concern with eros,50 but for the 
purpose of this study of eros we must note the following.  The ultimate purpose of the 
communism of the family discussed in book five is not the unity or production of the best 
offspring that Socrates alleges in book five, but rather the destruction of the private 
family.  The destruction of the family is sought so as to prevent the guardians’ forming 
those attachments which lead to mourning.  Such mourning, as Socrates’ analysis of it in 
book ten shows and as the examples in book three from Homer which he wishes to censor 
confirm, would prevent the guardians’ adherence to the theological teaching of book two.  
Thus, the Republic presents ordinary erotic attachments as opposed to philosophy 
because of the irrational beliefs in the gods and the inability to accept mortality which 
inevitably accompanies these attachments among the decent.  Socrates’ apparent wish to 
rid the city of eros is thus an indication of the tendency towards irrational religious belief 
characteristic of ordinary eros.  To see why eros has this tendency, we shall have to wait 
for the treatments of eros in the Phaedrus and Symposium, just as we shall have to wait to 
see if there are other forms of eros more worthy of praise or if even this irrational form of 
eros deserves praise when viewed from a perspective other than that concerned with 
philosophic rule.                                        
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Part Two: Tyrannic Eros 
 
 Before turning to the Phaedrus and Symposium, let us first investigate the second 
part of Socrates’ harsh treatment of eros in the Republic, that of book nine, where he 
portrays eros as the key to the development of the tyrannic soul. By doing so, we provide 
some confirmation of the interpretation presented above of book five’s treatment of eros.  
Thus far, we have considered Socrates’ opposition to the eros of the decent law-abiding 
citizens as it is presented, above all, in his best city’s communism of the family.  Thus, 
we have considered the Republic’s most strikingly unerotic feature, yet this is not its most 
anti-erotic discussion, for Socrates reserves his harshest and most explicit criticism of 
eros for the discussion of tyranny in book nine.  There, Socrates portrays eros as the 
source of corruption in the most corrupt of souls, that of the tyrannic man (572e4-6, 
576b4-9, 587a13-b6).  To be sure, Socrates only suggests that eros has so corrupting an 
effect on the soul of a democratic son who is already tempted to rebel (573a2), yet 
Socrates hardly draws attention to this limitation to his blame of eros, and he does draw 
much attention to a link between eros and both madness (573a8-b1) and hostility to law 
(cf. 571b4-c4 with 574d5-e1), a link which we must understand in order to understand 
Socrates’ harshness towards eros. 
 In book nine, eros first appears as the key to corruption.  Since book eight, 
Socrates has been giving an account of the corruption of regimes and of individuals 
corresponding to those regimes.  It is an account of the descent from the best city and best 
individual to that of timocracy (547b-550c), oligarchy (550c-555a), democracy (555b-
562a), and then, finally tyranny (562aff.).  In each case, the origin of the corrupt regime 
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or individual is traced to the preceding kind of regime or individual, and therefore the 
tyrannic individual is described as descending from a democratic father.  Eros is the key 
to this descent.  That is, in Socrates’ description of the descent from a democratic to a 
tyrannic individual, it is by the arousal of eros that a youth raised in the democratic 
manner of his father is finally led to reject his upbringing (572d8-e6).  That democratic 
upbringing was characterized by nothing so much as easygoingness (cf. 561d5-7), as the 
democratic man acted on each desire as it occurred to him (561c6-7, 572d2).  Of course, 
such easygoingness requires the neglect of those desires that make the satiation of a great 
variety of desires impossible, and Socrates indicates something of this shortcoming in the 
democratic man’s attempt at equal treatment of desires by noting the democratic man’s 
repression in his waking life of those desires that are hostile to law, immediately prior to 
his discussion of the tyrant’s genesis (561c3-4, 572d2-3, cf. 571b4ff, 574d7-e2).  Yet, 
while eros is the source of the youth’s corruption which culminates in his embrace of 
such hostility to law as his father represses in himself (574e2-3), eros itself is not said to 
be so directly hostile to law; rather, eros leads other desires which themselves only 
eventually lead to such outright hostility to law (cf. 572e6-573a1 with the development 
from 573d7-575a4).   
 In fact, Socrates characterizes the youth’s eros as a “winged drone” (573a1-2).  In 
book eight, Socrates had characterized those who had squandered their wealth and 
become impoverished as drones (552c2-4), and Socrates then divided drones into two 
classes, those with stingers and those that are stingless; all the winged drones, he tells us, 
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are stingless (552c6-7). 51  Finally, Socrates indicated that only those drones with stingers 
are criminals, while the others were beggars (552c8-d1).  Thus, the youth’s rejection of 
the democratic man’s morality, led as it is by eros, is not first made for the sake of the 
criminality or hostility to law which his father represses.  In characterizing eros as a 
drone, Socrates likens it to an impoverished man who wishes to regain his wealth (552c2-
4),52 and this would seem to mean that despite or because of his father’s very 
permissiveness, the erotic youth feels some lack which requires the rejection of his 
father’s way of life.  Eros thus comes to sight as a source of discontent with a way of life 
that at least claims to allow contentment of all desires.   
 Eros leads the youth away from the ways of his father and, by so doing, places the 
youth in an environment where his eros itself is corrupted; eros is strengthened and given 
a stinger through its association with the pleasures of “incense, myrrh, crowns, wines” 
and the other pleasures of “such societies” (573a4-8).  The possession of a stinger, then, 
leads eros to take madness as its guard (573a8), and this madness, led by eros, purges the 
youth of shame and moderation (573b1-4), at which point the youth has become a 
tyrannic man (573b5).  Socrates explains this madness only by saying that the madman 
“attempts and hopes to be able to rule not only humans but also gods” (573c3-5).  By 
highlighting the impious or hubristic character of the tyrannic man’s madness, Socrates 
helps clarify the role of those pleasures which first gave eros a stinger and thus opened 
the door to madness, for the pleasures Socrates lists—incense, myrrh, crowns, and 
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wine—were all customary adornments of Greek religious ceremonies.53  Thus, Socrates 
portrays eros as being strengthened and given a stinger by desires and pleasures which 
surround it, overflowing with these religious adornments.  It seems that eros comes to be 
the leader of and guarded by a madness which hopes to rule the gods after first having 
itself been treated or worshiped as a god.  It is difficult to say in exactly what the worship 
of eros consists; it is implausible that the future tyrant would consciously assert that his 
eros is a god.  It seems, however, that Socrates suggests that the desires and pleasures 
which surround and adorn eros lead the future tyrant to regard his eros, at least tacitly, as 
something worthy of worship; he exalts his eros in the manner of a god, implying that its 
worth is equal to that of a god.    
 The suggestion that eros is corrupted by something like religious worship is 
further supported by Socrates’ description of the youth’s corrupters, for he calls them not 
only “tyrant makers” (turannopoioi) but also “wizards” (magoi) who therefore may 
aspire to supernatural creations (572e4-5).  And if we look to the final crime Socrates 
attributes to the tyrannic man before explaining the complete corruption of his soul by 
criminal opinions, which, as we shall see, play the same role as madness, we find the 
tyrannic man cleaning out (neokoresei) a temple: the tyrannic man takes what belongs to 
a temple for himself and is then thoroughly corrupted (574d1-8).  Socrates choice of a 
euphemism for the man’s robbery creates an ambiguity between the literal piety and the 
implied impiety of what he describes.  Eros, which as a drone must be impoverished, 
gives rise to madness, when worshipped as a god.  Such exaltation of eros may lead to the 
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youth’s forgetting the poverty or neediness implied by his eros, thus preparing the way 
for the mad hope to rule over gods, and such madness, in turn, makes a fitting guard for 
this tyrannic eros, preventing it from discovering its mistake.  Such a development seems 
plausible in the soul of a democratically raised youth, for such a youth would not have 
been taught to subordinate his strongest passions to the demands of the laws or gods.  
Nothing therefore prevents his complete exaltation of eros once it is aroused, and the 
striking difference between the feeling of erotic devotion and the easygoingness by which 
he is surrounded may make eros appear especially worthy of worship. 
 In his initial discussion of the tyrannic man’s eros, Socrates gives no indication of 
its erotic object or aim, but, to judge by his subsequent discussion of how such a man 
lives (573c11ff), Socrates means eros in the ordinary sense of love of another human 
being (574b12-c5).  Of course, Socrates’ subsequent discussion of actual tyrants (who 
rule cities) seems to suggest that tyrannic rule of the city is the ultimate aim (575d8-9), 
but in his discussion of actual tyrants, Socrates refrains from mentioning eros, referring to 
tyrannic rule as the end of the tyrant’s “desires”, and calling the actual tyrant the one with 
the greatest tyrant (not necessarily the tyrant eros) in his soul (575c8-d1, contrast 573d4, 
574e2, 575a1).  Thus Socrates must go to great lengths to assimilate the tyrant’s 
treatment of his fatherland and motherland to the model of the tyrannic individual’s 
treatment of his father and mother (cf. 574b12-c5 with 575d3-8).  Furthermore, the 
dissolute tyrannic individual, ruled by corrupt eros, hardly seems likely to make a 
successful tyrant, and in book eight Socrates already gave an account of the development 
of a political man into a tyrant which seems far more plausible, and which suggests that 
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tyrants must come from “a root of leadership” (565d1ff).  Finally, the individuals 
corresponding to each regime were not, in the other cases, members of the ruling class in 
those regimes.54  It thus seems plausible that Socrates grafts political tyranny onto his 
description of the tyrannic individual, so that his argument for the wretchedness of the 
most corrupt individuals will apply to the perpetrators of the greatest injustice (578b9ff).   
Thus we take the eros of the tyrannic individual to be love of another human 
being, but although this eros guides the tyrannic man, it is not his sole motivation, for 
eros unleashes and is accompanied by a variety of desires (572e6-573a1).  These desires 
seem to be for a variety of decadent pleasures—Socrates mentions “feasts, revels, parties, 
and courtesans” (573d2-3)—and these pleasures may further serve to create an 
environment conducive to the easy satisfaction of erotic desire (if on the basest level).  
Eros’ leadership of these desires presumably then consists in ordering them around and 
subordinating them to the attainment of the erotic object.  Feasts, revels, parties, and 
courtesans are enjoyed but also used to help enable erotic satisfaction. 
 In addition to guiding these desires, eros is also guarded by them (573e7).  In his 
description of the tyrannic man’s genesis, Socrates had assigned the role of bodyguard to 
madness (573a8), and in his concluding description of the tyrannic man’s corruption he 
assigns the role to opinions (574d7-8).55  Both madness and opinions seem to “guard” 
eros by directing the tyrannic man’s mind away from opposing beliefs (573b1-4, 574d5-
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7).56  It is therefore likely that the tyrannic man’s desires, noisy, painful, and expensive as 
they may be (573d10-574a1, 572e6-573a1), serve as a bodyguard for eros, not only by 
making erotic satisfaction easier, but also by diverting attention to their fulfillment and 
away from any concerns the tyrannic man may have about their or his goodness (cf. 
573e7-a1, 574a3-4).  Finally, Socrates calls these desires “idle” when he first mentions 
them, despite their great demands and activity (572e6), and, considering the impossible 
hopes entailed by the madness which also guards eros, it is likely that the idleness of 
these desires is to be interpreted as we have interpreted it elsewhere (see pages 27, 54-56 
above), as indicating the failure to consider what is possible.  That is, the desires 
associated with eros depend upon illusions about what is possible. 
 The tyrannic man’s eros needs a bodyguard, it therefore seems, because it is at 
risk of attack from moral and rational considerations.  Socrates’ alternative suggestions 
that madness, then desire, and then opinion serve as the bodyguard could suggest a 
development in the course of corruption: first, in a frenzy, one turns away from one’s 
upbringing; this permits the arousal and intensification of desires which further the 
corruption, culminating ultimately in the tyrannic man’s actually believing that his 
actions are good.  Yet, even if opinions only change at the conclusion of the corruption, 
Socrates does not indicate that the process can be simply completed, for he says the 
change of opinions occurs “throughout all these” [crimes], suggesting that the change is 
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constantly occurring.57  The moral opinions need to be continually mastered and 
remastered, and this in turn explains why the soul’s purgation of moral beliefs at its first 
corruption, in the course of which Socrates says any moral opinions are slain (573b1-3), 
needs to be repeated and also why a “bodyguard” for eros continues to be necessary.  The 
necessary incompleteness of the tyrannic man’s corruption may be readily explained if 
the corrupt opinions themselves depend upon or presume lawful beliefs, as madness, 
which like opinion serves as a bodyguard, must depend on some belief in the gods in 
order to hope to rule over them.   
 The corrupt opinions’ dependence on lawful ones is suggested by Socrates’ 
explanation of them.  The opinions which prevail in the tyrannic man are those formerly 
repressed except in dreams (574d8-e2), and these opinions must therefore be the 
accompaniment to the desires admitted in dreams, which Socrates discussed at the outset 
of book nine.  These desires constitute a class of the unnecessary desires which are 
hostile to law (paranomoi) (571b4-5).  These desires are repressed except in dreams, 
when the other parts of the soul rest, but these desires emerge especially when the beastly 
part of the soul has been strengthened by overfeeding, and thus they do not seem to be 
merely a response to excessive repression (571c3-7).  This wild part of the soul now 
“dares to do everything” (571c7-8) and “leaves out no folly or shamelessness” (571d3-4), 
and Socrates indicates no purpose or overall aim which would limit the acts dared.  
Socrates does, however, make some of the acts explicit: incest or intercourse with anyone 
else, including gods, any murder, and any food (571c9-d3).  The reference to food seems 
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impossible to understand as anything but a euphemism for cannibalism, and, in the 
context, the reference to murder seems to point to parricide.58  That is, Socrates specifies 
desires for acts which place one on an equal footing with the gods, an equal (incest) or 
superior (parricide) level to one’s parents, and which lower the rest of humanity beneath 
one to the status of food.  Such acts seem to be hostile to law not merely in the sense of 
violating some law but by attacking the very foundations of law.  Cannibalism would 
undermine the sense of equality with other men in light of which it makes sense to follow 
universally applicable laws.  Undermining the superior status of parents would remove 
the primary source of lawful rearing as indicated throughout book eight.  Finally, placing 
oneself on a level with the gods reverses the order of lawful behavior as Socrates presents 
it at the end of book nine (589c7-d2).  These acts do not seem to be desired merely for 
their own sake; rather, the desires seem to be precisely for acts which undermine the 
revered foundations of law.  The dreamer wishes to place himself, at least in his 
imagination, or “as he supposes” (571d1), above the law, but to desire this means to 
retain some sense of the law’s worthiness or high rank, for otherwise its transgression 
would not elevate. 
 A slight change Socrates makes in the conclusion to this opening discussion of 
dreams further supports the suggestion that the desires unleashed in dreams are dependent 
upon belief in the worthiness of law.  Whereas Socrates began his discussion of these 
desires by referring to them as both unnecessary and “hostile to law” (paranomoi) 
(571b4-5), he concludes saying only that some “lawless” (anomon) form of desires is in 
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everyone (572b4-5).  Now the unnecessary desires were said to admit of removal (571b6-
8), and this is a requirement for a desire to be classified as unnecessary (559a3), in which 
case Socrates cannot be sure that these hostile-to-law desires are in everyone.  If Socrates 
has in fact indicated in the intervening discussion that some lawless desires are in 
everyone, then it would seem that even with the removal of those desires which are 
hostile to law, lawless desires of another sort remain.  This, in turn, would be the case if 
the desires hostile to law were dependent upon law such that they present a constant 
temptation to all who have some belief in the law’s exalted status (which explains why 
they are so widespread), for, in this case, the removal of such hostility to law would entail 
freedom from the law.59  
 Returning to the tyrannic man and his eros, the opinions associated with the 
desires released in dreams take hold of his soul in waking life (574d5-e3).  Whereas 
Socrates had earlier suggested no purpose which would limit or qualify the desires of the 
dreamer, here Socrates says the tyrannic man will stop at nothing which nourishes or 
supports (threpsei) his eros, limiting the scope of criminality to the needs of eros.  The 
acts specifically attributed to dreamers however, would be of little use in terms of 
providing wealth for the tyrannic lover’s exploits, unlike his previous crimes (cf. 574a3-
d5).  This is perhaps the reason Socrates does not mention desire so much as opinion in 
this context, for, along with the opinion of the goodness of the acts desired, the tyrannic 
man would also have opinions about himself as the sort of man who could commit such 
acts, and it is perhaps these opinions, rather than the desire to commit such acts which 
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most serves as a bodyguard for eros.  Recalling that madness too had served as a 
bodyguard, we may suggest that it is the belief in one’s superiority to law which makes 
these opinions a good bodyguard.  Madness brought with it the hope to be able to rule 
over gods, and, if we follow Socrates’ corrected suggestion from the end of book nine, 
that noble lawful things cause obedience to the divine (589c7-d2), hostility to law then 
appears as a necessary manifestation of the attempt to convince oneself of one’s ability to 
rule over gods.  Of course such violations of the law, real or imagined, prepare one to rule 
gods only in one’s imagination, but by referring us to the opinions and desires satisfied in 
dreams, Socrates has indicated precisely the propensity to take satisfaction in merely 
imagined achievements.  We therefore need not believe that the tyrannic man consciously 
affirms, with a clear understanding of what he affirms, his ability to rule gods; rather, it 
seems that the tyrannic individual may live in something of a dreamlike state, the 
pleasure of which consists in his feeling as if he could rule gods, yet never making the 
hopes implied by this feeling entirely explicit to himself. 
 Socrates’ description of the tyrannic man’s corruption by eros thus concludes by 
pointing us towards his eros’ need for complete hostility to law as a bodyguard, a 
bodyguard which could protect eros by helping maintain the mad hope to be able to rule 
gods, which eros both unleashed and needs for protection.  Why should eros need such 
protection?  In our interpretation of book five’s sexual legislation, we saw that the eros of 
decent men comes with the more or less explicit hope for divine assistance.  That hope 
was linked to the decent men’s sense of the worthiness of the law or virtue (see pages 54-
56 above) and thus to the devotion to virtue on the part of the decent.  In a man raised by 
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a democratic father, such devotion to virtue must be extremely weak (for any fully 
conscious admission of it would entail awareness of its opposition to the democratic 
equality of desires).  When eros is aroused in such a man, his ability to support his eros 
with hopes for divine assistance based on devotion to virtue must be extremely 
attenuated.  While the notion of meriting the needed assistance through desert may seem 
incredible to one so removed from serious and consistent concern with virtue, he 
apparently retains deeply buried beliefs in virtue and gods,60 and the lover may thus be 
driven to seek the needed assistance by rule over the gods.  The Republic thus leads us to 
the link between divine hopes and eros in two kinds of lover: the decent man whose 
devotion to virtue permits him to hope for divine aid and the tyrannic man who madly 
seeks to take it.  An account of eros which further clarifies the way falling in love is 
intertwined with divine hopes may have to wait for the fuller treatments of the Phaedrus 
and Symposium, but we turn to these works bearing in mind the Republic’s suggestion. 
 
 
Chapter One Conclusion: Eros, Pleasure, and Painlessness 
 
 Some further confirmation of the connection between eros and religious hopes is 
provided by turning now to Socrates’ final argument against the unjust life in book nine, 
an argument which criticizes the lives of all non-philosophers alike (583b3-5, 584e7-9, 
586e4-587a1) and which Socrates says is most decisive (583b6-7).  Here, Socrates 
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 In this connection, see also 578a10-12 , where Socrates indicates that no one mourns more than the 
tyrannic man. 
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indicates a desire shared by all non-philosophers, law-abiding and tyrannic alike, which 
renders hope for divine assistance necessary, and he connects this desire to eros.  The 
basic contention of this argument is that the pleasures of the non-philosophers are false 
pleasures (583b3-6).  It is unclear to Glaucon (583b8), however, and probably also to us, 
what the application of falsity to pleasure might mean, and Socrates’ explanation is 
largely misleading.  Socrates alleges that what the non-philosophers believe to be 
pleasure is false in that it is not pleasure at all, but he points more subtly to false beliefs 
on which these pleasures depend. 
 Socrates responds to Glaucon’s question as to what it means for the non-
philosophers to have false pleasures by saying, “you answering and me seeking at the 
same time, I will find out” (583c1).  Socrates thus suggests that his interrogation of 
Glaucon itself shows the meaning of the falsity of the non-philosopher’s pleasures.  
Glaucon’s ready acceptance at the conclusion of the discussion of the claim that the 
superior pleasures are those connected with unchanging things (585b12-e5), and his 
willingness to disparage pleasures mixed with pains (586b7-8 with c6),  may thus provide 
a dramatic portrayal of a non-philosopher’s desires.  This possibility is confirmed by 
analysis of the argument. 
Socrates begins by attaining Glaucon’s agreement that pleasure (hedone) is the 
opposite of pain and that there is a state of repose between enjoyment (chairein) and pain, 
which is neither of the two (583c3-9).  Socrates does not here claim that repose, although 
not enjoyment, is not pleasant (hedone), and in his subsequent remarks he allows a 
difference between pleasure and enjoyment, at least in thought, by noting that those who 
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are suffering call repose from pain rather than enjoyment (chairein) most pleasant 
(hediston) (583d7-9).  Thus, Socrates’ conclusion that those who affirm the pleasantness 
of repose err (583e7-8, 584a4-10), a conclusion upon which his claim that the non-
philosophers’ pleasures are simply false would seem to depend, is invalid, as his 
alternation of hedone and chairein indicates.  Before drawing this unfounded conclusion, 
Socrates calls attention to the tendency of those suffering to claim that repose from pain 
is most pleasant (583c13-d11), and he further suggests that the repose from pleasure 
would be painful (583e1-2).  While Glaucon readily agrees to the former suggestion 
(583d2, 5, 10-11), he responds with doubt to the later (583e3), and Socrates seems to 
share this doubt as his failure to offer examples or claim that this would seem most 
painful suggests (contrast 583e1-2 with 583c13-d1, d3-4, 6-9).  It is then these indications 
of the great pleasure found in the relief from pain and the relative lack of pain in the 
cessation of pleasure, rather than his explicit conclusion, that seem to be Socrates’ serious 
point in this first argument. 
 Socrates then adds a second argument, saying that the pleasant and painful are 
both kinds of motion in the soul, but “what is neither painful nor pleasant” is repose, and 
therefore it is neither pleasant nor painful (583e9-584a6).  Socrates thus presents the 
argument in such a way as to prove nothing, for Socrates assumes what he needs to 
prove, beginning with a state that is neither painful nor pleasant, then classifying the state 
as repose, only to conclude that it is neither painful nor pleasant.  On the other hand, 
calling pleasure and pain movements in the soul seems to mean that both involve a 
change in one’s awareness, in which case the cessation of pain is just as much a change 
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as being in pain, as also the repeated recollection of a past state of pain by someone free 
of that pain would be.  Thus, while appearing to argue for the opposite conclusion, 
Socrates helps indicate precisely how what is a state of repose in one respect might 
include the pleasant awareness of change in another respect.  Furthermore, and perhaps 
most fundamentally, Socrates’ suggestion that pleasure is a “motion” puts in question his 
later suggestion that the truest pleasures are those connected with and in what never 
changes (585b12-e4, see especially c1-3).61 
 Socrates has therefore not shown that relief from pain is not a pleasure, and, while 
it is true that he goes on to affirm the existence of some pleasures which do not depend 
on previous pains, the only example he offers, and he indicates it is an exemplary case, is 
that of pleasant smells (584b5-6).  Such pleasures seem trivial when compared to relief 
from great pains, and Socrates notes this in the sequel, saying “yet the most and the 
greatest of the so-called pleasures stretching through the body to the soul are of this form: 
they are deliverances from pain” (584c4-7).  There is no suggestion that the cessation of 
pleasure is equally painful.  More importantly, Socrates has here characterized human life 
as one in which suffering must be sufficiently widespread and intense to make people 
seek relief as their primary pleasure.  Socrates then adds that the greatest anticipatory 
pleasures and pains are those of the expectation of the cessation of their opposite (584c9-
                                                          
61
 This suggestion is suspect for other reasons as well.  Socrates introduces here the idea of an immortal 
soul or mind with no prior preparation (585b12-c5), and with no explanation of how a mind, which because 
of its connection with what is always the same must itself be always the same (585c4-5), can change from a 
state of ignorance to knowledge.  Furthermore, Socrates’ argument includes the odd and apparently 
unnecessary claim that “the being of what is always the same” shares in “being no more than in 
knowledge” (585c7-8), which implies that if no such unchanging being is known, it does not exist.  
Regarding this last point, contrast Ferrari (2002); Ferrari, assuming that the “undisputed aim of the 
argument at 585b-e is to show that satisfaction of the soul is superior to bodily satisfaction,” finds himself 
forced to emend the text, because otherwise, on his reading, the sentence in question is “simply not 
relevant” (2002, 384).      
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11), and here Socrates has dropped the pretense of calling these “so-called” (legomenai) 
pleasures (contrast 584c5 with c10).  Pain so pervades our lives that what delights us 
most in anticipation is the thought of its relief.  Furthermore, among the anticipatory 
pains, the expectation of the cessation of pleasure is greatest, whereas the actual cessation 
is not so painful.  With this consideration it becomes clearer why relief from pain must be 
so widely sought, for, regardless of our circumstances, we all must anticipate one most 
complete and seemingly inescapable cessation of our pleasures in the anticipation of 
death.62  By Socrates’ account, awareness of our mortality must be a very great pain, and, 
for this reason, hopes which provide some relief from this pain will be very significant 
pleasures. 
 Socrates now offers an image for the mistake the non-philosophers make 
regarding what they consider pleasant, and his interpretation of the image helps confirm 
the above analysis.  Socrates compares the popular attitude towards pleasure to that of a 
man from the bottom of the world who is brought to the middle, which he mistakes, out 
of lack of experience, for the top (584d1-e5).  This image by itself suggests Socrates’ 
misleading claim that the non-philosophers mistake a repose from pain, which is between 
pleasure and pain, for the true pleasures, but in Socrates’ explanation of the image he 
makes some changes and offers a new image.  First, when a man is brought from pain to 
relief, Socrates says he supposes only that he is nearing fulfillment, not that he has 
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 If Socrates’ suggestion that the greatest anticipatory pains arise from the cessation of pleasure is not to be 
taken strictly, which his indication that the actual cessation of pleasure is not so painful may suggest, but 
rather as pointing to anticipation of the end of that on which all our pleasures depend, i.e., life, Socrates 
would also point to a desire for life apart from any consideration of its pleasantness.  Such a desire would in 
turn explain why death is not typically desired as a relief from what Socrates’ describes as a fundamentally 
painful condition.  
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achieved it (585a2-3).  The man does not simply mistake his relief for perfect bliss—no 
doubt in part because pains must still linger due to his doubts about the future—, rather 
he takes his relief to indicate the approach to bliss, which approach it would in fact be 
according to the first image.  Secondly, Socrates says such men, out of inexperience of 
pleasure, look from pain to the painless, as if out of inexperience of white they looked 
from gray to black (585a3-5).  Black is not an intermediate between grey and white, and 
thus the man is mistaken in his belief that in his repose he is nearing fulfillment because 
he is looking in the wrong direction.  When the non-philosophers look from their painful 
condition to a state of painlessness they are looking towards an extreme state, a state 
opposite to that sought by the philosophers, and one whose spurious attractiveness entails 
denial of the necessity that pleasures be accompanied by pains (not least the pain of 
anticipating death).  The pleasure of the non-philosophers thus differs from that of the 
philosophers in that the former find pleasure in the hope for relief from all pains, whereas 
the philosophers accept pain’s necessity.  In this case, the pleasures of the non-
philosophers could be said to be false in light of their dependence upon false hopes and 
beliefs. 
 Finally, Socrates connects these false pleasures to eros.  He portrays the life of the 
non-philosophers as a perpetual struggle, full of dissatisfaction (586b1-4), in which their 
pleasures, by contrast with pains, produce “raging loves (erotas) of themselves” (586c1-
3).  Socrates likens the objects of such love to phantoms of Helen, i.e., false images of 
beauty (586c4-5, cf. Phdr. 243a5-b1), and therefore the falsity of these pleasures seems 
to lie in particular in the loves they produce.  Socrates’ suggestion seems to be that man’s 
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painful situation leads him to imbue these pleasures with a false beauty, which, in 
accordance with the above interpretation, is false in the hope that accompanies it, a hope 
which requires the assistance of the gods.  
 
 Book nine’s contrast between the pleasures of the philosophers and everyone else, 
by suggesting that the non-philosophers seek a state free of pains and by connecting this 
wish to eros, confirms the suggestion we drew from our studies of the treatment of the 
eros of the decent in book five and that of the tyrannic individual in book ten that eros 
entails false religious beliefs, beliefs in gods who may provide one aid, not least in 
providing for one’s immortality.  The deepest aim of the communism of the family that 
Socrates proposes is not the unity of the city, as he alleges, but the destruction of the 
family.  The destruction of the family is then consistent with Socrates’ earlier 
endorsement of the guardians’ self-sufficiency, for this self-sufficiency implied their 
independence from one another.  But the guardians’ self-sufficiency, in turn, is not sought 
to promote their virtue, as Socrates suggests, but rather it is sought for the sake of 
destroying those attachments among the guardians that prevent their holding to the 
theology necessary for philosophic rule, i.e., the rule of reason.  Socrates’ treatment of 
the eros in the tyrannic individual, in a different way, points to the same basic connection 
between eros and irrational religious belief.  The tyrannic individual’s eros leads and is 
protected by a state of madness in which he hopes to rule over gods.  Now, while book 
nine’s indication of the relentless suffering caused by anticipation of death indicates 
something of the need for religious belief, it does not explain how such beliefs come to 
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be.  Furthermore, the most we have seen by way of explanation for the connection 
between eros and religious belief would seem to be the suggestion that the immense 
concern one feels for beloveds and children, the most common product of eros, is such as 
to provoke mourning in which religious hopes are felt.  But this is not to explain why 
there is necessarily such a connection between eros and religious belief, for while it may 
be clear that those with religious beliefs will be given occasion to resort to and thereby 
strengthen those beliefs in times of mourning for lost loved ones, it is not yet clear why 
all lovers have such beliefs.  That is, it is not yet clear why, as Socrates seems to think, 
the removal of eros and the family that goes with it would free the guardians from 
irrational religious belief.  For this would seem to suggest not only that eros strengthens 
irrational religious belief through mourning, but also that eros is an important source of 
such belief.  Our studies of the Phaedrus and Symposium below will go some way toward 
explaining how and why eros is so connected to such religious belief.                                   
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Ch2:  The Phaedrus’ Praise and Blame of Eros 
  
In the Phaedrus, Socrates makes two opposed speeches concerning eros.  The first 
speech suggests that a beloved should gratify a non-lover rather than a lover and the 
second suggests that a lover should be preferred (cf. 243e-244a).  Our primary task is to 
understand the teaching of each of these speeches about eros and to understand their 
relation to one another.  Here, our theme is finally love proper; we are treated to 
numerous depictions of the experience of falling in love and the hopes and fears, both 
noble and base, which attend this experience.  The eros depicted, despite being primarily 
pederastic eros, will remind us of romantic love as we see and feel it today.  Thus, the 
reflections of chapter one regarding the conditions necessary for philosophic rule and the 
perverse eros of the tyrannic individual are nowhere near the surface of the Phaedrus.  
Nevertheless, through understanding Socrates’ treatment of eros in this dialogue, we can 
begin to answer the questions raised at the conclusion of chapter one regarding the 
connection between eros and religious hopes. 
 
Part One: Lysias’ Speech 
 
While our study of the Phaedrus concerns Socrates’ praise and blame of eros, we 
must first turn to a speech which Phaedrus reads, Lysias’ speech, which precedes both of 
Socrates’ speeches.  That Lysias’ speech occurs in this dialogue, where the principle of 
logographic necessity, according to which there should be some necessity that the 
speeches on eros begin with that of Lysias, is most clearly articulated (264b3-c5), more 
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than suffices to justify beginning with Lysias, so as to ascertain the context in which 
Socrates presents his speeches.  That Socrates himself, in this dialogue, demands of the 
artful rhetorician that he tailor his speech to his listener’s soul (271d2-272a8); that 
Socrates’ speeches should therefore be tailored to Phaedrus’ soul; and that Phaedrus finds 
Lysias’ speech so appealing (227d6-228a4, 234c6-7, d3-4, 235b1-5), heightens the 
demand to begin with Lysias.  For only in this way can we discern that in Phaedrus’ soul 
which is so delighted by Lysias’ defense of a nonlover.  To understand the way Lysias 
can attract Phaedrus to a nonlover and render lovers unattractive is to understand 
something of what Phaedrus desires and fears with regard to love.  By understanding the 
persuasive power of Lysias’ speech, we thereby understand something of Phaedrus’ own 
view of eros, and it is by understanding this that we can assess how Socrates may have 
tailored his speeches to suit Phaedrus’ soul.     
Close scrutiny of Lysias’ speech could seem to be rendered unnecessary by 
Socrates’ denigrations of the speech: he suggests both the insufficiency of its content and 
its form (235a1-8, 262d8ff.).  Yet, strictly read, Socrates’ remarks actually motivate a 
closer study of Lysias’ speech, not only because Socrates explicitly recommends such an 
examination (264e5-6), but also because Socrates’ careful qualifications of his criticisms 
suggest the possibility that Lysias’ speech has an important hidden structure.  Socrates 
admits that Lysias’ speech has “many patterns” which one would benefit from 
examining, and thus he seems to contradict his earlier suggestion that the speech lacks 
order (264b3-4).  It is true that Socrates adds here that one would benefit by “not entirely 
undertaking to imitate” Lysias’ patterns, but this hardly constitutes a complete rejection 
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of Lysias’ rhetoric, and it may be readily explained by Socrates’ suggestion that not even 
Lysias himself should continue his way of life writing such speeches in condemnation of 
eros (257b1-6, cf. 278b7-d1).   
In Socrates’ later and more sustained criticism of the speech,1 he first appears to 
fault Lysias for failing to define eros at the beginning of his speech (263d7ff.), but then, 
by forcing Phaedrus to repeat the opening lines of Lysias’ speech while adding one 
further line (cf. 262e1-4 with 263e6-264a3), Socrates shows that Lysias did “compel us 
to assume Eros is some one of the beings which he wished” (263d8-e1),2 namely, the 
desire for another human being coupled with beneficence (cf. 264a2-3).3  The reason 
such a definition as accords with the common understanding of love is better left tacit 
becomes clear through reflection on Socrates’ second criticism of Lysias’ speech, that 
Lysias begins by discussing the end of the affair (264a4-b2), for during the affair the 
lover does offer benefits, to which Lysias would hardly wish to call attention by making 
this defining quality of love prominent in his attack on lovers.  Finally, Socrates’ makes 
his third criticism, that there is no apparent order in the speech, only while qualifying 
himself as incompetent and leaving it up to Phaedrus to decide the matter (264b3-8).  
Socrates thus allows that there is an order to Lysias’ speech which differs from the order 
of his own first speech by virtue of being concealed from all but those competent in 
rhetoric.  Whereas a perfectly clear order of argumentation following an explicit 
                                                          
1
 For Socrates’ qualification of his earlier criticism see 234e9-235a1, 235a3-4.  As he also does in his later 
criticism, Socrates’ leaves it up to Phaedrus to determine the adequacy of Socrates’ remarks; by doing so he 
can better gauge Phaedrus’ attachment to the speech as a whole (cf. 235b1-5 with 234c6-7), and encourage 
Phaedrus to reexamine the speech.    
2
 Note also that with this formulation Socrates is not clearly asking for an explicit definition and that he 
leaves the question without explicit answer. 
3
 See Seth Benardete (1991, 176); Ronna Burger (1980, 78).  
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definition may be of great value in teaching, as Socrates soon suggests (265d3-7), its 
usefulness for a rhetorical speech which seeks to persuade through false or unexamined 
claims is doubtful, for by its clarity it would expose its own weaknesses.  It would 
therefore seem to be for this reason that Socrates’ criticisms of Lysias’ speech occur in 
that part of the Phaedrus’ treatment of the art of speaking (262c5ff) which turns out to 
concern the principles of dialectic and not rhetoric (266b8-d2). 
 Socrates’ first criticism is of the opening of Lysias’ speech and he concludes his 
criticism by suggesting to Phaedrus that the opening and closing of his speech are 
interchangeable (264e1-2).  Yet, if we compare the opening and closing a difference 
emerges: the beginning of the speech refers only to the mutual benefit the beloved and 
nonlover can receive from the affair (230e7), but the conclusion first exhorts the beloved 
to avoid all harm and then refers to mutual benefit (234c3-4).  That Lysias turns from an 
appeal to benefits to an emphasis on the avoidance of harm makes sense, for, as we shall 
see, his speech proves much more capable of drawing attention to the dangers that attend 
affairs with lovers than showing the positive benefits to come from affairs with 
nonlovers.  Following this introduction, Lysias then disguises his argument, and thereby 
his lack of arguments for the benefit of the affair, by presenting it through twelve 
apparently unconnected points or arguments.4  The following is my attempt to present a 
plausible account of the order of these arguments. 
                                                          
4
 See Burger (1980, 23), where she notes Lysias’ use of merely mechanical connectives to structure his 
speech, which allow its easy division into separate points (at 231a6, b7, c7, e3, 232a6, b5, e3, 233a4, c6, 
d5).  Burger agrees with my claim that the speech has a concealed structure, but she seems to consider the 
large central portion of the speech a “loose enumeration” (ibid.).    
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 The first two arguments belong together as they both contrast the former lover’s 
view of the benefactions given during the affair with that of the nonlover.  According to 
the first argument, lovers repent the benefactions they have given (231a2), and the second 
says they consider that they have adequately repaid the beloved with their benefactions 
(231b1-2).  In both cases, the lover is inclined to stop giving to the beloved, but there is a 
tension between the two arguments, for the lovers of the first argument regret having 
given, whereas those of the second consider their gifts to have been justly given.  This 
tension suggests the possibility of two groups of lovers, one more decent than the other, 
and therefore of one group which Lysias would not wish to make explicit but would 
rather leave in the shadow of the less decent.  Lysias would still wish to make an 
argument against the beneficence of the more decent group, as the beloved is likely to be 
more or less aware of such decent lovers, and therefore, presenting only the first 
argument would be less completely persuasive.   
 While these first two arguments seem to argue for the superiority of the nonlover 
based on the material benefits he would offer, reading them together suggests that their 
force lies rather in the beloved’s desire that the affection for him continue. 5  In the first 
place, both arguments indicate that the nonlover will give to the beloved only what is in 
his own interest to give (231a5, b6-7).  To the question of how much he is likely to want 
to give, the second argument makes clear that it will not be anything that costs him 
much—indeed, this is the very reason he will not consider that he has paid back the 
                                                          
5
 Throughout my interpretation of Lysias’ speech, I refer to its intended listener as the “beloved” despite the 
fact that he is allegedly not loved by the nonlover; disregarding the fact that the nonlover, if he is not 
altogether a liar, seems to be merely a rather lukewarm and calculating lover, the term “beloved” is 
appropriate, because the target of the speech is treated at least as if he has lovers (whom he ought to reject). 
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beloved (231b2-5).  Furthermore, if the beloved were simply interested in being 
benefited, why would it be much of a deterrent that the former lovers will later regret 
their gifts?  There is no indication that they would try to take them back.  It seems 
therefore that Lysias’ apparent appeal to benefit in fact relies upon the beloved’s desire to 
continue to be loved. 
 Lysias’ third argument, that, if lovers are most friendly to their beloveds, when 
they move on to a new beloved they will be more friendly to another (231b7-c5), 
continues to work on the beloved’s desire for lasting love but now it is clear that this is 
also the desire to be loved exclusively or preeminently.  The pain the beloved feels at the 
prospect of his lover now loving another is heightened by the argument’s conclusion, 
that, since the lover, due to his surpassing friendliness, is most willing to be hated by 
others on behalf of his beloved, he will be willing to harm his former beloved if his new 
beloved wishes (231c2-7).  Such willingness to harm, apart from the harm actually done, 
is likely quite painful as it reinforces the point that one is no longer loved.  Furthermore, 
the desire on the part of the new beloved to harm the previous beloved is relevant only if 
it is rooted in the former beloved’s having been loved by the new beloved’s lover.  The 
new beloved is likely to have such a desire, and such a desire is likely to be intelligible to 
the beloved to whom Lysias speaks, if, out of the desire to know that the lover loves him 
exclusively, the beloved is inclined to insist on his lover’s harming past lovers as a sign 
of the end of his affection for them.   
 Of course, it is not as if the nonlover can offer stronger, more exclusive affection 
for the beloved; the nonlover must rather, and perhaps above all, lessen the beloved’s 
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desire for such affection as lovers offer, for such affection is the distinctive contribution 
of love regardless of the lover’s capacity to offer other benefits.  Such an attack on the 
beloved’s desire for affection only begins with the third argument, which arouses the 
beloved’s fear at the painful prospect of losing his lover to another.  By arousing the 
beloved’s fear regarding the consequences of love, Lysias prepares or perhaps even 
inclines the beloved to hear the criticism offered of the character of the lover’s affection 
in the next argument.  This fourth argument seems a mere repetition of the first, arguing 
that, after the affair, the lover will regret his actions (231c7-d6), but the fourth adds the 
reason for this regret, by claiming that the former lover, thinking well again, will now 
view his love as misfortune, sickness, immoderation, and poor thinking (231d1-6).  After 
arousing the beloved’s fear regarding the end of his lover’s affection, Lysias portrays the 
affection itself as sickness and vice.  To present love as such is to lessen its attractiveness, 
but this implies that the beloved does not want such affection from the lover as comes at 
the expense of the mental health or virtue of the lover; that is, the beloved wants his 
lover’s love to be good, for himself as well as for the lover.  This fourth argument thus 
seeks to detach the beloved from his desire for being loved by relying on the beloved’s 
concern for his lover, i.e., by relying on the beloved’s concern for something more than 
mere personal benefit, a concern implied by his desire to be loved. 
 Thus it is only now, in the fifth argument, that Lysias argues that there is a greater 
chance of finding one worthy of friendship among nonlovers (because there are more of 
them), and asks the beloved himself to seek someone to whom he may offer his favors 
without regard to the recipient’s having professed a desire for the favors or the beloved, 
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but only based on the potential friend’s merit (231d6-e2).  This merit is not explained in 
terms of benefits for the beloved.  The criticism of the vice of the lover prepares the way 
for the appeal to the virtue or worth of the nonlover, which appeal makes at least some 
demand that the beloved be willing to give something of himself or put himself at risk, at 
the very least of rejection, for the sake of friendship with one who deserves it.  This 
appeal has been facilitated by the previous argument’s making the beloved somewhat 
aware both of his desire for virtuous healthy attachment and of what is implied in this 
desire, some concern of his own that puts aside his narrow self-interest.  
 The speech has thus progressed from arousing the beloved’s fear of the end of his 
lover’s affection to a criticism of the affection itself to a recommendation that the beloved 
himself seek a nonlover to gratify, but the speech has yet to make any argument on behalf 
of the speaker in particular.  Such an appeal is coming (233a4-5), but we turn first to the 
beloved’s concern with reputation, a concern which makes a fitting beginning for an 
argument leading up to the claim that the beloved should gratify one specific person, 
since gratifying all seemingly “worthy” nonlovers would necessarily damage the 
beloved’s reputation, as the speaker ultimately makes explicit (234c2).  Furthermore, a 
turn to the beloved’s concern for reputation is especially needed at this point, because the 
fifth argument has just made the highly paradoxical and potentially risky suggestion that 
the beloved should seek someone among the nonlovers to gratify, and Lysias therefore 
now needs to show that the lovers are more risky for his reputation. 
 Thus the sixth and seventh arguments concern the nonlovers’ superiority for the 
beloved’s reputation.  Like the first and second arguments which both pertain to the same 
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issue but which seem to treat different groups of lovers, these two arguments point to two 
different problems lovers pose for their beloved’s reputation: the first argues that whereas 
nonlovers prefer what is best over reputation, lovers desire honor and will brag about 
their erotic successes (232a1-6); the second argument, which would be superfluous if all 
lovers were such braggarts, argues that many will see the lover with the beloved, and, 
having heard the lovers previously proclaim their love, will assume the couples to have 
recently been or be about to be engaged in their (sexual) desire (232a6-b2).  Lysias, as in 
the first two arguments, seems to wish to point out the danger that attends coupling even 
with decent lovers without calling attention to the existence of such lovers.                    
 Having aroused the beloved’s fear for his reputation,6 Lysias now turns back to 
the question of lasting friendship, but this time he draws attention to the beloved’s 
concern that the relationship last especially due to his having given away his sexual 
favors (232b5-c2).  The beloved desires in particular that he not give up his favors for a 
mere fling.  In turning to the beloved’s concern with reputation, Lysias drew attention to 
the beloved’s fear of having his sexual activity found out; awareness of this fear thus 
prepares the beloved to confront his fear of engaging in sexual activity itself.  It is not 
that the beloved is opposed to sex—he makes most or much (pleistou poiei) of his favors, 
i.e., he takes great pride in them—but he desires the limitation of his sexual favors to 
lasting affairs and believes himself to have suffered a great loss if they are not so limited.  
One prominent reason that the beloved would believe he has lost much through 
                                                          
6
 That fear on behalf of his reputation is not likely, at least in Lysias’ view, to be an adequate argument 
against the beloved’s gratifying a lover is also indicated in that, however much beloveds are like lovers in 
caring about their reputation, Lysias also believes that the nonlover’s preference for what is “best” over 
reputation will appeal to beloveds (232a4-6).   
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promiscuity becomes clear within this very section of the speech, for Lysias now adduces 
the lover’s fear that others will receive his beloved’s favors, i.e., the lover’s demand for 
exclusivity (232c4ff., cf. 234b6-c1), as the reason that friendship with a lover is more 
precarious.  The failure of the friendship after providing sex thus leaves the beloved or 
his favors degraded in the eyes of potential lovers (234c1).  Lysias therefore again 
confronts the beloved’s desire to be loved, this time with the fear of losing his lovability.   
 As becomes clear, however, within this eighth argument, the nonlover does not 
place such import on the exclusivity of sexual favors as either the lover or beloved does, 
for, so far from fearing other associations, the nonlover encourages them, hoping to be 
benefited thereby (232d4-7).  No argument is made that the nonlovers will know their 
partners better and therefore have more solid trust in them.  Therefore, the nonlovers 
must be at least relatively unafraid of sharing their partners.  In this case, it seems the 
lovers offer much more esteem for their beloved’s favors, and Lysias would therefore 
want to lessen the beloved’s desire to be loved for his favors.  Lysias seems to do so by 
criticizing the value of the favors themselves, as he had earlier moved from arousing the 
beloved’s fear regarding the cessation of love to a criticism of love itself.  This begins to 
occur, if tacitly, in the next (ninth) argument. 
 Here, in again arguing for the greater security of friendship with nonlovers, Lysias 
argues that lovers often begin with desire for the body, and it is therefore unclear whether 
they will remain friends after their desire passes (232e3-6). Thus, after pointing to the 
danger lovers pose to the worth of the beloved’s favors, Lysias points to the bodily 
character of those favors, and thus to their necessarily fleeting character, a character 
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which they have in the eyes of the nonlover as well (cf. 234a7-b1), and a character which 
he is now better prepared to admit.  Lysias then concludes this section arguing that so 
long as the beloved chooses a nonlover from among his current friends, the cessation of 
sexual favors (presumably following the cessation of the nonlover’s desire) will not harm 
the friendship (233a1-4).   
 The ninth argument thus requires that the beloved not be too bothered by the 
cessation of the nonlover’s desire for his favors, i.e., by his no longer being found 
attractive, and the tenth argument continues this criticism of the worth of the favors, now 
not by pointing to their fleeting character, but by hinting at their being intrinsically worth 
less than is believed by lovers while in love.  According to this argument, lovers are to be 
feared for the false praise and blame they confer, not only out of a desire to please the 
beloved, but also because love makes lovers “when unfortunate, believe grievous what 
furnishes no pain to the others, but when fortunate it compels the things not worthy of 
pleasure to meet with praise from them” (233a5-b5).  Lysias does not specify the fortunes 
or misfortunes of lovers, but it is likely that failing to attain and attaining the favors of 
their beloveds would be among those pains and pleasures that others do not share.7  
Lysias thus criticizes, if only by intimation, the lover’s delight in his beloved and his 
accompanying praise as false or unmerited.  Such a criticism undermines the beloved’s 
desire to be delightful to his lover.  Lysias’ criticism is only effective if the beloved 
desires to be praised truly, but in this case, the praise is for the delight he provides the 
                                                          
7
 Cf. the use of misfortune (atuchesai) at the opening of the speech (231a1). 
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lover, and thus Lysias works on the beloved’s desire to be genuinely delightful to another 
by arguing that the delight of lovers is false. 
 In the place of such unmerited flattering and therefore potentially harmful 
treatment as the lover offers, Lysias now refers to the benefit which may come from a 
nonlover (233a4-5).  It is notably only here that the speaker refers directly to himself 
within the speech (233a5, b6-c5).  This turn to the first person is prepared by the ninth 
argument’s limitation of the choice to one from among the beloved’s current friends.  
More importantly, however, Lysias’ purpose is not to persuade the beloved to seek all 
nonlovers but only one in particular, and therefore it is not surprising that it is at this 
point, where Lysias actually indicates a specific advantage that may come from gratifying 
this nonlover, true evaluations, that the nonlover refers to himself as the one capable of 
offering it.8  Beneficial as it may be to consort with one who offers truthful evaluations, 
Lysias evidently does not consider this benefit terribly attractive to the beloved, for, 
within this very section of the speech, he turns from this benefit, which he never even 
makes entirely explicit, to praise of the nonlover’s self-mastery and victory over love, his 
patience, and the promise these provide for steady friendship (233b6-c6).  Thus, in this 
argument, where the speaker refers to himself and the one benefit he clearly offers, his 
                                                          
8
 Note the ambiguity in the speech’s other references to benefits as to whether the nonlover is concerned to 
provide them for himself or for his partner (231a5-6, b6-7, 233c1).  234a2-3 is an exception, but again no 
indication is given of what goods the nonlover offers, and 234b4-5 quickly returns us to the selfish 
nonlover. 
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appeal is also to the virtue which facilitates this benefit and the strength this provides for 
friendship.9 
 Having now completed his criticisms of the love offered by lovers and the delight 
they take in their beloveds, those qualities with which a nonlover can least compete, 
Lysias has presented the nonlover as superior in terms of virtue and the endurance of 
friendship he offers.  Precisely because the lover’s attachment to the beloved has been so 
criticized, some question may have arisen regarding the strength of friendship which the 
nonlover can offer.  This would in part explain Lysias’ turn in his eleventh argument to 
examples of strong friendship without love (233c6-d4).  Yet the beloved is likely to retain 
some doubt regarding the strength of friendship the nonlover may offer.  The nonlover is 
already an associate or friend of some kind, but not a close friend, and the previous 
criticism of the lovers as well as the examples of friends—especially family members—
who do not desire sex would hardly give the beloved the impression that gratifying the 
nonlover will make that friendship stronger10 (although he may be asked to believe that 
gratification will not harm the friendship, which may then grow stronger for other 
reasons).  Thus, the eleventh argument makes a rather weak case.  Perhaps it is also for 
this reason that Lysias only presents it after he has made his case against love, for then, 
frightened of lovers and somewhat disappointed in his hope to be the object of a good 
love, the beloved may be especially willing to look elsewhere for that strong friendship 
which had been among his attractions to love (cf. 231b7-c2). 
                                                          
9
 At this point we should note that the previous four arguments each appeal to the nonlover’s virtuous 
character (232a5), his friendship (232b3-4, 233a1-4), or both (232d4-5 with d7-e2).  See especially the 
claim of argument eight that the nonlovers attain sexual favors “through virtue” (232d4-5).   
10
 Note also the third argument’s complete omission of even the pretense on the part of nonlovers to offer 
strong friendship (cf. 231c1-2).   
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 Lysias then makes one final argument in conclusion, which turns into something 
of a summing up of his whole argument.  Lovers are compared to the poor, as those 
“most in need” of the beloved’s favors (233d5-8).  Lysias admits that the lovers would be 
the most grateful recipients of the beloved’s favors but also the least capable of paying 
them back (233d8, e4, 6-7).  Such a poverty on the part of the lovers, which is not 
restricted to the time after the affair, only makes sense if the beloved has accepted Lysias’ 
previous attempt to portray love as a mental illness, for in this case the lover’s need or 
love for the beloved is, as with material poverty, the very source of his inability to pay 
back his debts.  The distance the speech has thereby traversed becomes somewhat visible 
by contrasting this final argument, which prominently admits the gratitude and goodwill 
of lovers for the beloved (233e5), with the begrudging image of lovers presented in the 
first argument.  Lysias’ rhetoric, if it has worked, allows him to portray the good and 
attractive attributes of lovers as the mere consequence of their badness (sickness or vice).   
 The argument then concludes, turning from the lover’s poverty and the nonlover’s 
resources to a list juxtaposing the qualities of the lover to those of the nonlover, 
reiterating the main points of the speech (233e7-234b1).  With the exception of the claim 
that nonlovers “will give a share of their good things to him when he becomes older” 
(234a2-3), the qualities of the nonlover mentioned indicate his relative safety for the 
beloved’s reputation, the enduring friendship he promises, and, ultimately, his virtue.  
This list then seems to confirm that the speech renders the nonlover attractive not 
primarily through appealing to the beloved’s mere self-interest, but rather by appealing to 
his desire for friendship and his admiration of virtue.  Lysias then adds one further 
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remark, which confirms this suggestion, before making his concluding request: he tells 
the beloved to “lay to heart (enthumou) that friends admonish lovers that the practice is a 
bad one, whereas for nonlovers no one of their kin has ever blamed them for deliberating 
badly about themselves” (234b2-5).  Lysias expects the goodness of non-love for the 
nonlover and the badness of love, which primarily means, because the friend of the lover 
would be primarily concerned with his friend’s interest, the badness of love for the lover, 
to be a compelling reason for the beloved’s preference for the nonlover.  It is then the 
beloved’s concern with the interest of others, his concern that his friendships be mutually 
rewarding, and his desire to be with or even reward the virtuous (cf. especially 232d4-5), 
to which Lysias appeals in his argument for the nonlover. 
 Lysias’ speech appeals to the beloved’s self-interest as well as to his concern for 
friendship and his admiration of virtue.  The above analysis suggests an order behind 
these seemingly haphazard appeals: Lysias masks an appeal to the beloved’s concern for 
others with an appeal to the beloved’s self-interest.  The necessity which would compel 
such speech writing (cf. 264b7) would then be rooted in the beloved’s desire to be loved, 
which Lysias must attack in order to endorse an affair with a nonlover.  Lysias does not 
wish to attack the desire to be loved directly, without preparation, and he therefore begins 
by appealing to the beloved’s interest, especially his fear of the harm that may come from 
lovers, and only subsequently subjects love itself to criticism.  The criticism of love itself 
depends on the beloved’s desire that love be good for both lover and beloved.  By 
arguing that love cannot be mutually beneficial, Lysias weakens the beloved’s desire to 
be loved which must be left unfulfilled by the nonlover.  Now merely criticizing love and 
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offering steady friendship would not suffice to explain why the beloved should gratify the 
nonlover.  Thus we see the second advantage of drawing attention to the beloved’s desire 
that his lover’s love be good, for this implies the beloved’s concern for his lover, and, by 
arousing some awareness of his concern for others, Lysias prepares the beloved to hear 
the call to gratify the lover for his virtue.  Lysias’ praise of the nonlover must make him 
the object of something like the beloved’s love if it is to have the desired effect, and 
praise of the nonlover’s virtue is used to achieve this effect.11  Finally, noting Lysias’ 
need to present the nonlover as virtuous, we see a second advantage to masking the 
argument with an appeal to self-interest.  By beginning only with an appeal to the 
beloved’s self-interest, Lysias permits himself to present the nonlover’s rational 
selfishness as a good or at least neutral quality which he may subsequently, through 
contrast with the immoderation of love, present as the virtue of moderation or self-
mastery, and thus as something worthy of gratification. 
 The central theme or problem of Lysias’ speech may then be said to be that of the 
relation between self-interest and concern for virtue or others.  Lysias’ masking of an 
appeal based on the beloved’s concern for virtue and other human beings in an appeal to 
self-interest shows that the appeal of self-interest, on its own, is insufficient to attract a 
beloved to a non-lover.  In our study of Socrates’ speeches below, especially his 
palinode, we shall see much that helps explain why a beloved, or anyone else, would be 
attracted by something more than his self-interest.  But the fact that the appeal to virtue 
                                                          
11
 Perhaps this, that Lysias’ defense of a nonlover aims at turning the nonlover into a beloved, is what 
Socrates means when he suggests that the earlier love poets, who praised their beloveds, surpassed Lysias 
(235c2-d3).  See Benardete (1991, 118).  Cf. 255e2-3, where Socrates describes the desire to reciprocate 
love as nearly the same as love. 
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and concern for others may be successfully masked, at least when Phaedrus is the 
audience, with an appeal to self-interest, shows also that we are not simply attracted by 
the concern for virtue and the good of others; something in us may be attracted to a 
speech which appears to endorse concerning ourselves only with our self-interest.  
Furthermore, even though we are motivated by more than our own interest, there is an 
appeal to thinking our motivation is solely self-interest.  As we shall see in our 
interpretation of Socrates’ first speech below, Phaedrus’ concern about what eros may 
require of him, even if he is the beloved, is an important source of the appeal of Lysias’ 
speech; Phaedrus is attracted by a view which permits him to overlook or misinterpret his 
concern with something more than his own self-interest.    
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Part Two: Socrates’ First Speech 
 
  
Turning now to Socrates’ first speech, the contrast between Socrates’ depiction of 
the lover, which emphasizes above all his lack of goodwill for the beloved (239a1-2, 4-7, 
e3-5, especially 241d1), and that of Lysias’, which begins by conceding the lover’s 
goodwill,12 is glaring.  By arguing that the lover’s immoderation has the effect of 
thoroughly eliminating goodwill (238e2-239a2), Socrates can offer a much more 
thorough condemnation of lovers than could Lysias.  Yet, as I have argued, Lysias’ 
rhetorical purpose is served by his initial admission of the lover’s goodwill, and therefore 
we expect Socrates to a pay a rhetorical price for his harsher depiction of lovers.  It seems 
that he pays such a price.  As Phaedrus points out (241d4-6), Socrates can offer no praise 
for the nonlover such as to inspire a beloved’s attraction, whereas Lysias, by pointing out 
the lover’s goodwill and its defects, arouses the beloved’s desire for such goodwill and an 
awareness of his own goodwill towards potential suitors, which in turn prepares the 
beloved to feel love or some approximation of it for the nonlover.  Indeed, to judge by 
Phaedrus’ responses—and after all he is the audience—Socrates’ first speech is 
rhetorically the least successful of the dialogue (contrast 227d6-228a4, 234c6-7, d3-4, 
235b1-5 with 241d4-6 and 257c1-4). 
 Socrates’ rhetorical failing, however, need not be taken as a failing of his speech, 
unless we assume that it is Socrates’ purpose merely to surpass Lysias in rhetorical 
artistry or persuade Phaedrus of a perverse thesis.  That Socrates has no intention of so 
                                                          
12
 Recall also that Socrates’ will draw attention to precisely this aspect of Lysias’ speech in what he asks 
Phaedrus to reread (cf. 262e1-4 with 263e6-264a3 and p. 88 above). 
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competing is suggested by his comment, at the outset of the speech, that the speech will 
make Phaedrus’ comrade, who earlier seemed wise to Phaedrus, now seem more so 
(237a10-b1), for Lysias seemed wise to Phaedrus in terms of his rhetorical competence 
(228a1-2), and Socrates’ rhetorical failure would only serve to heighten that appearance 
of competence.  What then is Socrates’ intention?  Socrates’ denial of the lover’s 
goodwill amounts to denying what had been the implied distinction of the lover 
according to Lysias, and thus Socrates’ condemnation of the lover amounts to a 
condemnation of Lysias’ nonlover as a nonlover.  That is, the basic claim of Lysias’ 
speech had been that sex was preferable with one who lacks eros, because he lacks eros, 
and eros was distinguished by goodwill; now, Socrates shows that sex with one lacking 
goodwill (a Lysian nonlover) means sex with a dangerous predator (cf. 241d1).13  Thus, 
rather than competing with Lysias in the task of persuasion, Socrates exposes the basic 
error of Lysias’ position.   
 In this way, we can understand not only Socrates’ failure to offer praise of the 
nonlover, but also his suggestion of the disgusting unpleasantness of sexually gratifying 
an older man (240d4-e2)—which undermines the nonlover’s chances of success as much 
as those of the lover—as well as his treatment of friendship and virtue.14  Friendship had 
been among the chief concerns of the beloved upon which Lysias relied, but Socrates 
now first reduces the status of friendship to that of a possession (239e2-240a2), thus 
                                                          
13
 The predatory aspect of the nonlover is of course moderated in Lysias’ speech, because the speech is 
given by something of a friend who offers friendship, and Lysias’ speech is, today, all too easily imagined 
as coming from a relatively unerotic but sexually attracted friend who would limit the harm he inflicts on 
his partner.  But insofar as such a friend feels goodwill along with his sexual attraction he blurs the 
distinction between himself and the lover and to this extent deviates from the speech’s defense of the 
nonlover.   
14
 See also Griswold (1986, 57-58); Benardete (1991, 120).  
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ignoring the role of the beloved’s goodwill in friendship,15 and then Socrates claims that 
friendship belongs only to those of the same age (240c1-3), thus rendering an appeal to 
friendship with the nonlover impossible.  Regarding the virtue of the nonlover, the 
opening of Socrates’ speech follows Lysias’ in appealing to his moderation (237e2-3), 
but the second part then appeals primarily to manly virtues (238d8, 239a2-3, a7-b3, c5-
d7), which may characterize lovers (239c1-2), notably omitting moderation (cf. 239a2-
3).16  Finally, the preface Socrates provides for his first speech—the story of a concealed 
lover speaking to his beloved (237b1-6)—may be taken as confirmation that Socrates 
does not aim at offering a persuasive speech but rather seeks to show the error of Lysias’.  
For through this preface Socrates not only distances himself from his speech’s argument, 
but also presents the truth, that Lysias’ nonlover is some kind of concealed lover.  We 
may then understand Socrates’ later comment, according to which Lysias is “father of the 
speech” (257b2), as highlighting Lysias’ responsibility for the corrupt view of love 
Socrates now articulates.  
 Socrates’ suggestion of Lysias’ influence on the speech is, however, 
overshadowed by his attribution of the speech to Phaedrus, whom Socrates not only 
credits for influencing (238d5, 241e4) and compelling his speech (238a9, 242d4-5), but 
also twice simply credits as its author, calling it “Phaedrus’ speech” (242d11, 244a1), 
spoken by Phaedrus through Socrates’ mouth (242e1).  Socrates wishes to show the error 
of Lysias’ speech, but he does this primarily for Phaedrus’ sake, and thus his primary 
                                                          
15
 Note, however, that the second of three qualities attributed to friendship is unsurpassed goodwill 
(eunoustaton) (239e4): the speech quietly indicates what its argument overlooks. 
16
 See Benardete (1991, 124), Burger (1980, 37).  Socrates’ treatment of moderation in this speech will 
receive further discussion below. 
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goal is to instruct Phaedrus.  Such a goal may be facilitated by a speech which Socrates 
suggests is an expression of Phaedrus, if Socrates wishes to show Phaedrus something 
about himself.  Having seen that Socrates’ first speech, despite its apparent agreement 
with Lysias’, contains the tacit rejection of Lysias’ argument, we expect that Socrates 
will present those views of Phaedrus which led to his attraction to Lysias’ speech in such 
a way as to indicate their shortcomings. 
 Socrates begins by veiling himself (237a4-5) and invoking the Muses (237a7), 
thereby further distancing himself from the substance of his speech.  Socrates’ self-
concealment, which leaves his words emanating without an apparent source, and his 
invocation of the Muses give the impression that the speech is divinely inspired.17  But 
the very act of veiling himself, as an expression of his shame (237a5), a shame which 
Socrates will explain after the fact as rooted in his awareness of the speech’s false 
presentation of love (243b4-7),18  betrays his self-possession in giving the speech.19  
Furthermore, while Socrates attributes divine influence over the speech to other 
divinities, as we shall have to discuss below, he never credits the Muses, suggesting that 
he does not take his invocation to be effective.  Socrates’ subsequent remarks about the 
Muses, according to which they are the divine source of poetic madness (245a1-5, 
265b4), makes their invocation a fitting preparation for the story (muthos) Socrates will 
now tell (237a9), but Socrates most sustained discussion of the Muses suggests that his 
invocation of them here is also something of a warning.  
                                                          
17
 See Griswold (1986, 55).  Cf. Socrates’ later suggestion that the first prophetic speeches came from an 
oak tree (275b5-6). 
18
 See Sallis (1975, 123). 
19
 See Griswold (1986, 56). 
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 That is, in his most sustained treatment of the Muses, Socrates tells another story, 
that of the cicadas, in which the Muses have the effect of turning those who most enjoy 
their music into cicadas (258e6-259d8).20  When the Muses and music came to be, some 
were so stricken with pleasure that they lost concern for eating and drinking and thereby 
died without noticing their death (259b7-c2).21  The Muses’ song thus offers great 
pleasure, including that of freedom from the painful concern with one’s mortality, but 
this pleasure comes at the price of distracting one from taking care of oneself and 
ultimately death.  The Muses then, as compensation for their first victims, rewarded them 
by turning them into cicadas who could sing their whole lives without need of 
nourishment and then, upon dying, report to the Muses those humans who honor them 
(259c2-6).  The cicadas, the servants of the Muses, also sing a bewitching song (258e7, 
259a3),22 and this song again indicates the dangerous character of music inspiration, for 
Socrates indicates that it is by resisting its bewitchment that one properly honors the 
Muses (259a6-b1, d7-8).23  In his invocation of the Muses, Socrates suggests that they 
may have received their name for the clarity of their song but he leaves this an open 
question (237b7-9); considering his later story of cicadas and the manifest clarity of 
presentation of the speech (cf. 265d6-7), Socrates’ invocation of the muses may serve as 
warning, above all to Phaedrus, who as Socrates notes is a music lover (259b5), not to be 
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 Burger notes the “anti-erotic” character of the Muses, describing them as those “who punish their own 
lovers with death and grant favors only to those who do not succumb to their charms” (1980, 35). 
21
 Socrates tells this story in response to Phaedrus’ suggestion that life should be lived for pleasures without 
preceding pains (258e1-5); cf. pgs. 78-83 above. 
22
 The bewitchment depends on “idleness of thought” (259a3-4); cf. my treatment of Socrates’ view of 
idleness in the Republic, especially pages 27, 54-56, 72-73 above. 
23
 Socrates here includes among the Muses, Muses concerned both with erotic matters and philosophy 
(259d1-7), whereas he later gives the Muses credit only for poetry, attributing erotic madness to Aphrodite 
and Eros (265b4-5). Perhaps Socrates only means that love and the speeches of philosophy (cf. 259d6) 
offer the same dangerous bewitchment as music proper.   
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seduced by the speech’s clear surface but to attentively look beneath it.  This of course 
presumes that Socrates expects or hopes that Phaedrus will reconsider the day’s speeches, 
just as he instructs Phaedrus to do regarding Lysias’ speech (see pages 87-89 above). 
 The speech’s apparent clarity is on display as soon as Socrates has put it in the 
mouth of a concealed lover, who begins with a reflection on the order the speech is to 
follow.  The concealed lover asserts that there is one proper beginning or rule (arche) for 
deliberation, namely, to know first what the deliberation is about (237b7-c1).  Such 
advice could seem too obvious to need stating, but the speaker indicates its necessity by 
noting that “the many” begin their deliberations without such knowledge and, unaware of 
its lack, proceed to disagree with each other and themselves (237c2-5).  That is, the 
members of “the many” hold opinions which contradict those of others as well as their 
own, and they are unaware of holding such contradictory opinions.  The speech thus 
begins by suggesting an approach which is called for due to the problematic status of 
opinions, thus presenting in advance a cautionary notice for its subsequent reliance upon 
opinion in its defense of moderation (cf. 237d6-c4).  Furthermore, the many are unaware 
of the ignorance implied by their self-contradictions, and this observation then raises the 
question, which the speech nowhere explicitly takes up, of the source of the many’s 
ignorance.  In the dialogue’s later discussion of the rhetorical art, Socrates asserts that to 
speak by art one must “first” grasp the character of those things in regard to which “it is 
necessary” that the many contradict themselves (263b6-9), and only subsequently does an 
artful speaker turn to defining (263c3ff.).  To grasp the character of the class of things 
about which it is necessary that the many contradict themselves implies understanding the 
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cause of their ignorance (otherwise the necessity would be unknown), and thus we may 
expect the concealed lover’s failure to answer this question to lead to a failure in his 
definition, as the definition may proceed without adequate attention to contradictory 
understandings of the definition’s terms.  Indeed, as the concealed lover further spells out 
the procedure, he indicates that in order to decide their question, whether lover or 
nonlover should be chosen, they will first define love, and then discern its benefit or harm 
(237c6-d3).  The speaker thus tacitly assumes that whereas love is in need of an initial 
investigation, the good is sufficiently clear, but the good is, at the least, preeminent 
among the terms about which the many contradict themselves (cf. 263a9-11), and, as we 
shall see, the failure to first investigate the good renders the attempt to define love 
inadequate. 
 Before turning to the attempt to define love, we should note one further feature of 
the opening discussion of procedure, which further suggests the inadequacy of the speech 
to come while indicating a reason for such inadequacy.  The concealed lover begins by 
noting the need for “knowledge” of what is to be discussed (237c1), but then, having 
linked knowledge to agreement by noting the disagreements attending the many’s 
ignorance (237c2-5), he concludes by suggesting only that he and his beloved come to an 
agreement, setting down a definition of love (237c8-d1).  As Socrates will note later, 
however, following an agreed upon definition allows one to “make clear what one wishes 
to teach about,” speaking clearly and consistently, without necessarily speaking the truth 
(265d4-7).  If the speech begins with an inadequate definition, one set down by 
agreement but not known to be true, what will it clearly teach?  The consequences 
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following from the initial agreement—i.e., the speech will articulate the full 
consequences of the opinions of those who agree with its beginning.  Now, despite the 
emphasis on coming to an agreement, the concealed lover engages in no dialogue with 
the beloved, and therefore we cannot rely on the speech to indicate the character of the 
beloved whose views are thus expressed.  If then, we take Phaedrus, as the audience, to 
stand for the beloved, as Socrates later implies he does (243e4-6), the concealed lover’s 
emphasis on agreement can be taken to indicate that the view articulated is that of 
Phaedrus.  Socrates presents as consistently as possible Phaedrus’ view so as to teach him 
its inadequacy.  We may then in this way understand more precisely the manner in which 
and the reason for which he presents what he will call the speech of Phaedrus (see pages 
105-106 above). 
 The attempt to define love begins by noting that love belongs to the class of 
desires and linking love to the desire for beautiful things or human beings, but the 
speaker then notes that nonlovers also desire these beauties (237d3-5).  If one allows 
beauty or the beautiful things (tōn kalōn) their full range of meanings and takes love or 
eros in its ordinary sense as pertaining to a kind of sexual desire, the distinction between 
love in particular and desire for beautiful things in general is obvious, but the concealed 
lover’s whole argument requires that he imply the more questionable claim that nonlovers 
desire beautiful human bodies.24  The more likely distinction would have been between 
eros and aphrodisia (mere sexual lust) (cf. 254a7),25  but by making this distinction, the 
                                                          
24
 One may wonder whether sexual desire divorced from any eros would include any care for beauty (cf. 
Sym. 206b7-e5 and 209b2-3 with 207c9-208b9 where beauty drops out of the account of eros, and Socrates 
is dissatisfied).  
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 Benardete draws attention to this distinction making a somewhat different point (1991, 122).  
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concealed lover would show the baseness of the nonlover’s desire.  He thus leaves it at 
both lovers and nonlovers desiring beauty and seeks a further criterion by which to 
differentiate lovers.  He does so by arguing that in addition to natural desires for pleasure, 
we are also moved by acquired opinions which aim at the best (237d6-9), and he will 
distinguish love by arguing that it is desire for beauty in a distinct relation to opinion 
(238b7-c4).  To do so, however, is to define love by its relation to what guides us towards 
the good, and therefore we can already see that the concealed lover will be incapable of 
defining love without asserting something about its goodness.  
 The concealed lover indicates four possible relations between opinion and desire: 
they can agree or be likeminded (homonoeiton); they can struggle against one another in 
faction; one can master the other; and the other can master the first (237d9-e2).  The 
agreement of the two is called likeness of mind, which therefore implies that in states of 
faction we are of multiple minds, and thus the concealed lover would seem to hint that 
desires are not simply divorced from thoughts (or mind, nous) and that the conflict in the 
opinions of the many may have its root in conflicts between opinions of the good and 
desires.  The latter two relations, in which one or the other masters (kratei) the other, 
would seem to be versions of factious struggle, for like-mindedness would not seem to 
admit or require one ruling the other.  Now the rule of opinion will be called moderation 
(237e2-3), which serves the speaker as a standard against which to condemn eros, but if 
moderation is only one version of strife, it would seem inferior to a higher standard of 
like-mindedness.  On the other hand, the concealed lover may mean or allow that when 
one ruling principle masters the other it does so so thoroughly that the ruled comes to 
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agree: i.e., opinion educates desire so one desires the good, or desire so deludes opinion 
that one believes bad pleasures to be good.  The concealed lover would seem to leave this 
ambiguous, thus leaving the status of moderation unclear; we shall see that there are 
grounds for supposing the speech to consider two different forms of moderation. 
 However this may be, the triumph of opinion is called moderation and that of 
desire is hubris (237e2-238a1).  Gluttony, excess with regard to wine, and love are 
presented as three forms of hubris which are condemned as immoderate (238a6-c4).  
Phaedrus’ concern for health (cf. 227a4-6, 268a8-9), as well as the disdain for bodily 
pleasures which accompanies his desire for pleasures without pain (258e2-5), surely 
opposes gluttony, and, as we know from the Symposium, it opposed excessive drinking 
(Sym. 176d5-7).  We can see then here how Socrates articulates Phaedrus’ view, which 
had found the moderate nonlover of Lysias’ speech so attractive.  Difficulties emerge, 
however, if we examine the speech more closely.   
 Moderation is not simply defined as the rule of opinion but rather that of rational 
opinion (doxes logoi) leading towards the best (237e2-3).  Hubris, we are told, has many 
names because it has many limbs and many forms (238a2-3).  The speaker’s emphasis is 
on the diversity of hubris; he suggests not only that there are multiple kinds of hubris but 
also limbs,26 which implies each kind of hubris is part of one unified opposition to 
rational opinion.  It is for this reason that he then says, “whichever class happens to 
become conspicuous” supplies the name for the one who has it (238a3-4), for this implies 
that the hubristic man has the other forms of hubris as well, but one in particular is 
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 Or parts, depending on which text one follows; the choice is between polumeles and polumeres, but 
either one implies a unified hubris which has the parts or limbs.   
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especially noticeable.  The concealed lover thus points to hubris as the basic source of the 
many’s ignorance, but he seems to leave its aim obscure.  That is, what is sought in 
opposition to reason or the source of dissatisfaction with the goods offered by rational 
opinion is unclear, but it is unclear, it would seem, above all, because the concealed lover 
leaves the good, or the aim of rational opinion itself unclear.   
 The speaker does, however, quietly intimate his awareness of this failing.  When 
providing different examples of hubris, the concealed lover names gluttony but then 
refers to excessive drinking without naming it, but calling some attention to the omission 
by saying its name is clear (238a6-b3).  Shortly thereafter, he says, “what has been said is 
altogether clearer than what has not been said” (238b7),27 and we must ask therefore why 
he left the name for excessive drinking unclear.  The word for gluttony, gastrimargia, 
contains the word for stomach, gaster, and thereby points to the standard, bodily health, 
according to which one should eat, but excessive (wine) drinking is surely not related to 
thirst as gluttony is to eating, and while excessive drinkers may be easy enough to point 
out for practical purposes, it is much harder to say at what one should aim in consuming 
wine.28  The speaker’s omission of a name for excessive drinking thus points us towards 
the obscurity of the standard by which it is judged.  As questionable as the standard is for 
proper drinking, that for the pursuit of beauty is surely as or more obscure, and the 
concealed lover quietly intimates this.  Whereas the definition of gluttony accorded easily 
with that of moderation in that gluttonous desire was said to oppose the “reasoned 
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 If one takes the alternate reading, “what has been said is somehow clearer than what has not been said,” 
the statement still raises the question of what has not been said.   
28
 Cf. Benardete (1991, 122). 
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account” (logou) of the best (238a7), love is only said to oppose correct opinion (doxes 
epi to orthon)—there is no claim that such correct opinion or orthodoxy is rational 
(238b7-8).29  The speaker thus quietly allows that such moderation as Phaedrus admires 
which opposes the erotic desire for beauty is not rational, although he certainly wishes to 
give the impression that eros is immoderate.  In other words, moderation seems to be 
presented ambiguously: on the one hand there is a moderation whose rationality is 
uncertain which condemns eros as an excessive pursuit of pleasure; on the other hand 
moderation may be taken as rational, in which case its relation to eros is unclear.   
 There is a further difficulty with the definition of eros, which again points to the 
speech’s failure to adequately analyze the good, or the aim of reason.  Love is said to be 
for the pleasure of beauty (238c1), but the speaker had just mentioned beauty as a quality 
which the name one receives for hubris will lack (238a5).30  Such a use of the term 
“beauty” places it on the side of moderation against the hubristic desire for pleasures, and 
it therefore raises the questions of whether beauty is intrinsically good, such that its 
pursuit cannot be immoderate, and also of whether it is properly understood as kind or 
source of pleasure.  The second part of the speech will offer further reasons to suggest 
that beauty is not properly understood as a source of pleasure.  In this case, moderation 
too must be put in question, not only as to its standard and whether it in fact opposes eros, 
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 It is true that the definition of love refers to it as a desire without reason, but this does not necessitate that 
the opinion opposed to love be rational (I shall argue that Socrates presents in this speech both a rational 
and an irrational opposition to love).  Furthermore, what is said to be without reason does not seem 
perfectly clear in the Greek.  That is, the “without reason” (aneu logou) which would seem to modify desire 
is placed immediately before the reference to correct opinion, thus reading, “aneu logou doxes…” (238b7-
8).  I know of no rule in Greek according to which “without reason” could be proved not to modify 
“opinion”,  and its placement immediately before the mention of correct opinion then certainly raises the 
question of the rationality of correct opinion.  None of this is to deny that the concealed lover intends on the 
surface to imply that it is desire which lacks reason and that the opinion opposed to this desire is moderate.     
30
 Cf. 237b7. 
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but also as to whether it is best understood in terms of the opposition between opinions of 
the good and desires for pleasure.  The answers to such questions would again require 
what the concealed lover omitted, a prior investigation of the good and its relation to 
beauty and pleasure. 
 The definition of love thus presents eros as the desire for the pleasure of beauty 
which opposes correct opinion, being mightily strengthened by dominant desires for 
beautiful bodies (238a7-c4).  If one regards the condemnation of eros as immoderate as 
questionable and qualifies the emphasis on pleasure, the definition looks like a tolerable 
definition of love: 31 a strong desire for beauty coupled with and strengthened by desires 
for bodily beauty.   There is one further difficulty, however, to which Socrates calls 
attention after offering this definition.  After defining eros, Socrates interrupts the speech 
to call attention to his having suffered something divine (238c5-6).  Phaedrus agrees, 
interpreting Socrates’ divine suffering to be his “unusual fluency” (238c7-8).  Socrates 
does not correct this interpretation, and if we look at the preceding, Socrates’ unusual 
fluency would seem to have been exhibited above all in the playful etymologizing by 
which eros is associated with forcefulness (238c2-4).  Socrates, however, does not seem 
to regard his divine suffering as unqualifiedly good, for he suggests he may soon be 
possessed by nymphs, and he seems to hope this may be avoided by the prompt 
completion of the speech (238d1-7).  Indeed after, the speech, Socrates gives as a reason 
that he did not complete his assignment and praise the nonlover his fear of being 
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 Consider Socrates’ later emphasis on this one definition for his speech about love, where he is treating 
both speeches together as one (263d2-3 in context). 
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possessed by nymphs (241e3-5).  Playful as his remarks about the nymphs may be,32 
Socrates thus seems to indicate by them that we ought not to trust the nymphs’ influence 
on the speech, and that his etymological connection of love with force may be 
problematic. 
 After the interruption, Socrates turns to the formal evaluation of the lover.  This 
evaluation was to be based on the definition, but as the definition said nothing about the 
character of beauty, by which it specified the pleasures which love seeks, the definition is 
of little direct value in the evaluation.  Furthermore, the principles of human behavior 
outlined in the first part of the speech are nowhere used to establish the various benefits 
or harms which may come from the lover.  The evaluative portion of the speech therefore 
does not seem to be deduced from the prior definition.  This further suggests that the 
process of definition was primarily a means for Socrates to raise questions about the 
character of moderation and its relation to eros, and furthermore, it suggests that 
Socrates’ interruption served to conceal the absence of a necessary connection between 
the definition and the evaluation of love.  Finally, the one point from the definition which 
seems to be carried over to the condemnation of love is the association of love with force, 
which Socrates established through his playful etymologies and called into question 
through his reference to nymphic possession. The association of love with force turns up 
in the evaluative part, as the concealed lover argues: that one ruled by desire as a lover is 
must do everything to make the beloved as pleasant as possible; that the lover is sick, and 
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 Socrates refers both to the place and the nymphs as the source of his divine suffering, and we may 
perhaps explain this by saying Socrates spends the day in an unusual place, taking time off from his usual 
conversations (230c6-d5), and under such relaxing influences, responding to Phaedrus (cf. 238d5), who 
appreciates such stylistic flourishes, Socrates is led to speak in an unusual manner.    
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to the sick the weaker is always more pleasant; that therefore the lover will always seek 
to make the beloved weaker and worse (238e2-239a2).  The lover is thus portrayed as 
compelled to seek nothing but domination of his beloved.33  The difficulty with such a 
characterization of love comes out most clearly in the palinode, where eros is portrayed 
not only as spurring lovers on towards their beloveds but also restraining their pursuit and 
giving them goodwill towards their beloveds (254b5-255a1), but even in this first speech, 
the inadequacy of suggesting that lover’s merely wish to dominate their beloveds, will 
become apparent as we proceed. 
 Because lovers are alleged to seek to make their beloveds as defective as possible 
(239a2), the lovers will seek to deprive their beloveds of all goods, and the speech 
therefore proceeds to detail the damage that would be done thereby.  The various kinds of 
harm from lovers are clearly divided and the order of presentation is clear: the concealed 
lover indicates first the harm done to the intellect (239a2-c1); then he treats harm to the 
body (239c3-d7); and then harm to external possessions (239d8-240a9).  The concealed 
lover next treats the unpleasantness of the lover, which, while strictly speaking irrelevant 
to a consideration of his harmfulness, surely renders the lover more unattractive, and its 
relative unimportance determines its placement after considerations of harm (240a10-e7).  
Finally, he turns to the harmfulness of lovers (for their beloveds) after their love has 
ceased (240e8-241c1), a point which Lysias had made primary but which is now put in its 
proper place as secondary to the harmful effects of love itself.  Of the goods of which the 
lover will deprive the beloved three seem to be emphasized: philosophy (239b3-4), 
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manliness (239a3, b2, c7, d4-7), and friendship (239e3-6). The speech gives no explicit 
indication of why these goods are emphasized or even why they are considered goods, 
but upon scrutiny it seems that they are goods especially problematic for a lover seeking 
to tyrannize his beloved,34 and, at the same time, their status as goods implies a critique 
of such moderation as Phaedrus seems to admire, the moderation of the speech’s first part 
whose rationality was questionable. 
 The coincidence of these two features of the goods in question is explained when 
we note that moderation, or one version of it, is compatible with the desires of the lover.  
In detailing the excellences or virtues of intellect of which the lover will deprive the 
beloved, the concealed lover names four: wisdom, courage, rhetorical skill, and wit 
(239a2-4).  In such a listing of four virtues we might have expected justice and 
moderation in addition to wisdom and courage,35 but apparently moderation and justice, 
or at least such moderation and justice as are separable from wisdom and courage, are not 
necessarily troublesome to the lover.  Indeed, looking ahead to the description of the 
unpleasantness of lovers and their deeds after the affair, it becomes clear that to accept 
such a lover a beloved would need to have a sort of moderation of his desires for 
pleasure, insofar as he would have to endure unpleasantness for the (false) promise of 
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 Cf. Symposium 182b7-c4, where Pausanias notes that tyrannies oppose philosophy, eros, and exercise, 
because they fear proud thoughts and strong friendships.  See also Benardete (1991, 124-126); the 
following account is much indebted to his observations regarding the opposition between moderation and 
manliness, although I do not necessarily follow his reasoning, nor do I interpret the speech as being about 
politics as he seems to do. 
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 See Burger (1980, 37); Benardete (1991, 124). 
119 
 
future rewards (cf. 240e9-241a2).36  The beloved must be moderate in the sense of ruling 
his desires by opinions, although these opinions are evidently unreasonable; we shall call 
such moderation vulgar moderation, in light of its reliance upon mere opinion. 
 We must examine the details of what amounts to a criticism of vulgar moderation 
more closely.  It is striking that the virtues of which the lover would deprive the beloved 
are now said to pertain to “intellect” (dianoia) as opposed soul, as will later be suggested 
(contrast 239a5 and c1 with 241c5), especially since this has the consequence of 
presenting courage as an intellectual virtue.  To speak of soul as opposed to speaking of 
intellect by itself would seem to mean treating intellect as bound together with desire (cf. 
246a6-7).  Thus, the failure to mention soul here seems to accord with the prior denial of 
any connection between desire for beauty and the good of the intellect, for an 
understanding of beauty as something bound to the good of the intellect would 
presumably require an account of some interdependence of intellect and desire.  That 
courage, which presumably pertains to the willingness or desire to face fears, is presented 
as a virtue of intellect alone and not as a disposition of intellect together with desire calls 
our attention to the inadequacy of the earlier dichotomy of opinion and desire on which 
the speech’s view of moderation is based. 
 Taking manliness as akin to courage (cf. 239c7-d1 with d4-7), the next portion of 
the treatment of harm to intellect, which focuses on the beloved’s loss of associations 
from which he might most become a “man” (aner), again calls our attention to the point 
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 To see the lover’s need for the beloved’s “justice”, compare the beloved’s expectation that lovers keep 
(harmful) oaths, an expectation on which he bases his gratification, with the view of oaths of the former 
lover who has intelligence (240e9-241b6).  
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made in the preceding paragraph regarding the restriction of such harm to the intellect 
while also explaining the lover’s need to oppose such virtues.  The concealed lover 
argues that the lover’s jealousy will lead to his depriving the beloved of many 
associations, especially those beneficial ones which promote manliness, the greatest of 
which is that from which he would become most thoughtful (phronimotatos), divine 
philosophy (239a7-b4).  Philosophy is thus linked to manliness, and, although this 
paradoxical37 link is not explained, it seems connected to what the concealed lover next 
notes: that philosophy would lead to the lover’s being despised, while the lover wishes 
the beloved to be ignorant and thus to “look toward” the lover in all matters (239b5-7).  
That is, wisdom is the key to independence and is at least in this sense manly.  The lover, 
however, seeks complete obedience and thus must at all costs prevent the beloved’s 
pursuit of wisdom.  Such moderation then as would blindly obey acquired opinions is 
thus tacitly criticized in light of the standard of wisdom and courage or manliness.  
 If there is still some doubt that Phaedrus is here being criticized, the next part of 
the speech, detailing harm to the beloved’s body, should put an end to it as clearly as 
could be desired.  This section of the speech is conspicuously abbreviated, for the 
concealed lover claims that the harmful activities of the beloved are clear and not worth 
detailing (239d3), and he begins the next section saying “one must let this [previous 
subject] go as clear” (239d8), implying that the matter has not in fact been fully clarified.  
The speaker’s conspicuous abbreviation points to his failure to name specific activities of 
the beloved, but if we ask why it is the activities of the beloved and not the lover that are 
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primarily in question, we are directed to an even greater omission: the concealed lover 
here speaks only of the harmful bodily conditions of the beloved which attract the lover 
(239c5) and nowhere indicates explicitly how the lover harms the beloved.  To be sure, 
we must take it as implied that the lover will encourage and seek to perpetuate the 
beloved’s harmful activities, but the omission of this point means that this section is 
primarily an indictment of the beloved.   
 If we look then at the character of the indictment, its criticism of Phaedrus 
becomes unmistakable.38  That is, in describing the beloved’s softness and avoidance of 
manly toils, the concealed lover says the beloved will be “reared not in pure sunlight but 
under mixed shade” (239c6-8);39 Phaedrus’ desire for shade has already been indicated 
(229b1), and his concern for shade together with his avoidance of bright sunlight will 
become conspicuous shortly after the speech (242a3-6), just as his later suggestion that 
life should be lived for pleasures free from pains (258e1-4) confirms that he must seek to 
avoid manly toils which surely involve pain (239c7-8, d4-7).  There is no contradiction 
between the suggestion that Phaedrus is soft and seeks to avoid pains and the suggestion 
that he believes in and exhibits a vulgar moderation which requires the acceptance of 
some pains, for as Phaedrus’ very formulation of his desire for pleasures without pains 
indicates, he is aware of painful bodily needs, and it is the pleasures associated with these 
needs that he disparages (258e1-5).   Phaedrus’ desire to avoid pain leads him, under the 
guidance of medical professionals, to moderate his desires, thus exhibiting some 
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 The beloved is also described as adorned with alien colors and adornments (239d1-2); this could be a 
reference to Phaedrus’ carrying a book, which Socrates claims renders him attractive (227d2-5, 228d6-e2).  
Cf. 275a4, where books are described as “alien markings.” 
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resistance to pain, so as to render life as painless as possible; he wishes above all to avoid 
living for, or viewing as highest, pleasures that are inseparable from pains.  Socrates, 
here, with his appeals to manliness and criticisms of softness tries to arouse in Phaedrus a 
greater appreciation for toughness, while he omits here specific details of the beloved’s 
activities so as to avoid too direct and therefore offensive a criticism of Phaedrus.  
Recalling the earlier indication of a connection between manliness and philosophy, it 
would seem that Socrates here implies that Phaedrus would need greater toughness also if 
he were to turn towards philosophy.  Philosophy’s need for such toughness may be 
explained if one considers the pain one would need to undergo to free oneself from 
opinions and attain the independence of wisdom.40     
 The speech’s appeal to manliness thus accords with its praise of philosophy and a 
criticism of Phaedrus with regard to both, but the appeal to manliness also criticizes 
Phaedrus’ view of friendship.  Much of Lysias’ speech appealed to the beloved’s concern 
for friendship, and Phaedrus appeared to share this concern (cf. 234e2).  Now, Socrates 
will speak in glowing terms of friendship (239e3-4), but only after first indicating the 
need for manliness on the part of the good friend.  Socrates concludes his treatment of 
bodily harm, saying that the beloved will have such a body as in times of war or other 
great distress gives enemies confidence and friends fear (239d4-7).  A good friend must 
be manly in body if he is to help his friends, but, more importantly, if a friend is to be 
“most good-willed” (eunoustaton) towards his friends, as Socrates indicates he should be 
(239e4), he must have courage or the willingness to hazard great dangers and pains on his 
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 Consider also the lesson of the story of the cicadas, according to which one must resist their enchanting 
offer which includes a painless death (see pages 107-108 above). 
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friend’s behalf in times of distress.  Thus, the conclusion of the treatment of the body 
prepares the turn to the treatment of friendship (as the primary point of the discussion of 
external possessions), and Socrates’ criticism of Phaedrus’ unmanly or soft moderation 
implies a further criticism of his capacity for friendship.  In extreme circumstances, 
Phaedrus’ aversion to pain is at odds with his appreciation of friendship; Socrates wishes 
to strengthen the later while weakening the former, and, as we have suggested, by so 
doing Socrates may also bring Phaedrus closer to philosophy.   
 Phaedrus has now been criticized from the point of view of philosophy, 
manliness, and friendship, and the vulgar moderation to which he is attracted has been 
exposed as encouraging these deficiencies.  Such deficiencies render Phaedrus 
susceptible to Lysias’ rhetoric, which, by masking its appeal to his concerns for 
friendship and virtue with an appeal to self-interest that denies the need for sacrifice, 
would permit Phaedrus to ignore the dangers to himself that are implied by his concern 
for virtue and others.  More generally, vulgar moderation in a beloved is conducive to a 
concealed lover’s success.  Thus the moderation by which love was condemned turns out 
to be a means to love’s success, in which case vulgar moderation hardly seems an 
adequate standard by which to condemn love.  Thus the speech now turns from a 
criticism of the moderation by which love was condemned to a quiet criticism of the 
initial characterization of lovers, which is called for now that the moderation which 
condemned eros has been shown to be deficient.   
At the conclusion of his discussion of the lover’s harm to property, the concealed 
lover notes that the lover will seek to deprive his beloved of wife, child, and household 
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for as long as possible, so as to have the beloved for himself as long as possible (240a6-
8).  Thus the concealed lover tacitly admits that lovers seek unending possession of their 
beloved, in which case it appears that love aims at more than mere bodily beauty.  Next, 
in the discussion of the painfulness of lovers, it becomes clear that the lover’s pursuit of 
beauty is hardly well understood as a simple pursuit of pleasure.  The concealed lover 
argues that what is compulsory is painful for all involved, and his explicit point here is 
that the lover’s compulsion to be with the beloved is unpleasant for the beloved 
(240c4ff.), but it is the lover here, as throughout the whole speech (238e3, 239a7, 239c4-
5, 240a4), who is primarily under compulsion, and thus love, the alleged pursuit of 
pleasure, turns out to be an allegedly painful compulsion.  Furthermore and more 
fundamentally, this painful compulsion is not simply painful but precisely where its 
pleasantness is indicated it seems to aim at something more than pleasure.  For the lover, 
as the concealed lover now admits, perhaps counting on the repulsive picture he presents 
of an older man’s sexual gratification to conceal the admission, is driven by necessity not 
only to pleasurably perceive his beloved in every way, but also constantly, with pleasure, 
“to serve him closely” (240c6-d4).  That is, the lover’s desire for beauty compels his 
constant service of the beloved; it is true that this service is pleasant, but this also means 
that the lover pursues more than his own pleasure.  It is now finally obvious that the 
lover’s immoderate desire for beauty cannot require or permit the lover to seek to weaken 
his beloved in all respects so as to make him easier to possess, for the lover, as Lysias 
also admitted, seeks to benefit the beloved.  We see here again the consequence of the 
initial failure to consider the relation between the attraction to the beautiful and the 
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concern for the good, most immediately, in this case the connection between beauty and 
the good of the beautiful beloved.   
 The speech has thus far presented both Phaedrus’ view of moderation so as to 
subject it to criticism for its reliance on mere opinion and its related lack of wisdom, 
manliness, and due consideration of what is required by friendship, deficiencies rooted in 
Phaedrus’ avoidance of pain, and it has indicated the deficiency of the speech’s initial 
view of love, which was condemned by the standard of vulgar moderation.  We may then 
connect Phaedrus’ defective moderation to his defective view of love and beauty, for the 
desire for beauty is more than a mere desire for pleasure, as it entails service to another, 
and therefore, while such service is pleasant, it is certainly a mixed pleasure, including, at 
the least, the risk of some, perhaps very great, pains.  As a pleasant compulsion to benefit 
another, love is a mixed or impure pleasure which, like philosophy, manliness, and 
friendship, requires the acceptance of pains as inextricably linked to the goods sought (cf. 
pages 107-108 and note 40 above).  To show that love, like philosophy, manliness, and 
friendship is tied to pain in this way and that it is not adequately condemned by the 
standard of opinion is not, however, to show that love is in fact good.  On this point the 
speech seems above all to leave Phaedrus or the reader with the question of the relation 
between beauty and the good as a question to ask of the teaching of the palinode. 
 Yet the speech’s conclusion itself offers a disconcerting and unexplained answer: 
love is not simply good.  After having quietly revised its presentation of lovers and 
accordingly now replacing the earlier mentions of harm to intellect with harm to the 
“education of soul” (241c5), the speech presents the former lover as better off as a result 
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of his no longer loving.  Once the lover has “desisted from love” (240e8), i.e., not merely 
when the lover has fallen in love with a new beloved (cf. 241b1-3), the former lover has a 
new leader, intelligence (nous) and moderation instead of love and madness (241a3).41  
Intelligence or rationality is now coupled with moderation, and thus we have a return to 
moderation as the speech originally defined it (cf. 237e2-3).  This moderation seems to 
stand higher than the vulgar moderation which has been criticized, and the former lover 
regards it as such a gain that he is “compelled” to violate his past oaths to his beloved 
lest, by “doing the same things” as he did before,” irrationally serving the beloved, as we 
may infer, he may go back to being a lover (241a7-b4).42  The speaker could have 
rendered the former lover more unattractive by presenting him betraying his former 
beloved for a new one, as Lysias had done.  Thus it seems the speaker has turned away 
from the attempt merely to condemn love as harshly as possible, and yet it seems he 
wishes to maintain a condemnation of lovers. 
 Perhaps, however, the condemnation has been softened, and love is no longer 
presented as simply bad; perhaps love, while itself mindless, has prepared the former 
lover for his acquisition of intelligence.  The speaker claims that lovers are by necessity 
mindless (241b7), but he makes no claim that all nonlovers have intelligence, saying only 
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 Note that the speech now introduces madness instead of hubris in its treatment of love.  Perhaps the 
presentation of love here is meant somehow to accord with or prepare that of the palinode;  perhaps hubris 
is not so opposed to intelligence as madness is. 
42
 The lover is said also to be influenced by shame (241a6-7).  Out of shame he will not dare to say he has 
become other nor to uphold his past oaths, but the failure to uphold his oaths is explained subsequently as 
the result of a rational calculation (241b1-3), and thus the shame seems to apply especially to daring to say 
he “has become other.”  It does not say that he does not dare to admit he was once a lover, but that he no 
longer is one.  It seems that the former lover, while not considering love simply good, is aware of its power 
and feels shame at condemning it, as Socrates himself subsequently professes to do (243b4-7, d3-4).  
Socrates’ shame, in any event, is linked to his awareness of the divinity of Love, and thus we must wait 
until this divinity has been explained before we can offer an explanation of the shame. 
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that the nonlover who also (kai) has intelligence should be preferred (241c1), yet he does 
presume that the former lover has intelligence (241a3-4, b1).  That one who loved has 
been freed from the grip of eros evidently is evidence enough that he has acquired 
intelligence, although we should note that the former lover is also not simply free from 
love—he must vigilantly guard against acting in such a way as to become a lover again 
(241b1-3).  Since there may be other nonlovers who lack intelligence, we may wonder 
whether having loved offers some peculiar advantage for its attainment.   The beloveds 
themselves seem to be examples of nonlovers who lack intelligence, as is evidenced by 
their incomprehension of their former lover’s intelligence and moderation (241a4-6, b5-
c1). If we then look to Phaedrus as the example of or the stand-in for a beloved, we see 
someone opposed to love, a nonlover, whose lack of eros permits him to leave the 
character of beauty unexamined, and whose ignorance of his deficiencies in philosophy, 
manliness, and friendship, could perhaps be remedied by an improved awareness of 
beauty.  We may contrast Phaedrus then with a former lover, who would presumably 
have a much greater awareness of beauty’s character and who is asserted to have 
intelligence.  The former lover would be aware of beauty, and we may wonder further if 
it is because he has also somehow become aware of beauty’s relation to the good that he 
is able to be a former lover.  In this case, he would have had to carry out what we 
indicated was missing from the concealed lover’s approach at the outset, an analysis of 
the standard, i.e., the good, and its relation to beauty.  Having carried out such an 
analysis, the former lover would be prepared also to understand the “hubris” or 
“madness” which opposes the good aimed at by reason, which seemed to be the source of 
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the many’s self-contradictions, and the awareness of which seemed to be necessary for 
rising above self-contradiction.   In this way, finally, we may understand why the former 
lover, as a result of loving and ceasing to love has acquired intelligent or rational 
moderation.  The speech therefore concludes by raising the possibility that intelligent 
moderation is accessible only or especially to former lovers, precisely because of their 
having loved, in which case love would be rational and a good, not unqualifiedly, but as 
the means to a higher, post-erotic moderation. 
 It is difficult to determine at this point how to assess the indications about eros 
that we have discerned in this first speech of Socrates, for he is about to take back his 
blame of eros and offer a much longer, more beautiful praise, as we shall discuss below 
(cf. 257aff.).   Exercising caution, we take only some questions which we shall apply to 
the palinode.  Above all, we wish to understand the stance taken in the palinode on the 
relation between beauty and the human good: does the lover attain something truly good 
or even enter into the best way of life in virtue of his eros?  Does the palinode offer any 
support for the suggestion with which we concluded our study of the first speech, that 
while eros is superior to vulgar moderation, philosophy, or the life of the intelligent man, 
is higher than eros? And if the palinode does support this suggestion, what good does it 
suggest eros offers over vulgar moderation?  That we are inclined to raise such questions 
after a close study of Socrates’ first speech perhaps suggests something of his ultimate 
purpose in making it, or Plato’s purpose in having him make it: by prefacing what is his 
greatest praise of love with a harsh blame of love, he prepares the reader (or Phaedrus if 
he thinks back on the speech) to look more critically at the subsequent praise, regardless 
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of the fact that Socrates will disavow the first speech in the interim.  By thus prefacing 
the praise with the blame of eros that he would have his Socrates take back, Plato  makes 
it easier for readers still enchanted by eros to indulge their eros, and he would have 
wished to do this precisely if he thought eros superior to the lack of eros for the non-
philosophers.                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Part Three: Socrates’ Palinode 
 
  
Turning now to the palinode, and taking a preliminary glance at its suggestion of 
the connection between love, beauty, and the human good or philosophy (cf. especially 
249c1-250c6), our interpretation of the conclusion of Socrates’ first speech makes little 
sense.  For according to that interpretation eros may be considered qualifiedly good but 
inferior to rational moderation, and is not the heart of the palinode’s teaching that the 
divinely inspired philosopher is led by his erotic longing for beauty to recall the realm of 
truly intelligible beings, the contemplation of which constitutes the blessedness of life?  
Does not Socrates show there not only that the moderation and friendship which 
Phaedrus has been seen to admire can only reach their perfection through well-managed 
eros (cf. especially 254b5-256e2), but also that a philosophic life too entails such eros?  
There can be no doubt that Socrates’ palinode does suggest a connection between eros 
and philosophy, but, as it seems to me, the palinode can hardly be said to explain the 
connection in an immediately clear or straightforward manner.  Furthermore, however 
highly erotic love for another person may be praised, there can be no doubt that in 
Socrates’ view its rank, as the means to philosophy, is lower than that of philosophy, just 
as beauty is somehow a means for the recollection of the intelligible beings as a whole.  
Indeed, since Socrates takes philosophy to be the peak of human life, it would seem that 
he could only offer the fullest possible praise of eros by somehow connecting it to 
philosophy (cf. 257a3-4).  The question, then, is only whether eros is merely a 
preliminary means to a philosophic life as the conclusion of Socrates’ first speech 
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suggests or whether eros remains as the indispensible inspiration for philosophizing.  
Even if the overwhelming impression given by this most beautiful piece of Socratic 
rhetoric opposes it, we do ourselves no harm by bearing in mind the former possibility as 
we turn to the interpretation of the palinode; we are inclined thereby only to scrutinize 
more carefully the connection indicated between philosophy and eros. 
 
The Interlude between Socrates’ First and Second Speech 
  
Before offering his palinode, Socrates engages in a brief conversation with 
Phaedrus, introducing a number of important themes which he will develop in the 
palinode.  First, after Phaedrus asks Socrates why he has not thoroughly praised the 
nonlover in his previous speech (241d4-7), Socrates, threatening to leave, indicates that 
their time together is at a critical junction (242a1-2).  In asking at this point if Phaedrus 
has not noticed that he had already gone from dithyrambs to epic verse in his speech, and 
that he therefore would be unable to continue to the praise Phaedrus requested (241e1-3), 
Socrates calls our attention to his previous speech’s concluding line, which was in the 
epic dactylic hexameter.43  In this line, he portrays the lovers as wolves chasing lambs 
(241d1), thus reversing his previous rehabilitation of lovers (see pages 125-128 above).  
Socrates thus seems to note that Phaedrus’ question shows his misunderstanding of the 
whole speech, and, perhaps more importantly, that Phaedrus shows no repugnance at 
such a portrayal of lovers.  It is then perhaps this defect of Phaedrus which inclines 
Socrates to leave.   
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 See Nichols (1998, 43 note 70). 
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Phaedrus asks Socrates to stay, suggesting they converse about the speeches 
(242a3-6), perhaps showing that Phaedrus is still open to some education.  While 
Socrates will stay, he uncharacteristically chooses to offer a second, much longer speech 
rather than discuss the content of the speeches.44  Socrates indicates two reasons for this 
choice, both stemming from his sense of the inadequacy of his first speech.  The first 
speech was both simpleminded and impious; Socrates must purify himself for these 
offenses (242d7, 243b3-7, d3-5).  There is reason to doubt Socrates is in need of such 
purification, for he seems to have been aware of the misleading content of the previous 
speech from the start, as is indicated both by his covering himself out of shame before the 
speech (237a4-5, cf. 242c7-8, 243b4-7), his self-interruption in the speech’s middle 
(238c5ff.), and the details of the speech which show Socrates’ disagreement with its 
apparent teaching.45  In this case, it is more likely that Phaedrus is the one in need of 
purification.  The speech’s simplemindedness, which consists in its maintaining a false 
thesis merely to gain reputation among “little men” (242e5-243a2), renders the speech 
contemptible to men of more noble breeding with experience of love (243c2-d1).  This is 
already of some concern to Phaedrus (243d2), as Socrates notes (243c1-2).  On the other 
hand, the speech’s impiety is of somewhat less concern to Phaedrus (242d10, 243b8-9).  
Thus it seems Socrates is especially concerned with Phaedrus’ impiety.  The rhetoric of 
Socrates’ palinode is therefore meant to lead Phaedrus’ soul towards piety; it will be an 
enchanting speech. 
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 See Griswold (1986, 71); Benardete (1991, 127). 
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 Consider also his attribution of the speech to Phaedrus (242d11-e1, 243e9-244a1). 
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 Phaedrus’ doubts about the gods, as well as some concern with piety, were 
indicated near the dialogue’s beginning, as Socrates reminds us now by referring to his 
speech’s impiety as “terrible” (deinon) (242d4-7; cf. 236d10-e1), for this was the term 
Socrates had used earlier to describe the impious sophists (229d4).  There, Phaedrus, 
expressing some interest in Socrates’ own views, asked whether Socrates believed the 
myth of Boreas’ possession of Oreithyia was true (229c4-5).  Socrates responded by 
indicating that, unlike the sophists with whom Phaedrus is known to have associated (cf. 
Protagoras 315c, cf. Phaedrus 266d5ff.), he is not satisfied by replacing myths relying 
on divine beings with accounts relying on natural causes (229c7-d1).  For he regards such 
a task as incapable of completion (229d2-e4) and, in any event, as secondary to his need 
for self-knowledge, in the absence of which the Delphic injunction compels him to 
investigate himself (229e4-230a1).  Socrates gives Phaedrus no chance to respond to his 
account (230a6-7), and, given the brevity of Socrates’ statement, Phaedrus is probably 
still unsure of what Socrates believes about the gods.  The palinode will offer a fuller 
account. 
 Prior to the palinode, and even prior to indicating his first speech’s impiety, 
Socrates already begins to hint at his view of the gods.  After indicating that Phaedrus has 
caused him to give another speech (242b4-5), Socrates attributes this decision to his 
daimonion (242b8-c3),46 and indicates that, in his own way, he engages in prophecy, 
purifications, and poetry, the three forms of divine madness which he will discuss at the 
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 For more extensive discussion of the daimonion see Strauss (1983, 45-47); Bruell (1999, 48,112).  
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beginning of his palinode (cf. 244a8-245a8).47  The soul too is somehow prophetic, as 
Socrates’ soul divines his error (242c3-9); Socrates will imitate Stesichorus’ method of 
purification (243a3-b5, cf. 244a2); and he has already invoked the Muses to begin his 
first speech (237a7-b1).  Yet Socrates’ own versions of the traditional forms of divine 
madness are highly unconventional: it is unclear whether he regards his first speech as 
genuinely inspired, but he regards its content in any event as impious; his prophecy and 
purification are the work of his own soul, and he does not attribute them to any god.  We 
shall have to wait for the palinode to further assess Socrates’ relationship to these three 
traditional forms of divine madness. 
 Finally, we should note that when Socrates says he will imitate Stesichorus’ 
method of purification, he indicates that he will do so by modeling his own palinode on 
that of Stesichorus, from whose speech Socrates’ takes its name (243a3-b5, 244a2, cf. 
257a4).  Stesichorus, like Homer, lost his sight due to his evil speaking regarding Helen 
(243a3-6), which evidently means that these poets committed an impiety in attributing 
the horrors of the Trojan War to the beautiful Helen and the love she inspired.  Thus, 
Stesichorus wrote, “this speech is not genuine, she did not go on well-benched ships, nor 
did she come to Pergamon of Troy” (243a8-b1).  By so writing, Stesichorus no longer 
attributes the war to Helen, but he accomplishes this only by also denying that the lover, 
Paris, was gratified.  Socrates will follow this pattern, for he will argue for the goodness 
of beauty, but only by denying that the lover should be gratified (cf. 256b7-c6).48           
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 Cf. Sallis (1975, 134-135); Burger (1980, 46); Griswold (1986, 76-77), Benardete (1991, 133). 
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 Cf. Benardete (1991, 130). 
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Divine Madness 
 
Socrates makes the question of the connection between the gods and eros thematic 
from the outset of his palinode.  He does this first by attributing his speech to Stesichorus, 
whom he refers to as the son of Euphemus (244a2), thus suggesting the pious character of 
the forthcoming speech,49 and then by indicating that the precise failure of the previous 
speech was the failure to see the divine character of some madness, which, as Socrates 
will argue, includes erotic madness. That is, the thesis that one should prefer a nonlover 
to a lover due to the lover’s madness would be fine (kalos), if madness were simply bad, 
but in fact the greatest goods (agathon) come to be through divinely given madness 
(244a4-8).  Therefore, before turning to his argument that eros is sent by the gods (cf. 
245b7-c4), Socrates offers more general evidence that madness is not simply bad, 
adducing examples of madness which are widely accepted as divine.  By calling attention 
to the broad acceptance of the divinity of these forms of madness, Socrates surely raises 
some doubt about the condemnation of madness, thus preparing his audience to consider 
eros’ connection to the divine.  At the same time, however, as Phaedrus’ question and 
Socrates’ response near the outset of the dialogue indicate (229c4ff.), the acceptance of 
the divinity of these forms of madness, though widespread, is not simply universal; by 
tying his thesis about eros to these forms of madness, Socrates necessarily raises the 
question, for some people (including Phaedrus), of whether the connection between eros 
and the gods is not as dubious as that of the other forms of madness.  Furthermore, 
Socrates’ introductory suggestion of the divinity of these other forms of madness appears 
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all the more out of place when compared with his subsequent ranking of human lives, for 
the relatively low ranking of the lives characterized by such madness hardly accords with 
his initial praise (248d7-e2).  There, the lives are ranked in accordance with the amount 
of truth a soul has seen (248d2), and Socrates therefore implies that however divine these 
forms of madness may be, their awareness of the principles of their inspiration or 
madness is deficient.  Since these forms of madness are taken to be sent from the 
conventionally accepted gods (cf. 265b2-4), Socrates’ indication would seem to be that 
they entail mistaken views of the gods.  Socrates therefore seems to be`gin his palinode 
by quietly calling attention to the generally pervasive misunderstanding of the gods 
which permits the widespread acceptance of the divinity of these forms of madness.   
 Of the three forms of non-erotic divine madness, Socrates speaks first and at 
greatest length of prophecy.  Whereas Socrates claimed that divine madness brings the 
greatest goods, he now asserts that the prophets at Delphi and Dodona have accomplished 
many beautiful things (kala) when mad, while accomplishing nothing when moderate 
(244a8-b3).50  One might suggest Socrates is using beauty and goodness interchangeably 
here, but this seems unlikely in a speech dedicated to the precise understanding of beauty. 
The suspicion that, in Socrates’ view, whatever goodness may derive from prophecy is 
not derived directly but via its beauty is perhaps further strengthened by his additional 
note that the Sibyl and other prophets have “guided aright”(orthosan) many (244b3-5), 
given the ambiguity of his earlier use of orthos (see pages 113-114 above). 
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 Furthermore, these are accomplished for Greece and not necessarily for the prophets or the individuals 
who have consulted them, despite the fact that Socrates indicates that the prophets have been subject to 
both private and public consultation (244a8-b3).  The Greek communities may be more directly beautified 
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 To embellish his praise of prophecy, Socrates engages in some playful 
etymologizing, which, while supporting the praise of prophecy, first places the difference 
between all the forms of divine madness on the one hand and human thought on the other 
in the starkest light, and then playfully puts in question the superiority of such madness.  
Socrates claims that prophecy (mantike), was originally named “the art of madness” 
(manike), for the ancients believed divine madness beautiful, but “those now,” 
inexperienced in beauty (apeirokalos), add a tau to the name (244c-5).  Prophecy, 
therefore, in the ancient view, was not distinguished from other forms of madness,51 and 
Socrates’ next etymology helps explain this apparent conflation.  Socrates claims that the 
ancients named the (non-divine) inquiry into the future by means of birds and others 
signs “the art of understanding-thought-information” (oionoistiken), since it “provides 
intelligence (noun) and information (historian) from thinking (dianoia) for human 
understanding (anthropinei oiesei),” whereas “the young” today make the name for this 
merely human art more solemn, lengthening the omicron to an omega, naming it “bird 
augury” (oionistiken) (244c5-d1).  Socrates thus contrasts all human thought (dianoia), 
including that of philosophers (cf. 249c4-5), with madness.52 While the two arts in 
question are directly concerned only with the future (244c1, 244c6), the human art, at any 
rate, makes predictions based on its understanding of the past and present.  Therefore, 
prophecy implies the rejection of one’s merely human understanding, not only of the 
future but of all things, in favor of an understanding given by the gods.  Thus, the ancient 
conflation of all the forms of divine madness into prophecy implies that the defining 
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 The madness of ritual purification is also said to “prophesy” (propheteusasa) (244d7). 
52
 Cf. Burger (1980, 49). 
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feature of divine madness is that one’s understanding is taken to be given by the gods, a 
characteristic that would hold of poetic inspiration and ritual purifications.  The contrast 
between divine madness and human thought raises the question of whether one should 
guide oneself by human thought alone or whether one’s thought should rely on the gods.  
Socrates then concludes his etymologizing by rendering his apparent preference for the 
divine questionable, saying, “by as much as prophecy (mantike) is more perfect and 
honored than bird augury (oionistiken), both in name and in deed, by so much do the 
ancients testify that madness from god is more beautiful than human moderation” 
(244d2-5).  Socrates uses the modern names, in which prophecy has been named 
gracelessly and bird augury has been solemnized, and then suggests a comparison of the 
two names, in order to rank the two arts.  Socrates’ later ranking of the philosophic life 
far above the prophetic would then seem to remove any doubt as to which he regards as 
superior (248d2ff.). 
 Socrates turns next to the madnesses of ritual purifications and poetry.  Here, 
while praising each form of madness as divine, he quietly notes their limitations.  The 
purifying madness comes to those “for whom it was needful” and discovers prayers and 
rituals to release those in need from the sicknesses and toils of ancient guilt (244d5-e1).  
Socrates indicates that this madness had to arise for these people, and his omission of any 
god who provides it suggests that it is the inevitable result of the sickness of those who 
go mad.53  Furthermore, Socrates suggests that the purifying rituals make their 
practitioner safe for the present and future but immediately adds that it is release from 
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 Of course, since he wishes to praise divine madness, Socrates also for this reason cannot trace this 
sickness, which stems from” ancient guilt”, to the gods.  
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present evils in particular that is found (244e2-4).  The release from evils then coincides 
with the state of madness rather than resulting from the prayers and rituals discovered in 
a state of madness (cf. 244e1-2).  Socrates allows or implies that the purifying madness 
itself consists in a self-forgetting state, in which one’s awareness of guilt vanishes, and 
after which one may live regarding oneself as guilt-free.54  Finally, Socrates addresses the 
madness of poets who, however much they may be aided in their work by inspiration 
from the Muses and so “educate posterity” (245a1-5), do not also educate themselves, for 
Socrates here omits mention of the poet’s self-education, and he elsewhere denies it 
outright (cf. Apology 22b-c, Protagoras, 247e, and Republic 601a).55  The cost of poetic 
inspiration seems to be self-ignorance.   
 We must note, however, that despite his doubts about the conventionally accepted 
forms of divine madness, Socrates still goes out of his way to make his defense of eros 
depend upon its being given by the gods.  That is, as Socrates turns from his introductory 
discussion of other forms of divine madness to his defense of eros, he states what he must 
prove, binding his defense of eros to its divine origin.  Whereas it would seem that a 
defense of eros only requires showing that love is good, Socrates says that he must show 
that eros is given by the gods for the greatest good fortune, just as his opponent must 
show not only that eros is harmful, but that it is not sent to the lover and beloved from the 
gods for their benefit (245b4-c1).  It could seem that Socrates unnecessarily increases the 
difficulty of his task by demanding that he prove the divine origin of eros, but then we 
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 Cf. Burger (ibid.). Consider also 268c-269a in context, where Socrates attributes the poetic art to 
Euripides and Sophocles and does not suggest one must gain inspiration from the Muses to attain this art. 
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must also note the great difficulty Socrates supplies to his opponent, the moderate man 
who wishes to be chosen as a friend instead of the lover (245b4),56 namely, that he must 
disprove the divinity of eros.  Such rationalizations of myths as Socrates earlier attributed 
to the sophists do not seem to satisfy Socrates’ demand for such a proof (cf. 229c6ff.).  
Thus, when Socrates goes on to say that his “demonstration” (apodeixis) will be 
untrustworthy to the clever (deinois), using the term by which he characterized the 
sophists (229d4, cf. 242d4-7), the limitation Socrates admits to his speech’s 
persuasiveness seems to indicate the defective character of the sophists rather than any 
theoretical superiority they may possess.  Socrates can therefore add that his speech will 
be trustworthy to the wise (245c2).  With this addition, however, Socrates suggests a 
change from the stance towards myth that he previously claimed to hold, for earlier, 
however ironically, Socrates also attributed the distrust of myth to the wise (229c6) and 
claimed that he himself set aside questions of the truth of myth, accepted the customary 
beliefs, and tried only to know himself (229e4-230a2).57  Now, Socrates separates the 
wise from the merely clever and indicates that he cannot avoid an investigation of the 
gods; such an investigation is necessary for self-knowledge in any erotic being. 
  
The Immortality and Idea of Soul 
 
The beginning of Socrates’ demonstration takes the form of a proof of the soul’s 
immortality.  It is true, as Griswold notes, that “no one maintains that the palinode’s 
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 Socrates has now changed the contest over whom the beloved should gratify to one over whom the 
beloved should befriend (cf. 243e5-6, 244a4-5): this is in keeping with Socrates’ later suggestion that 
gratification (in its usual meaning) should be avoided for the sake of philosophic friendship (256a7-c5). 
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 Compare, however, 252e5-253a1; see pages 169-174 below. 
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argument for immortality…is sound” (1986, 144).  Yet Socrates’ subsequent myth 
presupposes the immortality of incorporeal human souls,58 and his depiction of the erotic 
experience then relies on that myth.  To save Socrates from the logical blundering of 
which his proof seems to render him guilty, one is tempted to interpret the soul’s 
“immortality” here, as Griswold does, allegorically.  He writes:  
“Immortality” expresses…the thesis that a person can in principle transcend the 
obstacles posed by the dimensions of time and space to which a soul is…bound.  
The transcendence, again, occurs not by a soul’s literally leaving this life via the 
gates of death but by means of knowledge.  “Immortality” is a way of expressing 
the primordial connection between the soul and Being. (1986, 145) 
 
That is, by saying the soul is immortal, Socrates only means the soul can gain knowledge 
of eternal truths.  Now, as Griswold further notes (1986, 147), this allegorical 
interpretation raises the question of why Socrates did not just speak literally, and to his 
credit, Griswold undertakes to answer this question (1986, 147-151).  In his answer, 
Griswold does not discuss “immortality” in particular but rather Socrates’ use of “mythic 
language” in general; he notes that Socrates’ mythic language is especially suited to the 
experience of lovers: “Phenomenologically speaking, the lover may indeed feel that the 
beloved is godlike...” (1986, 148).  The beloved’s being “godlike,” however, to say 
nothing of his being worshiped as a god or his motivating a lover to investigate the nature 
of a god (251a6, 253e5ff.), presupposes the belief in gods, whose immortality surely 
consists in more than their access to “Being”.59  Furthermore, the belief in the gods 
presupposes also a belief in one’s own immortality at least insofar as, in Socrates’ 
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 Thus, while the “proof” of the soul’s immortality could seem to refer to some non-individuated “all-soul” 
(245c5), the meaning of the subsequent myth clearly suggests that the immortality of individual souls is 
presumed to have been proven. 
59
 Thus the gods only occasionally view the beings and at other times have other activities (246e4-247a8). 
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account of lovers, it is a belief in those gods whom one follows as an immortal soul.  In 
other words, Griswold would seem to admit that the erotic experience which Socrates 
describes does depend on a belief in literal immortality.  This fact then points us to the 
fundamental problem with the attempt to allegorize immortality: transcendence of the 
obstacles posed by space and time means more to us than the possibility of knowledge; in 
particular, it means, as we shall discuss below, that freedom from bodily evils, especially 
death, the yearning for which Socrates so beautifully expresses in the palinode (cf. 
especially 250c1-6).  This is to say that the erotic experience, in Socrates’ account, entails 
belief in an immortality which, going far beyond merely permitting our mind’s access to 
“Being”, means the personal immortality of the soul.  In ruling out the allegorical 
interpretation of immortality, however, we have also come across a possible explanation 
of Socrates’ failed attempt to prove its existence.  Belief in immortality, immortality in 
the full sense of transcending death, is a belief characteristic of lovers, and Socrates’ 
failure may thus indicate not his own error, but his wish to indicate quietly the limitations 
of the erotic experience while offering it his highest praise.  It makes sense in particular 
to ascribe such an intention to Socrates given his desire both to raise Phaedrus’ 
appreciation of eros and to turn Lysias, to whom Phaedrus will attempt to relate the 
speech, to philosophy (257b3-6, 243d5-e1, cf. 228a5ff.).  Further scrutiny of the speech 
will support this interpretation. 
 Unsound as his proof may be, Socrates presumably offers this particular argument 
for the soul’s immortality for some reason.  The argument’s basic structure is as follows: 
that which is always moving is immortal; only the self-moving is always moving, and the 
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soul is self-moving and hence immortal (245c5-e3).60  While Socrates presents the first 
two steps rather straightforwardly, the third is more complicated.  By Socrates’ account, 
what is self-moving must also be a source for all other moved beings, for a source must 
never come into being, but whatever comes into being must come from a source (245c8-
d2).61  This source must also be indestructible, for otherwise the heaven and generation 
would collapse with its destruction (245d7-e2).  With so much then depending on the 
soul, and its own immortality at stake, Socrates now asserts that one “would not be 
ashamed” to affirm that the soul is what is self-moving (245e2-4).  In this way, Socrates 
makes the soul’s immortality depend upon its being self-moving, and he makes the 
affirmation of this dependent on shame, giving no reason for it, thus rendering this 
premise especially questionable.  Suspicion that the soul might not be self-moving in the 
required sense is heightened when we look back to Socrates’ earlier statement that “what 
moves another and is moved by another” is mortal (245c6-7).  For while it should only be 
a thing’s being moved by another, or its dependence on another, which renders a thing 
mortal, Socrates there adds also what moves another, which is the very thing Socrates 
says soul does for body (245e4-6).  But then the question may become whether soul, as a 
self-mover that moves another is not also such as to be moved,62 and in raising this 
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 See Sallis for a much more detailed and exceptionally clear presentation of the argument (1975, 135-
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 Socrates thus also asserts the principle of causality in the course of his proof, and his argument presents 
soul as the principle on which all movement depends and thus as the foundation of the intelligibility of the 
cosmos.  Perhaps this is also the meaning of Socrates’ later indication that incorporeal soul manages the 
cosmos and takes care of everything without soul (246b6-c1).  In this case, Socrates’ myth presents a 
cosmos whose intelligibility is grounded in the immortal soul, thus providing a foundation for philosophy.  
The failure of the proof then leaves open the question of whether the cosmos is intelligible, unless the 
unmoved hypouranian beings, to which even the gods are subordinate, are meant to replace the immortal 
soul in this respect. 
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 Cf. Sallis (1975, 139-140)  
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question we cannot help but recall Socrates’ reference to the lover as the one “having 
been moved” (kekinemenou) immediately prior to his “proof”.  The lover’s “having been 
moved” may refer to the growth of his soul’s wings as it absorbs the particles of the 
beloved’s beauty (251c5-d1);  his soul’s mad dash after the beloved, at whose sudden 
conclusion the soul’s horses stop moving entirely at the sight of the beloved’s beauty and 
moderation (254b5-c2); or his soul’s past motion around the hupouranian beings, to 
which love somehow recalls him, where the soul itself “stands fast” and is moved by the 
heavenly rotation, (247b7-c1).  In any event, eros or our erotic experience seems to be the 
preeminent evidence for the soul’s being moved, and Socrates’ proof therefore fails 
precisely so as to point to eros as the marker of mortality.63  In this way, we can then 
understand more easily Socrates’ statement at his proof’s conclusion: “all body to which 
[being moved] comes from within itself is ensouled, since this is the nature of soul” 
(245e4-6).  For this suggests that the soul’s nature is bound to the way in which a certain 
kind of body is moved, and this would seem to make soul somehow dependent on body, 
which, as we shall see, means mortal.     
 Socrates turns from his conditional conclusion of the soul’s immortality (245e6-
a1) to its idea (idea) (246a3), or what sort it is (246a4), or what it is like (246a5).  The 
very order of the argument highlights the difficulty of beginning with soul’s immortality: 
must one not first know what soul is in order then to determine whether it is such as to be 
immortal?  Furthermore, Socrates indicates that it is beyond his power to give an account 
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 To the objection that I have just asserted that belief in immortality belongs to eros, only now to suggest 
that eros is a sign of mortality, it may be that the very awareness of mortality that underlies the erotic 
experience spurs one towards the hope for immortality which accompanies that experience, and that 
reflection on that hope then makes one more deeply aware of the problem which it was to address. 
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of what sort soul is, both due to the length but also the divinity of such an account 
(246a4-6), and he thereby highlights his account’s limitation to a merely human 
perspective, thus raising the question of whether what we know of soul through our 
embodied experience of it is compatible with immortality.  At first sight, Socrates’ 
likeness of soul, as a charioteer with two winged horses (246a6-7),64 seems designed to 
fulfill the requirement that soul be self-moving.  Socrates, however, presents the soul as a 
composite, each part of which seems to be derivative; the parts of the gods’ souls are 
“from the good” (246a7-8), and those of humans have a mixed ancestry (246b1).  
Recalling that Socrates linked the soul’s self-movement to its being a source of 
everything else which itself had no source, we see that Socrates’ image of soul fails this 
requirement.  Regarding the parts of the soul, both the gods and humans have two winged 
horses, and while the human horses are of mixed quality, one being good and beautiful, 
and one opposite to this (246b2-3), the gods’ horses are both good and therefore seem to 
be indistinguishable;65 Socrates seems to model the gods’ souls on the human as their 
perfection.66  But the human soul includes a bad horse, and the meaning of this horse’ 
badness seems to be intelligible only in terms of embodied human experience.  That is, as 
Socrates later admits (253c7-d3), the virtue and badness of the horses is only explained in 
regard to the erotic experience, and in this experience, the horse’s badness is inseparable 
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 Socrates omits reference to the chariot which would unify the soul (Sallis 1975, 141n.22; Burger 1980, 
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 The gods horses are not said to be beautiful; as we shall see, beauty has a special significance for human 
beings. 
66See Burger (1980, 54). 
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from bodily sexual desire.67  Thus Socrates’ image of soul, which is supposed to be 
incorporeal, attributes to soul corporeal attributes; our experience of life and hence soul 
seems to limit our account of soul to one of corporeal souls. 
 After presenting his image of the soul, Socrates attempts to say,68 how a living 
being or animal (zoon) came to be called both mortal and immortal (246b5-6).  The task 
is ambiguous: having argued for soul’s immortality, Socrates may be asking what can 
still be understood by death, but he may also be asking how we came to speak of humans 
and gods as mortal and immortal living beings respectively.  In any event, both questions 
are addressed.  Mortality and animality or life are the result of the soul’s embodiment 
which itself follows from the soul’s loss of wings, animals being the composites of soul 
and body, and death being the subsequent separation of soul from body (246c2-6, cf. 
256d4-5).  Our embodiment implies our mortality.  Regarding immortal living beings, 
Socrates says, “immortal is not from any reasoned-out account (logou lelogismenou), but 
we fashion (plattomen) god without seeing or sufficiently understanding (hikanos 
noesantes) as some immortal living being, having a soul and body naturally grown 
together for all time” (246c6-d2).  It is unclear how to take these lines: do they indicate 
that gods are merely a human fabrication? Or are they merely a criticism of the 
conventional attribution of bodies to gods?  At the least, Socrates indicates that living 
beings or animals have bodies and that the idea of an immortal ensouled body is 
unreasonable, presumably because bodies are moveable and hence destructible.  This 
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 See especially 254a4, where the black horse “no longer” heeds the charioteer’s goads after the sight of 
the beloved, implying that the black horse only comes into his own with sexual arousal. 
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 It is only in this section of the myth that Socrates indicates he can make only an “attempt”.  His later 
account of how eros leads a lover to see his beloved as a god may in part be regarded as the completion of 
this attempt to say how an animal comes to be called immortal. 
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implies that the gods are not animals or living beings.  Life is incompatible with 
immortality.69  The gods are not as “we fashion” them or as they are conventionally taken 
to be, and having ruled out this possibility, Socrates reverently allows these things to be 
and be said “as is dear to the god” (246d2-3). 
  
Wing Loss and the Heavenly Journey 
 
Since embodiment, or the mark of our mortality, is caused by the loss of wings, 
Socrates turns next to the cause of wing loss.  First, he explains the function of wing, 
which is to raise the “weighty” (embrithes) up to where the gods dwell (246d6-7).  It now 
appears that human souls are heavy, which seems to imply, again, that our souls are 
bodily.  Socrates later indicates that it is the horse with badness which is heavy (247b3-
4), but given the especially close connection between the bad horse and bodily desire 
indicated above, the attribution of weight to the bad horse seems to point again to the 
bodily attributes of soul.  In any event, immediately after implying that souls are heavy, 
Socrates refers to soul (according to the manuscripts) or the wings of soul (according to 
Plutarch and the editors) as “pertaining to the body” (peri to soma) (246d8).70  Now the 
account of wing loss is to explain embodiment and hence our mortality as immortal souls, 
but if the soul is always bodily and hence mortal, as Socrates seems to suggest, then such 
an account is senseless.  It may then be for this reason that Socrates’ account of wing 
loss, despite its many interesting details, leaves the loss of wing unexplained in a 
                                                          
69
 Socrates only mentions life in his proof of the soul’s immortality to indicate that those beings which 
cease moving cease living; he avoids saying that the always moving is always living (245c5-7). 
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 Cf. De Vries (1969, 130). 
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fundamental and notable sense.  It is true that Socrates explains wing loss by reference to 
the human soul’s inability to view the hupouranian beings, which nourish the wings 
(248c5-8), but this inability is ultimately rooted in the difficulty of managing the bad 
horse, a difficulty which is itself unexplained (248a1ff, cf. 247b2-5, 246b4).  
Furthermore, the necessity that wings be lost when the beings are not seen is left so 
unclear that Socrates must introduce, with no explanation, the “ordinance of Adrasteia,” 
which determines by decree that those souls who have seen any of the beings may retain 
their wings while those that fail enter human bodies (248c2-d2).71  Similarly, no 
explanation is given for souls’ regaining their wings after a certain number of human 
lives (249a1); wings certainly cannot return because they have been nourished once more 
by the beings, for the sight of the beings depends on already having wings.   
 If, then, embodiment and mortality are simply the conditions of the human soul, 
what can we make of the extended discussion of wing loss?  As indicated above, and as I 
shall try to explain below, Socrates presents the immortal life of the soul to help present 
the erotic experience, which includes belief in some such life.  Yet, given the wide 
variety of beliefs about the afterlife and given the highly unconventional depiction 
Socrates offers here, it is hardly clear that the presentation of the erotic experience 
requires just this myth.  The unconventional character of Socrates’ myth is most manifest 
at the climax of the myth, at the depiction of the hupouranian realm and the divine 
banquet.  It is this realm which all souls strive to view (247d1-3, 248b5-c2), and therefore 
it is the contemplation of this realm, containing as it does the true, i.e., incorporeal, 
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unchanging beings with which true knowledge is concerned (247c5-e2), which 
constitutes the highest activity of all souls.  Thus we may say Socrates makes the center 
of his myth an activity similar but superior to philosophy (cf. 249c1-6).  This not only 
allows Socrates to offer a simple account of the superiority of philosophy, as the life 
which most fulfills the longing of all embodied souls, but it also allows him to indicate 
the connection between eros and philosophy, a connection by no means obvious, in a 
remarkably straightforward manner.  That is, Socrates’ myth permits him to present 
rhetorically the truth, which he will only explain more subtly, that the end of eros is 
philosophy.72  By the above account, the details of the myth can be fully explained only 
by reference to Socrates’ later description of the erotic experience, but before turning to 
that description, let us turn back to where we left off and prepare ourselves by 
highlighting the myth’s main points. 
 The wings’ power takes the soul to the dwelling place of the gods, but their 
nourishment is the divine, which is beautiful, wise, and good and everything of that sort 
(246d6-e1).73  As Socrates later clarifies, these are the hupouranian beings (248c1-2).  
Hence, wings alone do not suffice to take a soul to the beings, and Socrates must add a 
discussion of the gods, for it is by following them that human souls reach the beings 
(247a6-b, 248a1-6).  Socrates’ turn to the gods here, including the names and number of 
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 Socrates’ subtlety in explaining the connection between eros and philosophy, the best way of life, permits 
him the subtlety in indicating the limitations of eros, for which purpose, as we have already seen, he also 
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mind, are not so directly opposed by ignorance.    
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the traditional gods (246e4-247a4), 74 yet occurring as it does shortly after he professed 
ignorance of the gods or denied their conventionally accepted character (246c6-246d3), is 
striking.  It would seem that Socrates allows that the gods who lead a winged soul to the 
beings retain something of the character conventionally attributed to them.75  Yet the 
activity of the gods is quite unconventional.  Zeus, the god Socrates will indicate 
philosophers followed (252e2-3), is the leader in the heaven and he orders his army or 
chorus76 putting the gods in their ranks (246e4-247a4).  Hestia, however, remains at 
home (247a1-2), allowing that one may follow one goddess, namely the one associated 
with the home and thus one’s own things, perfectly and still see nothing of the beings.77  
Socrates tells us little of what the gods do:  Zeus takes care of all things (246e5-6), but it 
is unclear toward what end, and the gods maintain the station assigned to each, seeing 
many happy sights (247a2-4).  Zeus evidently orders the gods well giving them suitable 
stations, and their activity, as far as Socrates tells us, is theoretical, viewing the sights of 
the heavens.  Socrates does, however, add two details describing the way in which the 
gods act: each does his own things (pratton hekastos auton) minding his own business 
(247a6), or practicing justice in the sense of the Republic (cf. Republic 433a8-b1),78 and 
the gods, not being envious, permit whoever is willing and able to follow them (247a6-7).  
The gods’ freedom from envy accords with their justice, for, minding their own business, 
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they do not begrudge the success of others or compel those able but unwilling to follow 
them, although this latter group would naturally miss the divine banquet. 
 It is this banquet which Socrates describes next, indicating that the gods, or “those 
called immortal” as Socrates now refers to them,79 periodically ascend to the peak of the 
heavens to nourish their minds by viewing the things outside the heavens (247a8ff.).  The 
clear indication of this passage is that the gods’ minds, except that of Hestia, have 
unmediated access to the truth, free of the body and change which limits human thought 
(247c6-7, d7-e1).  Thus the banquet allows gods to be wise, and allows humans to have 
greater or lesser, but, once embodied, only mediated or partial access to such wisdom.  
Beyond this, one may get the impression from Socrates’ description of this realm that, 
rather than explaining the precise character of what is truly intelligible (to gods), he 
engages in a rhetorical flourish to beautify the mythic activity which philosophy is said to 
imitate.  Socrates begins his description saying no poet has ever hymned or will ever 
hymn the hupouranian realm worthily (247c3-4); he then adds that he must dare to say 
the truth, especially when speaking of the truth (247c4-6).  But would it not have been 
more truthful of Socrates to admit his ignorance of this realm, instead of describing it?80  
Socrates next describes the beings with which true knowledge is concerned (247c8), but 
in his description these are so purified of any connection with the bodily world and 
relational characteristics (247d6-e1), that, at the least, one cannot see how,  in grasping 
the unity of a manifold of perceptions, humans are recalling such beings, as Socrates later 
asserts (249b6-c3).  However this may be, Socrates indicates that it is by nourishment 
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from these beings that the gods maintain their divinity (cf. 249c5-6), and he singles out 
justice, moderation, and science (episteme),81 indicating that a soul should guide itself by 
the true view of science and morality.82  
 After describing the gods’ experience of the banquet, Socrates describes the 
human, and the clearest contrast emerges.  Whereas the gods are carried around and 
peacefully have their fill (247c1-2, 247e2-4), human souls at best, by likening themselves 
to a god, manage to get their heads into the heavenly rotation while being thrown into 
confusion by their horses (248a2-5).  Other souls may get a glimpse of one or another of 
the beings but their view is very incomplete (248a5-6), but what is most striking in 
contrast to the divine chorus is what happens to souls who remain below the surface, 
who, as such, are at risk of becoming human beings.  Hardly free of envy,83 these souls 
enter into a self-destructive competition with one another, trampling one another and 
breaking wings (248a6-b3).  These souls all long to see the beings and try to follow the 
gods (248a6-7), and it therefore makes sense that they are frustrated, but it is unclear why 
such frustration results in competition.  Socrates suggests the badness of the charioteer is 
at the root of this misguided contest (248b2-3); it is the charioteer’s job to manage the 
horses so as to liken the soul to that of a god, and it is clear that these competitive souls 
are bad at imitating the just gods.  Sense can then be made of the competition if the souls 
striving to be first are doing so out of a specific misunderstanding of the gods and their 
justice; that is, if the souls are striving to be first in their attempt to follow the gods, so as 
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to win the affection of their god and thereby receive divine assistance towards reaching 
the beings, failing to see that the gods’ justice entails minding their own business.84 
Socrates thus seems to indicate that a misunderstanding of justice and the gods is a 
common impediment among humans in their ascent to the beings (cf. 250a2-4).  
 The souls which failed to see the beings may then suffer some accident (cf. 
248c6), lose their wings, and be implanted in a human body, in accordance with 
Adrasteia’s decree.  These embodied souls now live lives arranged hierarchically based 
on how much of the truth they have seen (248d1-e3), suggesting that one’s view of 
science and morality determines the character of one’s life.85  The listing of lives is 
notoriously difficult to explain;86 there is a ranking of nine classes of lives, and while it 
may make sense that the philosopher is at the top of the list and the tyrant at the bottom, 
the reason for the order of the intervening ranks, e.g. why the lover of exercise surpasses 
prophets and poets, is less clear.  Furthermore, whether one should regard the “or’s” 
within each rank as disjunctive, as the contrast with the use of “ands” within the list 
would seem to imply, is also unclear; if one takes the or’s as disjunctive, lawful kings are 
set apart from warlike kings as makes sense (248d4-5), but then one must also accept the 
philosophers’ separation from the lover of beauty and the musical erotic man (248d2).  
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However this may be, the subsequent account of the afterlife of the souls before they 
receive wings, which allows philosophers to be re-winged after three thousand years 
while all others must wait ten thousand, clearly indicates that the fundamental division of 
the human lives is between philosophers and non-philosophers.87  The view of the city 
seems to enter into the ranking of the lower lives, with the best regimes at the top and the 
worst at the bottom;88 perhaps Socrates indicates thereby that once opinion has entered to 
replace knowledge (248b5), the view of the city classifies human lives while pointing to 
knowledge of the beings.  After death, a soul is punished or rewarded based on how justly 
it has lived its allotted life, and after one thousand years of such punishment or reward it 
may choose a new life (248e3-249b3).  The punishments and rewards are, in keeping 
with divine justice, not administered by the gods, and there is reason to wonder how 
effective such punishments and rewards are at helping the souls, as Socrates indicates 
some choose subhuman lives after receiving their punishments or rewards, failing to 
recognize the connection between thought and the human body (249b3-5, cf. Republic 
619b7-d1).89 
  
Philosophy and the Erotic Experience 
 
Having indicated that the fundamental division of humans is between 
philosophers and everyone else, Socrates now indicates something of the character of 
philosophy.  The philosopher is presented as the peak of the human, which is defined by 
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its ability to use speech or reason, or, in mythic terms, by its “recollection” of “what 
really is,” and it is philosophers who are most capable of such recollection (249d6-c6).  
As indicated above, it is unclear why or how the understanding or speaking of perceptible 
beings as members of a class, which, as a class, would seem to be in some way dependent 
upon the particular beings, amounts to recollection of the hupouranian beings, but it does 
not seem to be Socrates’ intention here to offer a complete theory of being and 
knowledge.90  Rather, Socrates emphasizes the philosophers’ connection to the gods, 
saying that the philosopher’s thought (not his soul) is winged and that to the best of his 
power he is in memory near those things “by being near which god is divine” (249c5-6).  
That is, the philosopher is here presented as the one who most knows the sources or 
principles of the gods’ divinity.  The passage then concludes by noting the consequence 
for the philosophers: coming to be near the divine, they stand apart from matters of 
human seriousness and are rebuked by the many, who see them not as inspired, but as 
disturbed (249c8-d3). 
 With this description of philosophy, Socrates turns, finally, to erotic madness, 
indicating that the whole speech has arrived now (explicitly) at the subject with which it 
has been concerned throughout (249d4-5),91 and he seems thereby to indicate the identity 
of the philosopher and the lover.  The lover also has “no care” for the things below but 
recalls true beauty and longs for the things above (249d5-8), and, as the philosopher is 
inspired (249d2), the lover also partakes of the best inspiration (249e1).  Yet, the 
inspiration of the philosopher leads him to the divine, i.e., the principles of the gods’ 
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divinity, whereas the inspiration of the lover comes from the gods (249e1-2), and 
Socrates does not refer to the philosopher’s madness (mania) but only to that of the lover.    
Whereas philosophers were near the beings with winged thought, the lovers, with their 
souls beginning to grow wings, long to fly up but lack the power (249d6-7), and the 
experience of lovers later seems to be essentially one of confusion, for which reason it is 
a state of madness (cf. especially 251a6-7, d7-8), but philosophy would seem to require 
the possibility self-knowledge and knowledge of the other beings.  Finally, the 
philosophic activity is characterized by the correct use of reason or speech (249b6-c6), 
but erotic madness is characterized especially by vision (249d5, 250d2-3, 251a3, b2ff.).  
There can be no doubt that Socrates indicates a role for eros in a philosopher’s life, but, 
as it seems to me, it is his rhetorical presentation of eros that tends, especially here, to 
make it seem as if the two were identical or as if philosophy were simply the best form of 
erotic madness.   
 After introducing erotic madness, Socrates turns to the difficulty, especially for 
philosophy, which eros addresses.  Repeating that every human soul has by nature beheld 
the beings, Socrates adds now that they are difficult to recollect (249e4-250a2).92 Two 
difficulties render recollection impossible for some souls: an inadequate vision of the 
beings in heaven, which seems to mean a lack of intellectual capacity, and unjust activity 
on earth (250a2-5).  On earth as in heaven justice is essential to one’s ascent to the truth.  
Furthermore, even those souls without these handicaps do not recall the truth with ease; 
encountering some image of the beings, they lose possession of themselves and are 
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perplexed (250a6-b1).  Such perplexity then spurs only a few souls to discover the truth 
of these images (250b4-5).  In particular, Socrates indicates that justice, moderation and 
“the other things honored by souls” have no splendor here and as such are hard to see, or, 
more precisely, to understand, for they are understood, unlike beauty which is seen (cf. 
250d2-3), through “dim organs,” presumably the ears,93 by hearing speeches (250b1-5).  
While Socrates does grant that some few are able to proceed from the images of justice 
and moderation here to the truth without any mention of eros or beauty and thus does not 
exclude the possibility of an unerotic philosopher,94 he presents the task of philosophy as 
one which in general is impeded by our limited access to these beings.    
 One expects Socrates to turn now to beauty and explain how it can assist with this 
difficulty, as he soon will, but while he does now turn to beauty, he turns to beauty as it 
was seen in heaven (250b5-6).  Perhaps he must do so now as he had not mentioned 
beauty in his earlier account of the hupouranian beings, and here he also emphasizes that 
beauty was bright to see in heaven, preparing us for the brightness characteristic of 
beauty on earth (250c8-d3).  Yet with such thoughts of beauty Socrates seems to get 
carried away, as he soon admits (250c7-8), to a recollection of the soul’s heavenly 
journey.  It would seem that Socrates offers a dramatic presentation of the role beauty 
may play for philosophy, moving from a thought of beauty to a recollection of the beings, 
were it not for the fact that Socrates does not now offer any philosophic reasoning about 
the beings, but rather simply speaks of their souls’ past heavenly bliss.  In preparation for 
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his later claims that philosophers are those who followed Zeus (252e2-3) and that lovers 
choose a beloved who followed the same god as themselves (252d1), Socrates now 
suggests that “we” (i.e., he and Phaedrus) were followers of Zeus (250b7).  Socrates then 
describes the heavenly journey, but, beautiful as his myth may have been, he seems to 
beautify it further here.95  He describes them as having been complete and perfect 
initiates there (250b8-c1), omitting the troubles even the best had managing their bad 
horses, and he adds that they were then inexperienced of the evils which awaited them 
(250c2), although  immortal souls would have been embodied infinitely many times 
before.  Socrates then concludes his transport recalling especially his freedom from a 
body, or the mark of his mortality (250c5-6).96   
When Socrates finishes this recollection of heavenly bliss, he grants that he has 
gone on at perhaps too great a length, and suggests that his speech be taken as a tribute to 
memory (250c7-8).  The speech certainly beautifies the objects of memory, but it cannot 
strictly speaking be the product of memory if there is no immortal soul or even if there is 
one and its experiences were accurately described in the earlier account.  Thus Socrates 
adds that it was said “in yearning for the things of that time” (250c7), suggesting that it is 
yearning which may inform such “memories” or hopes.  Noting that the things of “that 
time” were not so perfect even in Socrates’ earlier myth as he has just presented them 
highlights what Socrates seems to emphasize in this latest passage: the yearning for 
freedom from evils, especially those marked by the body or mortality, which is 
                                                          
95
 Contrast Socrates’ reference here to the “rites which it is right to say (themis legein) are most blessed” 
(250b8-c1) with his depiction of philosophers “always completing perfect rites” (249c7-8). 
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 As Nichols notes, Socrates use of asematoi in this context further points to mortality, as a sema may refer 
to a tomb or burial marker (1998, 55  n.109). 
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apparently aroused by the thought of beauty, and which motivates Socrates’ extended 
speech, whose theme he has indicated is erotic madness.  Thus, before specifying the 
particular power of beauty on earth, Socrates suggests a connection between eros, beauty, 
and a yearning for, above all, immortality.  
 
 
Eros, Beauty, and Wing 
  
This is not to suggest that eros simply is the desire for immortality.  Socrates has 
already indicated that the object of eros is beauty (249e3-4), and it is the distinctive 
character of beauty that Socrates now addresses.  Whereas the likenesses of the other 
beings have no splendor, appearing as they do to dull organs, beauty seems to be nothing 
if not splendid, as “the most brightly glistening thing” perceived by our brightest sense 
(250d2-3).97  When Socrates referred to the other beings’ lack of splendor, he referred to 
“justice, moderation, and the other beings honored by souls” (249b1-2), and beauty’s 
splendor therefore seems to imply that beauty is of peculiar import to embodied souls (cf. 
note 65 above).  The connection between beauty and body is again brought out by the 
link Socrates now suggests between beauty’s appearance to a bodily sense and its being 
most loveable, for whereas prudence (phronesis) would produce terrible loves if it could 
so appear, it cannot, and beauty is therefore most manifest and most loveable (250d4-e1).  
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 The superiority of what is seen to what is heard may lie in the trust people are more inclined to put in 
sight: whereas many are skeptical of justice when they hear about it and are disinclined to pursue it, the 
mere sight of beauty seems sufficient to elevate and attract the soul.  Cf. 273b3-c4 in context, where visible 
bodily strength is convincing but arguments about virtue are not; cf. Benardete (1991, 186). 
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Beauty’s lovability is thus first linked to its manner of appearance, but Socrates’ 
statement about prudence implies that the content of what appears also determines its 
loveliness; it hardly makes sense that a thing would be loved regardless of what it is, 
merely for its appearing brightly.98  Beauty, as appearing to sight, must be bodily beauty, 
and accordingly it is to the attractiveness and loveliness of beautiful (human) bodies that 
Socrates now turns, not by defining beauty or the loveable but by describing the effect of 
beauty. 
 Socrates begins by contrasting the erotic response to beauty with that of someone 
who is “not a new initiate or has been corrupted” (250e1).  In distinguishing between the 
corrupt and those who are not new initiates, Socrates allows that one may have been 
initiated some time ago, remain uncorrupted, and no longer be erotically inspired by the 
sight of the beautiful.  The old initiate and the corrupt may be attracted by beauty, but 
they will have to forgo those experiences which Socrates indicates are distinctive of eros.  
Without shame or awe or recollection of the beautiful, and with hubris, they will seek 
pleasure in the manner of a beast, contrary to nature, trying to procreate (250e1-251a1).  
Socrates’ reference to procreation here seems out of place, given the primacy of 
homosexual eros in the discussion and the fact that many corrupt responses to beauty 
surely do not involve the attempt to procreate; rather paired as the mention of procreation 
is with the indication that such a response to beauty is unnatural, Socrates seems to wish 
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 Although one who wishes above all to know would welcome a sight regardless of its content, merely for 
its clear appearance, for through this he may know it, surely bodily beauty, the beauty which attracts lovers, 
is not loved for its intelligibility.  
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to highlight how paradoxical his account of eros is.99  For Socrates will now argue that 
eros implies such fear and awe before the beauty of the beloved as restrains as well as 
provokes sexual desire (cf. 254b5-c2), and which, in the best case leads one to a 
philosophic friendship without sexual gratification (256a7-c5).  Such a response to beauty 
may be considered natural not for its freedom from dependence on conventions (cf. 
254b1), but for most fulfilling human nature. 
 In contrast to those who simply seek sexual gratification from beautiful bodies, 
Socrates now depicts what he will call “the erotic experience” (252b2-3).  In this 
experience, the lover undergoes something of a religious transformation and the attraction 
of beauty consists not in sexual arousal but in the essential role it plays in the growth of 
the soul’s wings, which, as we recall, lead a soul to the gods.  Thus, Socrates could seem 
to present the erotic experience without reference to sexual desire.  Yet, after presenting 
what he calls the erotic experience, Socrates presents several more accounts of falling in 
love, and sexual desire eventually becomes prominent (cf. 254b3ff.),100 and within the 
present account of the erotic experience, with his description of the swelling of the 
wing’s shaft and the tickling and throbbing associated with wing growth (251b4-6, c3, 
d4),101 Socrates shows a clear awareness of the sexual component of eros.  What is 
striking then in the present description of the erotic experience is that Socrates presents 
sexual arousal as a part of what lovers experience as their growth of wings and ascent to 
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 Alternatively, Socrates may mean by these lines that the homosexual pursuit of intercourse is contrary to 
nature, which he explains by contrast to the procreation of heterosexual intercourse among the beasts: the 
end of heterosexual eros may be children but homosexual eros should end in philosophy (cf. Laws 837b-d). 
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 There are three or four accounts in total, depending on whether one includes the account of the 
beloved’s reciprocation of his lover’s love (cf. 255d3 with d8-e2). 
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the divine; the distinctive aim of sexual desire is secondary, and the role it plays in such 
an experience is only explained later. 
 The “new initiate’s” experience begins upon his seeing “a godlike face, or the 
look (idea) of some body,102 which imitates beauty well” (251a1-3).  Socrates indicates 
two successive effects of this sight.  The order is clear: “first, [the lover] shivers and 
something of the dreadful things of that time come over him; next, beholding, he feels 
awe as before a god” (251a3-4).  The lover’s initial response to beauty is fear.  We have 
not heard of these “dreadful things” before,103 but they are surely not the “happy 
appearances” which Socrates just so fondly recalled (250c3).  “That time” must mean the 
time when the incorporeal soul saw beauty, and thus Socrates now seems to refer to the 
great struggle and distress attending the soul’s attempt to see the beings (247b1-3, 
248a1ff.).  This struggle was rooted in the soul’s concern both for what is best and the 
nourishment of its wings, i.e., the desire to avoid embodiment or mortality (248b5-c2).  
The sight of beauty arouses the lover’s fear of imperfection, including his mortality.  
Such a fear could seem to be dependent on awe at the beautiful boy’s seeming perfection, 
which, contrasting with and therefore highlighting the lover’s imperfection arouses his 
fear; Socrates could seem to support this interpretation by his subsequent indication that 
potential lovers live with a view to the gods prior to falling in love (252d1-5), and by 
later articulating the response of fear and awe at the sight of beauty in a somewhat less 
unambiguous order (254b7-8).  Yet the order here is clear, and Socrates repeats it saying 
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 Socrates’ reference to the idea of the beloved’s body as well as his reference to a “godlike” face indicate 
that it is not simply bodily beauty that attracts the lover: something of the lover’s soul may be seen in his 
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that, as the lover looks, unaccustomed heat “such as arises from shivers” comes upon him 
(251a7-b1, cf. Republic 387c4-5), for this heat implies that hope as the opposite of fear 
arises from the soul’s response to fear, and these would be hopes such as one feels in awe 
before a god.  The experience of awe is therefore dependent on a prior experience of fear 
for one’s self, one’s good and one’s life, which is aroused by the sight of beauty. It would 
be hard to see how hope and awe could arise merely from a terrifying thought, and 
Socrates does not say that they do, for he adds that the continued flow of beauty heats the 
soul as the wing begins to grow (251b1-3); awe and its attendant hope are thus dependent 
on fear but also on the sight of beauty which nourishes them.  
In his initial experience of awe, the lover, desiring to sacrifice to the boy as to a 
statue and a god, is restrained by fear for his reputation (251a5-7), and thus Socrates 
indicates that this is the beginning of a development at whose conclusion the lover 
despises all conventions and is ready to serve his beloved as a slave (252a4-6).  This 
development is the result of the growth of wings, which we were told take us to the gods 
(246d6-7), and thus the wing seems to be the soul’s awe before and hope for the gods, 
that is, such awe and hope as permit complete dedication to the beloved.  As we shall 
discuss below, Socrates leaves it ambiguous whether a lover must regard his beloved as 
literally being a god, or whether his beloved only inspires him with belief in other gods, 
but in either case, Socrates here confirms that eros leads to religious belief.   
The sight of the beloved’s beauty nourishes the wings, and they grow in its 
presence (251b1-7).  This is not, however, a simply pleasant experience; Socrates likens 
it to the cutting of teeth (251c1-5), and the pain in the soul accordingly implies that even 
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in this new initiate’s soul there is something resisting the growth of wing.  Furthermore, 
whenever the lover is apart from his beloved, his wing’s passageways begin to close 
painfully (251d1-6). Memory of the beloved offers some resistance to this pain (251d6-
7), but it is insufficient, for the lover is constantly driven to seek the sight of his beloved 
(251d7-e3).  The growth of wing is painful, but the cessation of its growth is even worse, 
for Socrates indicates that the relief accompanying the lover’s regaining sight of his 
beloved is the “sweetest pleasure” (251e3-252a1).   
What in the soul opposes the wings?  The wing leads the lover to serve slavishly 
his beloved as a god (cf. 255a1), and, in light of his awe inspiring beloved, he neglects 
his other attachments, family, friends, and property (252a2-4).  It makes sense then that 
his soul, attached to these as it initially is, resists his love.  Furthermore, the wing growth 
painfully ceases in the beloved’s absence, suggesting that the lover’s hope and awe then 
wavers.  That memory of his beloved offers some resistance to this wavering suggests 
that it is doubts about what he has seen that cause the wavering, doubts which may be 
partially remedied by memory: is the beloved truly so beautiful, so worthy of service?  
When the beloved returns to sight, his beauty manifest, the lover is reassured, and he 
consequently finds the sweetest pleasure in the assurance of his beloved’s divinity.   
Now, when Socrates says that the lover is ready to serve the beloved as a slave, he 
explains that this is because, “in addition to feeling awe at the beautiful one, he has found 
him to be the only doctor for the greatest troubles” (252a7-b1).  The only troubles we 
have seen for the lover, however, are the sacrifices demanded by his love (or the pain 
attending his soul’s acceptance of such sacrifices).  The beloved would seem to be the 
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only doctor for these sacrifices, because, in his service, they are rendered worthwhile.  
This could seem to make the beloved a poor doctor, providing his patient with great 
troubles and “healing” him only by making these troubles seem worthwhile, but this is to 
overlook the fact that the lover who is prepared to sacrifice everything for his beloved 
would seem to have been freed thereby from his concern for those evils which threaten 
his other concerns (cf. 252a3-4), including, therefore, his mortality.   
That “sweetest pleasure” which accompanies the growth of wing is the delight of 
having found something worthy of complete dedication (251e3-252a1).  This delight 
consists in the first place in the pleasure of being with and benefiting someone beautiful; 
Socrates indicates that those who are neither old initiates nor corrupt are attracted to this 
service.  Secondly, Socrates’ indication that the lover’s pleasure is greatly increased as 
his dedication reaches the point of complete disregard of his own things suggests that the 
pleasure in finding someone worthy of complete dedication is compounded by the relief 
it brings, relief that is of one’s concern for oneself and hence one’s mortality (251e3-
252b1).  But Socrates also indicates that such dedication as lovers have for their beloveds 
is incomplete; the dedication is accompanied by hopes for oneself, hopes which may 
provide a considerable addition to the pleasure of devotion (251a7-b7).  Furthermore, that 
wing growth is completed as the lover becomes “fully” dedicated suggests that it is the 
erotic dedication itself that gives rise to the lover’s fullest hopes.  How can this be 
explained?  One finds the “sweetest pleasure” in the relief of forgetting oneself in 
dedication to a beloved, but, as the very fact that the lover feels pleasure and relief in this 
self-forgetting as opposed to simply feeling concerned for the well-being of the beloved 
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shows, the lover’s self-forgetting and hence devotion are incomplete.  The lover is still 
concerned for himself, but this concern has been pushed to the back of his mind by his 
concern for the beloved, hence the lover’s feeling of relief.  Socrates then indicates that 
the lover’s concern for himself endures in the form of hopes that are aroused.  That lovers 
experience such hopes can been shown easily enough: at the same time that they feel 
themselves completely dedicated to their beloveds, feeling willing, that is, to give up their 
own good, lovers also believe their love to be surpassingly good, i.e., good also for 
themselves (cf. 252a7-b1).  Why the lover’s concern for himself endures in the form of 
hopes is, however, more obscure, but it would seem to be obscure of necessity, for it is 
precisely when the awareness of one’s self-concern is lacking that the hopes arise, and we 
therefore never have a clear experience of the arousal of these hopes.  This is not to say 
that no account could be given, nor that there could not be more and less plausible 
accounts, but only that we will not have direct experiential confirmation of any particular 
account.  The most we could do, I suppose, is to infer from what we are conscious of in 
dedication in particular, and from what we observe about the arousal of hopes in general, 
a particular connection between dedication and hopes.  Since I have not yet understood 
Plato’s understanding of the connection, indeed, since I am not even sure of whether he 
tries to explain one (consider Laws 791b1-2 in context from 790c-791b with 672b-d), I 
refrain from offering my own tentative opinion.  I regard it as far more important that we 
note that in dedication one feels such hopes than that we understand why they are felt.  
By becoming aware that there is a connection between dedication and hope, we can 
understand that the delighted dedication felt by lovers for their beloveds would provide 
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the basis for the hopes characteristic of lovers, hopes which, if made fully explicit, would 
entail belief in gods who could fulfill them.  And, in this way, we may understand how 
the beloved’s beauty causes the growth of the wings that lead the soul to the gods.  
Finally, by understanding this, we may understand why the lover finds in the beloved 
“the only doctor for the greatest troubles” (252a7-b1).                  
 We must ask, however, how such devotion and relief as the lover experiences is 
connected with philosophy.  In particular, is the lover’s devotion to the beloved rooted in 
a true discovery of his divinity?  Socrates would seem to make this question more 
pressing by following his description of the erotic experience, focused as it is on the 
lover’s pious awe before his beloved, with two verses juxtaposing the mortal and 
immortal views of eros.  For he suggests that the immortal view, by which mortals may 
be persuaded (252c1), is hubristic (252b5-6),104 and he thus raises a question as to 
whether the lover’s pious experience conveys the whole truth.  Mortals call Eros winged 
or flying (potenon), while immortals call him The Winged One (Pterota), because of the 
wing-growing necessity (252b8-9).  Mortals thus allow that Eros may fly, for potenon 
may mean winged or flying, while immortals do not attribute flight to him.  Wings, by 
flying are to take one to the gods, and the immortal view, hubristic as it may be, would 
seem to be justified in doubting whether such flight can take place, not only because 
Socrates has ruled out flight (or even a complete return of wings) for mortal beings 
(249d6-7, 249a1, 256d4), but also because the god the lover would seem to have 
discovered in his beloved is precisely what Socrates has indicated is unreasonable: a god 
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with a body (246c6-d2).  The lover, however, may be somewhat aware of this difficulty, 
for earlier Socrates indicated his confusion as to the divinity of his beloved to whom he 
wished to sacrifice as both a statue and a god (251a6-7).  Perhaps the lover can then come 
to distinguish clearly between his beloved and the god of which he is a reminder, but to 
fully understand his experience the lover will have to gain greater clarity about the gods, 
which, as Socrates is about to indicate, the lover will try to do.  We will have to see 
whether the lover may continue to remain devoted in the manner described as erotic if 
has done so. 
 Socrates also indicates that the immortals refer to the necessity for wing growth, 
and immediately after he offers these verses he says he has indicated both the experience 
and the cause of eros (252c1-2), whereas before he mentioned only the experience 
(252b1-2).  Thus Socrates implies that immortals especially are able to see the cause of 
eros or the condition of the human soul which makes wing growth necessary, while 
mortals tend to overlook it.  Socrates here refers to the two views as those of immortals 
and mortals rather than gods and humans, calling attention to our mortality.  Furthermore, 
immortals viewing mortals would be especially likely to note human mortality, whereas 
many humans, at any rate, may not be so likely to acknowledge it.  Finally, the 
immortals’ awareness of this cause is paired with their denial of eros’ flight, which, in the 
terms of the palinode is impossible for humans because of their bodies, i.e., our mortality.  
It thus seems that Socrates traces the source of eros to mortality, and we have seen that 
eros gives rise to such devotion as may alleviate one’s concern for mortality.  We may 
therefore suggest that the initial fear on which awe depends is fear of death, in particular.  
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Furthermore, we may suggest that beauty, such beauty as also arouses hope and awe, 
arouses this fear, because in its presence we may be sufficiently encouraged to 
acknowledge our deepest fears, as Socrates’ reference to the mortal view of eros implies 
we usually are not.  In this case, lovers, while not necessarily fully aware of the cause of 
their experience, despite the experience’s beginning with a fear that points to it, at least 
surpass those so corrupted as to be closed off from the experience, for by so closing 
themselves they also foreclose an opportunity for becoming more deeply aware of the 
condition to which it is a response.  And this is an awareness which many may be 
lacking, for it is an awareness which begins with the fear the new initiate feels at the sight 
of beauty, evidently a fear which he avoided confronting until that time, a fear which he 
could only acknowledge in the presence of awe-and hope-inspiring beauty, and which, 
we may suspect, the corrupt more persistently avoid (cf. 249e4-250a4). 
 
Eros and Education 
  
It is then the education to which eros may lead that Socrates now discusses.  
Having indicated the cause of eros, Socrates now turns to a condition and activity of 
lovers which precedes their falling in love, although they may not be fully aware of it.  
Each of the uncorrupted lives out his life honoring and imitating the god he followed to 
the extent of his ability, acting this way towards both beloveds and others (252d1-5).  
Socrates seems to mean that each tries to live as seems to him most in keeping with the 
demands of the gods, allowing that different kinds of people experience the gods 
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differently.105  Socrates limits this life in accord with the divine to one’s first life here, as 
long as one remains uncorrupted (252d2-3), implying that one’s memory of the gods is 
not sufficient to survive either corruption here or the justice of punishments and rewards 
administered in the afterlife, or, if Socrates does not believe in the afterlife, that an 
incorrect view of divine justice may suffice to render one’s imitation of a god impossible.  
Nevertheless, a perfect view of the god is not needed at the outset, for Socrates indicates 
that lovers will seek to discover their god’s nature under the influence of love (252e5-
253a2).  
Each seeks and picks out from among the beautiful someone of his type, i.e., 
someone who followed the same god as he has (252d5-6, 252e1-2, 253b1-4).  Then each 
“constructs and adorns” his beloved as god into a statue for himself (252d6-7).   This 
statue construction means, however, that each lover must seek to educate his beloved to 
be as like his god as possible (252e4-5).  To do so, the lover must himself first learn the 
nature of his god, and thus his love “intensely compels” him to investigate the god 
(252e5-253a2).  Socrates says almost nothing about how such an investigation may be 
undertaken, saying only that lovers learn from wherever they can, “taking the tracks from 
themselves (ichneuontes para heauton) to discover the nature of their god” (ibid.).  What 
Socrates emphasizes is that the investigation is made by each lover himself, not relying 
on any authorities.  The lover is thus on his own in this investigation.  Such an 
investigation is possible because the lover, like all men, has seen those knowable beings 
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on which the divinity of his god depends (249e4-5).  This suggests that the thought of a 
lover who completes this inquiry must come to be near those beings that are the source of 
the god’s divinity, i.e., the lover must become a philosopher (cf. 249c4-6).  It is here then 
that Socrates indicates the connection between eros and philosophy: the lover is 
compelled by his desire to perfect his beloved to attend to the likenesses of justice, 
moderation, and those other beings, for it is only in the light of these that he may 
understand true perfection (cf. 249c6-8).  Love provides the encouragement needed to 
attend to those dimmer images of the beings and discover the truth of what they 
imitate.106   
The account of love and education is not, however, without puzzles, especially 
when compared to the prior depiction of the erotic experience.  Rather than simply being 
struck by beauty, the lover here, perhaps unbeknownst to himself, is already seeking a 
beloved, and while he chooses one from among the beautiful, he looks to qualities of soul 
in making his selection (252e1-2).  The lover’s perception of his beloved’s beauty is then 
colored by his concern for the beloved’s soul.  Yet this concern for the soul stems from 
the lover’s previous reverence for a god, whereas in Socrates’ first depiction, falling in 
love seemed to be the beginning of reverence.  This discrepancy, as well as the lover’s 
being struck by beauty despite his already seeking a beloved from among the beautiful, 
can be explained if the lover is not fully aware of his concern for the god prior to his 
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falling in love; it is the sight of beauty and the feelings of fear, hope, and awe aroused by 
that sight which fully awakens the lover to his concern for the gods.  In his initial sight of 
the beloved’s beauty, the lover, regarding his beloved as both a statue and a god, is still 
not free from confusion, and thus the lover’s attempt to fashion his beloved into a statue 
of a god, is presumably not an activity of which the lover is fully aware.  The lover 
delights in having found something worthy of his dedication, thus becoming aware of his 
concern for the gods, yet he also senses the imperfection of the object of his love and 
wishes to perfect it.  The lover seems disinclined, at least initially, to admit the 
imperfection of his beloved.  This makes sense, for to admit his beloved’s imperfection is 
to raise the question of whether he is truly worthy of such dedication, and, since it is the 
beloved’s imperfection which makes the lover’s dedicated service necessary or beneficial 
to the beloved, the question also arises as to whether perfect gods would be such as to 
demand such dedication.  Therefore, Socrates’ presentation leads us to ask whether the 
lover may distinguish his beloved from the gods in a manner resisted by his initial erotic 
experience and still regard his dedication to an imperfect beloved as befitting his life in 
accordance with the gods. 
The answer to this question depends on what the lover who discovers the nature 
of his god learns.  Since such a lover would have become a philosopher and since 
Socrates indicates in this context that the philosophers are the followers of Zeus (252e2-
3, cf. 253b1-2),107 it seems we should look to them.  The question of whether a lover 
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could gain clarity about his god and remain devoted to his beloved is then not a question 
of whether philosophers would continue to serve or educate their beloveds.  For Socrates 
indicates that after discovering their god’s nature the followers of Zeus cherish the 
beloved still more (for aiding in this discovery), and they try to educate him (253a5-b1), 
just as Socrates later indicates that lovers who have become philosophers remain together 
in philosophic friendship (256a7-b1, cf.256c7).  The question is only whether such 
devotion as is characteristic of lovers is compatible with the philosophic view of the 
gods.  Socrates makes only one rather elusive statement about the distinctive character of 
the followers of Zeus besides indicating that these are the philosophers.  At the outset of 
the passage we are considering, he says that the followers of Zeus may bear “a heavier 
burden (embrithesteron achthos) of the wing-named one” (252c3-4). 108  Socrates does 
not say in what the burden of eros consists, but he illustrates it by a contrast with those 
who are “servants of Ares and went around with him” (252c4-5),109 who, when in love 
and supposing themselves to have been done an injustice by their beloved are murderous 
and ready to sacrifice both themselves and their beloved (252c5-7).  The followers of 
Ares are incapable of bearing disappointment in love or at least such disappointment as 
stems from the apparent injustice of their beloved.  The burden of finding someone 
worthy of devotion may be too much for them; yet, these lovers do not simply give up on 
devotion, for they are still prepared to sacrifice themselves.  It is unclear whether the 
followers of Zeus are less troubled by their beloved’s injustice so as to be less inclined to 
regard injustice as meriting punishment or whether they simply do not regard their 
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beloveds’ actions, even when harmful, as unjust.  But both cases are supported by 
Socrates’ indication that it is these who learn the nature of their god, for such learning 
requires at its outset, as we have seen, some understanding of the gods’ justice, and, by 
such learning, they presumably come to know the gods’ justice.  Thus, Socrates indicates 
that the followers of Zeus better bear the burden of eros in virtue of their superior justice, 
which means, their superiority in imitating the gods’ justice or minding their own 
business, a superiority which Socrates also indicates here by referring to the “followers” 
of Zeus on one hand and the “servants” of Ares on the other.  In this case, however, it 
does not seem that the philosophers could justly give up all their other concerns in 
dedication to their beloveds (cf. 252a5-6).  While Socrates then suggests that philosophic 
justice prevents specifically erotic dedication, we should also note what he emphasizes: 
the philosopher’s justice frees him from the temptation toward such injustice as may 
harm a beloved.110 
 
Eros and Sexual Desire 
 
Socrates has thus argued that the lover’s sight of his beloved is such as to nourish 
his wings, facilitating devotion to his beloved and awakening him to his concern for the 
gods, which concern, fully thought out, leads one into philosophy.  Yet it has remained a 
mystery, up to this point, why this response to the beautiful attends human sexuality in 
particular.  That is, humans see beauty in many forms and seek friendships and 
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community besides that of a sexual partner, and we must therefore ask why it is the sight 
of beauty, coupled as it is by eros with sexual attraction, that is the source of wings.  
Therefore, as Socrates finishes his praise of eros, he explains the role of sexual desire, by 
turning to the lover’s “capture” of his beloved (253c6), for this possession of the beloved 
by the lover is motivated, in the first place, by sexual desire (cf. 253d5ff.). 
Socrates begins by recalling his threefold image of the soul and now explains 
what he omitted before: the virtue of the good horse and the badness of the bad one 
(253c7-d3).  Socrates does not, however, tell us which horse is which; it is true that 
earlier he called one, the white horse as it now appears (253d4-e1), “beautiful and good” 
(246b2-3), while the other had a share of badness (247b3), but his description of each 
horse here, while tending to confirm the prior suggestion, is not sufficient to remove all 
doubt.  For while the black horse is disobedient and hubristic, his snub nose cannot but 
remind us of Socrates, whereas the white horse’s love of honor (times erastes) and 
companionship with opinion seem dissimilar (253d3-e5).111  Furthermore, in the 
depiction of love to come, the black horse plays an essential role, and without him there 
would be no eros.  It is thus not implausible that Socrates begins only ambiguously 
chastising the black horse, for if eros is good, so must the black horse be. 
Socrates now offers his third account of falling in love, and in this account, as in 
the second, Socrates indicates the state of soul preceding love, although the piety of this 
state is no longer the theme.  Now, before feeling fear and awe, before seeing his beloved 
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and recalling true beauty, Socrates says the lover’s soul, upon seeing “the erotic eye,”112 
is heated and filled with the goads and tickling of yearning, as one horse feels shame and 
the other compels him and the charioteer to proposition the boy for sexual favors (253e5-
254a7).  The charioteer and white horse resist the black horse, viewing the desire for sex 
as “terrible and unlawful” (254a7-b1).  The lover is thus conflicted due to his sexual 
desire on one hand and his respect for the law and shame on the other as he approaches 
the boy.  When he comes before the boy, the boy’s face “flashes like lightning,” and the 
lover recalls the nature of beauty, now together with moderation, “standing on a chaste 
pedestal, and seeing he is afraid, and he falls back feeling awe” (254b3-8).  It is no 
surprise that moderation now appears to the lover, driven as he is by what he must regard 
as immoderate sexual desire, but we need not conclude that his fear is therefore one of 
acting immoderately towards the beloved, having already felt awe at moderation.  Rather, 
recalling the priority Socrates indicated of fear to awe, which he repeats also here, we 
must now try to explain the fear on the basis of the new indication that sexual desire and 
lawful restraint attend the fearsome sight of beauty. 
At the sight of beauty, the sexually aroused lover is likely to experience delight at 
the contemplation of the act he desires, but, given his lawful beliefs, which tell him he is 
above such acts, he is especially likely also to regard his sexual desire in terms similar to 
Socrates’ earlier description: that is, as seeking pleasure after the manner of a beast 
(250e4-5).  The thought of a life lived for such pleasures, a beastly life, especially when 
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 By calling the beloved’s eye erotic, Socrates seems to point to the lover’s desire for his love to be 
reciprocated; the eyes are where longing for the lover will eventually enter the beloved (255b5-7), and by 
seeing the beloved’s eye, the lover may feel some hope for reciprocation, especially since it seems to be 
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the peak of what that life has to offer appears near to attainment,113 is dissatisfying and 
may well come with thoughts of the limits of such a life, and therewith the fear of 
death.114  Sexual desire in an uncorrupted soul, especially when the object of that desire 
flashes before one, may be especially likely to remind one of that fear which is a 
precondition for the hope and awe of lovers.  If the lover also considers the role of sex in 
reproduction, as Socrates earlier indicated (250e5), he may be all the more likely to 
consider the natural limits to his own life, as he will be replaced by another. 
Awe follows the fear, and as Socrates’ mention of moderation here highlights, the 
beloved’s beauty is such as to both arouse and inhibit sexual desire, calling the lover to 
devote himself not only to the beloved but also to the virtue of moderation, which he also 
may be inclined to do through his increased awareness of his beloved’s moderation or 
chastity (cf. 255a4-6).  The growth of wing is therefore painful not only because of the 
soul’s resistance to wing and the absence of the beloved, but also because the growth of 
wing includes both the arousal of sexual desire and the painful opposition to it, for the 
black horse is painfully stopped by the charioteer’s response to the sight of beauty 
(254b8-c6).  The black horse is soon insistent upon sex again, and the lover thus 
approaches his beloved again and “suffers the same experience still more” (254c6-e1).  
The lover’s feeling of awe thus increases with his increased sexual advances; with each 
pursuit, the lover becomes more aware of his beloved’s beauty and his own need for 
moderation. 
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 Consider also Phaedrus’ disparagement of the bodily pleasures and Socrates’ subsequent indication, 
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After many such experiences of the beloved’s beauty, the black horse is tamed, 
not by giving up sexual desire altogether (cf. 255e4-256a1), but by becoming so 
frightened at the sight of the beloved as not to act on it (254e5-8).  It is at this point that 
the beloved, seeing “that he is served with all service as if equal to a god” by a lover 
“who has truly experienced this,” accepts the lover’s company (255a1-b1).  The lover’s 
attainment of moderation permits his wholehearted service of the beloved.  While it may 
be the lover’s service or use which leads the beloved to accept his company (cf. 255a7), it 
is the lover’s goodwill, or his subordination of his own desires for the sake of the 
beloved, a subordination made much more manifest through his struggle with sexual 
desire, which soon “astounds” the beloved.  Through his goodwill, the lover, or “the god-
inspired (entheon) friend” as he is now called, surpasses all others in the friendship he 
offers (255b3-7).  The lover thus seems to have a god within (entheon) in virtue of his 
goodwill, and, unsurprisingly, it is this goodwill which then renders the lover attractive to 
his beloved (cf. 256a3). 
We may conclude then that the hopefulness which attends the lover’s falling in 
love is due in no small measure to the goodwill his love demands of him, for by this 
goodwill he may hope to attain both his beloved and some share of divinity.  But Socrates 
again highlights the limitation of such hope.  He describes the beloved’s attraction saying 
that the flow of beauty, which Zeus in love with Ganymede named longing, enters and 
fills the lover, so that the excess, as a breeze or echo springing back from something 
solid,115 is borne back into the beloved (255c1-255c7, cf. 251c6-7).  It is a beautiful 
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image of love’s reciprocation, but the result of what it describes is a state of confusion for 
the beloved: “then he loves, but he is perplexed as to what he loves” (255d3).  Socrates 
likens the beloved to one who has caught an eye disease and cannot state the cause, not 
noticing that he is seeing himself in a mirror in the lover (255d3-6).  The lover’s goodwill 
is nothing more than the reflection of the beloved’s beauty and what that beauty means to 
the lover.116  Furthermore, the lover’s condition is likened to an eye disease, which he 
passes to his beloved, which confirms that his own understanding of what he sees in the 
beloved is fundamentally inadequate: his awe before the beloved is dependent on a 
misunderstanding of the gods, in particular of their justice.  It is not hard to see how such 
a misunderstanding would also attend his estimate of the goodwill which follows from 
his awe.  
From the point of view of self-knowledge, however, the beloved’s condition is 
even worse.  He has caught the eye disease, but he cannot name its source, whereas the 
lover can surely name his beloved.  The beloved is incapable of seeing that what he loves 
in the lover is nothing more than his own beauty as reflected in the lover’s goodwill; the 
beloved resists seeing that what attracts him to the lover is the lover’s love for him, for 
seeing this would debase his own love for the lover—the lover could not then seem 
divine.  Furthermore, in Socrates’ view, the beloved loves and suffers “the same things” 
in the presence and absence of his lover as the lover does, but the beloved calls and thinks 
his feelings for the lover are only those of friendship (255d3,6-8,e1-2).  Socrates does 
also say that the beloved has “return-love” (anterota), the image of eros, and that he 
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desires his lover “in nearly the same way but more weakly” (255d8-e3), but this seems to 
mark a difference in degree between the two, rather than the difference in kind the 
beloved believes there to be.  The beloved, therefore, unable to see or admit the source of 
his attraction, is unaware of how great a change his soul has undergone.  This inferiority 
of the beloved to the lover is ultimately due to the beloved’s never having been struck by 
beauty.  Socrates then points to the beloved’s relatively weak sexual desire at the 
conclusion of this passage (cf. 255e5-6 with 256a1-5), and we surmise that the lover’s 
greater sexual desire is not an unimportant source of his greater eros and his consequent 
greater clarity about that eros. 
This is not to deny, however, that Socrates endorses only such sexual desire as 
occurs among the uncorrupted, that is, such sexual desire as occurs in those who will 
moderate it with some measure of chastity, as Socrates indicates at the conclusion of his 
speech.  There, Socrates praises two ways of life, that of lovers who become philosophers 
and that of other lovers,117 and in both of these there is to be a minimum of sex: there is 
none for the philosophers (256a7-b3), and it should be rare for the others (256c1-7).  
These other lovers cannot endorse sex whole-heartedly (256c6-7), and this implies that, 
despite their having indulged themselves, they retain the sense that love demands 
something higher from them (cf. 256d1-2).  The philosophers, on the other hand, display 
self-mastery in their constant preference for a chaste relationship with one another (cf. 
256b1 with c6-7), and thus Socrates indicates that the freedom philosophy may offer 
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from divine madness is far from the license for the corrupt and brutish pursuit of sexual 
pleasure.    
 
The Palinode’s Conclusion 
 
Socrates then concludes his speech again praising the superiority of philosophy 
but also praising eros.  As for the difference between the two, he says of philosophy only 
that neither human moderation nor divine madness can provide a greater good (256b5-7), 
while indicating that lovers who choose sex in the proper way carry off a prize for erotic 
madness (256d5-6).  If this contrast were not sufficiently clear, Socrates adds that the 
lovers of the later group also stay together in the afterlife (256e1), whereas the 
philosophers’ greater prize contains no such reward (256b3-7).  But while we have 
emphasized the difference between philosophy and eros in order to counteract the 
misleading thrust of Socrates’ rhetoric, we must not overlook the fact that Socrates also 
genuinely praises eros, and the reason for such praise is not only the ennobling delight of 
eros that Socrates has described, which from virtually every point of view renders love a 
blessing, but it is also the claim lovers may make to a truer awareness of themselves than 
those too dissolute to experience love’s charms.  For as we saw in the case of the 
beloved, whose capacity to reciprocate love marks him as far from the most unfortunate, 
many, perhaps all human beings feel, more or less dimly, the longings at the root of love, 
but not all become fully aware of them.  Many, perhaps fearing to admit the full extent of 
these longings and thus confront the difficult question of the possibility of their 
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fulfillment, never really come to experience them so fully as lovers do, and they thus 
remain in the dark about what they deeply desire.    
 
Chapter Two: Conclusion 
 
 We began our study of Socrates’ praise and blame of eros in the Phaedrus with a 
question from our study of the Republic as to whether and how eros is related to religious 
beliefs, and Socrates’ palinode has gone some distance towards answering this question.  
The palinode does this by making the growth of the soul’s wings, by which the soul is 
taken to the gods, central to his depiction of the erotic experience, the experience of 
falling in love.  Socrates thereby confirms that eros is bound to religious belief and 
deepens our understanding of this bond by suggesting that eros is in fact a source of 
religious belief.   By so doing, he makes it easier to understand why he would have 
wished to destroy the erotic attachments of the guardians, for by removing the possibility 
of forming erotic attachments, Socrates would remove an important foundation of such 
religious belief as would render the guardian’s acceptance of the theology of book two, 
the theology suited to philosophic rule, impossible.   
By noting the connection Socrates suggests between eros and religious belief, we 
are also better prepared to understand the relation between Socrates’ first and second 
speeches.  Both speeches, as we have seen, suggest that there is a life higher than that of a 
lover, the philosophic life, and the irrational religious beliefs to which eros gives rise are 
the reason that a philosopher must cease to be a lover in the strict sense.  These irrational 
religious beliefs also explain why eros merits both praise and blame.  Seen from the point 
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of view of philosophy, eros is deficient; the error in which lovers live cannot be 
wholeheartedly affirmed by the philosopher.  But still, as the palinode also makes clear, 
the error in which lovers live may be conducive to a philosophic education.  The 
awareness of mortality that lies at the bottom of the lover’s religious beliefs, even if it is 
not made entirely explicit, brings lovers closer to the truth.  Furthermore, lovers’ concern 
for the gods and their beloveds, together with their awareness of their incomplete 
understanding of the gods, may spur them on to an investigation of their own moral and 
religious beliefs, at the end of which they may know themselves and the world far better 
than they did before they first fell in love.  Finally, with this insight into the ambiguous 
character of love we can better understand why Plato prefaces Socrates’ two statements 
on love with that of Lysias.  Lysias’ criticism of lovers masks an appeal to the concern 
for virtue and friendship with an appeal to self-interest, which means its appeal depends 
on the unwillingness of some nonlovers to either admit openly their concern for 
something beyond their own interest or to simply pursue their own self-interest.  
Therefore, by understanding Lysias’ speech, we understand the defectiveness of these 
nonlovers whose lack of eros has not been attained through philosophic self-knowledge.  
Thus, Lysias’ speech, by pointing to such nonlovers, helps us understand the genuine 
superiority of lovers as Socrates presents it in his palinode.  
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Chapter Three: Socrates’ Symposium Speech 
  
Introduction: On the Symposium’s Relation to the Phaedrus   
  
A preliminary reading of Socrates’ speech in the Symposium confirms the 
conclusion we drew in our studies of the Phaedrus and Republic that there is a 
connection between eros and religious belief.  Eros is classified as one of the forms of 
divine madness in the Phaedrus (Phdr. 244a5-245c1), and its role is to spur the growth of 
the soul’s wings (Phdr. 251bff.), which wings, in turn, carry the soul to the gods (Phdr. 
246d6-7).  In his Symposium speech, Socrates replaces divine madness with the demonic 
realm: eros is defined as a daimon (202d13, 203a7-8), and its function is to facilitate all 
interaction between gods and human beings (202e2ff); it is through daimones that the 
whole art of the priests, prophecy, and sorcery take place, as well as all association and 
conversation from gods to human beings (202e7-203a3).  It is true that, just as in the 
Phaedrus, where eros is considered one of a variety of forms of divine madness, the 
Symposium refers to many daimones, but eros is the only daimon ever mentioned, and we 
are therefore entitled to suspect that it has the same privileged place in Plato’s account of 
the origins of religious belief here as it does in the Phaedrus, where eros’ capacity to spur 
wing growth is the source of such religious belief as provides a basis for the other forms 
of divine madness. 
 While confirming the Phaedrus’ teaching regarding the connection between 
religion and eros, the Symposium is considerably more open than the Phaedrus about the 
limits of such religious hopes as eros may arouse.  This greater openness of the 
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Symposium accords with an even more obvious difference between it and the Phaedrus: 
in the Symposium, the soul’s immortality is implicitly denied (cf. 208a7-b2).1  As we saw 
in the palinode, Socrates professed to believe in the soul’s immortality so as to present 
the experience and view of lovers, including especially their religious beliefs (see pages 
140-142 above); in the Symposium, where Socrates professes no belief in the soul’s 
immortality, we accordingly find greater openness about the limitations of religious 
beliefs.  Thus, Socrates makes the climax of his speech, i.e., the ladder of love, describe 
the purification of erotic beliefs, and at the peak of this purification he indicates that one 
who sees beauty truly will no longer imagine this divine beauty to partake, in any way, of 
a bodily shape (212a5, 211c8-d1, 211a5-7), therefore implying that all lovers who do not 
see true beauty do so imagine it.  In other words, Socrates indicates that with the 
purification of eros and the sight of true beauty comes the cessation of belief in the gods 
as they are conventionally understood (cf. Phdr. 246b5-d2).  More open and perhaps 
more fundamental is the Symposium’s argument that eros is not a god, a position Socrates 
refrained from stating in the Phaedrus (cf. Phdr. 242d9, e2).  Eros cannot be a god, 
because his lack of beauty and goodness, which follows from his desire for beautiful and 
good things, does not accord with the happiness or self-sufficiency characteristic of the 
gods (200e2-201b10, 202a6-202d5).  This argument is explicitly made only about eros, 
but, as Socrates’ mention of Agathon’s suggestion that “matters were arranged by the 
gods through love of beautiful things” serves to highlight (201a4-5, cf. 197b3-5), the 
argument requires a revision of the ordinary understanding of the gods, a revision the 
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conclusion of which is expressed by Socrates’ later statement that “god does not mingle 
with human being” (203a1-2).2  The Symposium, the only dialogue Plato devoted to the 
discussion of a god,3 presents an argument that suggests the perfection of the gods is 
incompatible with any desire on their part, including therefore the desire for the good of 
human beings.  In this way, the Symposium openly confirms the conclusion we were 
forced to draw in our interpretation of the palinode that the philosopher, the one who best 
understands and imitates the gods, would be led by his understanding of the gods, an 
understanding which he attains through the inquiry into the principles of their divinity, 
i.e., their perfection, away from complete devotion to his beloved (see pages 169-174 
above).    
 Thus the Symposium’s greater openness about the limits attending the religious 
hopes characteristic of lovers is of a piece with the Phaedrus’ teaching of the unerotic 
character of philosophy.  Accordingly, the Symposium also provides direct confirmation 
of this teaching about philosophy, and it does so, in a way, far more openly.  That is, if 
the Symposium’s ladder of love cannot be said to indicate openly the unerotic character of 
philosophy—for it would seem to present philosophy as the highest form of eros—, it is 
quite open about the tendency of philosophy to lead one away from love of another 
human being.  Socrates’ account of the ladder of love presents the education or 
purification of eros, according to which one turns from loving one kind of beloved to 
another higher kind, using each as the rung of a ladder (211c2), until one reaches the top, 
at which point one finally sees true beauty (209e5ff.).  At the point when one turns from 
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the love of a beautiful soul to the beauty of sciences, a turn after which only continued 
strengthening is required for the attainment of the final rung (210d6-e1), the (former) 
lover begins to consider the love of another human being petty and slavish (210d1-3), at 
least in comparison to the higher beauty on which he has now set his sights.  
Furthermore, this turn to the beauty of science occurs only after the lover has investigated 
the beauty of laws and practices in order to make his beloved better (210c2-4).  Thus the 
(former) lover turns away from his love of a beautiful human being only after having 
undertaken such an investigation as would lead him to the true view of justice, thereby 
confirming our interpretation of the palinode, according to which it is this view which 
would lead away from such love of a beloved as entails complete dedication (see again 
pages 169-174 above).   
Now, it is true that the ladder of love could seem to compensate for its greater 
openness as regards the philosopher’s not being fully erotic towards another human being 
by its suggestion that the philosopher is erotic towards a higher, truer beauty, the 
beautiful itself, but, if we look more closely at the description of the ladder of love, we 
find that no such eros of the beautiful itself is mentioned.  That is, after the turn to the 
beauty of the sciences, there is no further mention of any eros; the beauty of the sciences 
and the beautiful itself are beheld, but they are not said to be loved (210b7, d4, 7e4,  
211b6, c8-d1, 2-3, e1, 212a1-5).4  At his speech’s conclusion, Socrates, it would seem, 
uses eros in a specific sense, i.e., its ordinary sense, according to which eros means a 
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certain kind of attraction and care for other human beings (cf. 205d1-8),5 and, by this 
usage, Socrates suggests that philosophy is unerotic in the strict sense.  Thus he can 
conclude his speech saying only that it would not be easy to find a better helper than eros 
for human nature (212b3-4), whose end is philosophy (211d1-3), for if the philosophic 
activity were essentially the erotic fulfillment of eros, as the ladder of love could seem to 
suggest, then there could be no better helper than eros, nor any possibility that such a 
helper was dispensable.6 
Thus, the ladder of love is the clearest source of the impression a reader might 
also otherwise receive that Socrates’ speech in the Symposium offers a lesser praise of 
eros than his speech in the Phaedrus.  And Socrates confirms the truth of this impression: 
whereas he concludes his speech in the Phaedrus by saying he has given eros the greatest 
praise of which he is capable (Phdr. 257a3-4), he concludes his Symposium speech telling 
Phaedrus to regard it as a praise of eros or whatever else he might wish to name it 
(212c1-3), leaving its status as a praise ambiguous.  It is true that before beginning his 
speech, Socrates indicates that he will praise eros, but he does so only while explaining 
that a proper praise should include only the most beautiful aspects of its subject (198d3-
199b4), and thus calling attention also to the fact that there are uglier aspects of eros.  As 
we have already to some extent seen, Socrates will hardly prove incapable of calling 
more precise attention to eros’ various limitations in the course of his praise.7  Why does 
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the Symposium offer only this lesser praise?  We may begin to answer this question by 
noting that the Symposium’s primary theme is unquestionably eros, whereas the Phaedrus 
seems to be split between the treatment of eros and that of rhetoric.  Thus, Socrates’ 
speech on eros in the Phaedrus is also presented as a piece of rhetoric (Phdr. 262c10ff.), 
whose purpose may be to persuade rather than to convey the truth (Phdr. 271c10ff.), but 
Socrates emphasizes that he will tell the truth in the Symposium (199a7-b3).  
But this explanation of the Symposium’s greater truthfulness indicates, at most, 
why Plato would have presented a less truthful treatment of eros in his Phaedrus; it does 
not explain why Socrates would have spoken differently on these two occasions.  To 
explain this, we must attend to the different dramatic contexts of Socrates’ speeches.  The 
most obvious difference in context is that Socrates’ audience in the Symposium consists 
of considerably more people than in the Phaedrus, where only Phaedrus is present.  The 
audience in the Symposium seems to be a sample of the Athenian intellectual elite,8 and 
Socrates’ speech manifests a particular interest on his part in engaging not only Phaedrus 
(199b2-5, 208d2-6, 212b1-c3) but also Agathon and Aristophanes, the poets.  For, 
although Socrates criticizes all the previous speakers (198c5-199a3), he makes his 
disagreements with the poets clear, first, by dialectically refuting Agathon (199c3-201c9, 
cf. 194a5-d7), then, by criticizing openly what would seem to be Aristophanes’ thesis 
about eros (205d10-206a1, cf. 212c4-6), and tacitly rejecting Agathon’s (206e2-5).9  
Indeed, that Plato wished to make Socrates’ contest with the poets a theme of the 
dialogue is confirmed by the dialogue’s opening, where Agathon suggests such a contest 
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is coming (175e7-9), by the brief contest which occurs before Agathon’s speech (194a5-
d7), and by the dialogue’s conclusion, where we are told that Socrates, apparently 
victorious in the contest, is compelling the two poets to agree that the same man would 
know both comedy and tragedy and that the one who was a tragic poet by art could also 
be a comic poet (223c4-d6). 
Now, we are not told the arguments by which Socrates is able to compel the poets 
(223c6-d1), and the attempt to interpret the meaning of this final contest between 
Socrates and the poets would, as it seems to me, take us beyond our focus on eros, but 
perhaps we can discern something of what Socrates takes to be the superiority of his way 
of life to that of the poets by looking to his speech.  For there, Socrates not only indicates 
his specific disagreements with the poets about eros, but he also implicitly criticizes their 
way of life.  That is, Socrates presents poetry as one form of the pursuit of fame, indeed, 
the highest, when it is practiced by the greatest poets (209a4, 209c7-d4), and insofar as a 
poet is content to live for the pursuit of fame,10 Socrates indicates that he settles for a less 
adequate fulfillment of his eros than does a philosopher who ascends the ladder of love 
(cf. 209b7-c2 with 210c1-3).  Socrates therefore indicates that the poets live with 
insufficient attentiveness to the lack which eros seeks to fulfill (cf. 200d8-10).  Without 
sufficient attentiveness to this lack, the poets would then be disposed to misconstrue the 
manner in which eros attempts to fill this lack (cf. 203b7-8, 206e7-207a4), which 
explains Socrates’ criticisms of their theses about eros.  Furthermore, as they confirm by 
their choice of an erotic life based on fame, the poets fail to see with clarity the 
                                                          
10
 Contrast Phaedrus 276c3-277a4, where Socrates argues that one who knows the just, beautiful, and good 
things may write, but only as a sort of play which is subordinate to philosophic learning and instruction. 
191 
 
defectiveness of eros as a response to this need, a defectiveness which permits or requires 
the ascent beyond eros that Socrates describes in the ladder of love.  Thus, Socrates’ wish 
to engage with the poets and show the inferiority of poetry to philosophy may have 
compelled him to indicate more clearly the limitations of eros in this dialogue.  
Socrates’ Symposium speech is, however, more directly a response to Phaedrus’ 
request for a praise of eros than it is an address to the poets (177a4-c4, 194d1-8), and 
immediately before giving his speech, Socrates makes sure that Phaedrus in particular 
would like to hear the truth about eros (199b2-5).  We must therefore raise the question 
of how the teaching Socrates gives Phaedrus in the Symposium is to be understood in 
relation to Socrates’ attempt to educate him in the Phaedrus.  To answer this question, it 
would be of great help to know the dramatic dates of the two dialogues so as to assess the 
order in which Socrates attempts to instruct Phaedrus.  In the case of the Symposium, 
Agathon’s victory establishes a clear date of 416 for the original presentation of the 
speeches (173a5-7),11 but the Phaedrus offers no such clear evidence of its date.  Indeed, 
it would seem that such references as Plato provides to various historical figures in the 
Phaedrus render impossible the attempt to establish a precise date: the dialogue would 
have had to occur before 415 or after 403, because Phaedrus was exiled in the intervening 
years; it would seem to be impossible for the dialogue to occur after 403, for Socrates 
seems to speak of Sophocles, Euripides, and Lysias’ brother, Polemarchus, as if they are 
alive (257b3-4, 268c5ff.), and the two poets died in 406 while Polemarchus died in 404; 
yet if the dialogue is to occur before 415, it is hard to understand Socrates’ praise of 
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 See Henderson (2001, 78); Strauss (2001, 18); Nails (2002, 315). 
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Isocrates’ rhetorical skills, for although Socrates says he is still young, it is hard to see 
how he would have merited such praise at approximately the age of twenty, as he would 
have been in 415 (278e10ff.), and it is also hard to see how Simmias, who is called young 
in the Phaedo (89a), which takes place in 399, could have already been the cause of many 
speeches as Socrates says he was in the Phaedrus.12  Still, even if Plato felt free to refer 
in the Phaedrus to historical events or people in a manner that is inconsistent with 
historical fact, as he clearly did in his other dialogue devoted to rhetoric, the Gorgias,13 
he chose one character, Phaedrus, to link his two dialogues on eros together, and he 
therefore seems to raise a question for his readers about the effect of Socrates’ teaching 
on Phaedrus.  This question can only be answered by some indication of the order in 
which Phaedrus received Socrates’ teachings, and it would therefore seem that it can only 
be answered through a consideration of the order in which it would make sense for 
Socrates to offer his two teachings.14  That is, it seems to me we must consider the 
content of what Socrates teaches in the two dialogues and its relation to Phaedrus’ 
character, in order to determine the order in which it would make sense for Socrates to 
have presented these teachings to Phaedrus.  
At the outset of the Phaedrus, as we have seen, Phaedrus praises an unerotic or 
anti-erotic speech (Phdr. 235b1-5) and expresses doubts about the conventional beliefs in 
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 See Hackforth (1952, 8); Nussbaum (1986, 229-230); Rowe (1986, 13-14); Lutz (1990, 52); Nehamas 
and Woodruff (1995, xiii); Strauss (2001, 18-19); Nails (2002, 314). 
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 See Dodds (1959, 17-18) on the impossibility of establishing the dramatic date of the Gorgias. Consider 
the Menexenus for the clearest evidence that Plato felt free to play with historical dates in his Socratic 
dialogues, but, here again, it seems that Plato wished us to understand something of the dramatic date of the 
Menexenus, i.e., that it would have occurred after the Lysis.  Cf. Nails (2002, 319). 
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 Thus, while I agree with Hackforth (1952, 8), Rowe (1986, 13-14), and Dodds (1959, 17-18) that Plato 
did not consider himself bound by historical accuracy in his dialogues’ references to other people or events, 
I still think that he considered the dramatic dating of his dialogues important at least insofar as it affects the 
order in which Socrates taught others or learned certain things himself.  
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the gods (Phdr. 229c4-5, 242d10).  Socrates then offers Phaedrus an enchanting praise of 
eros and the gods.  At the outset of the Symposium, Eryximachus reports that Phaedrus 
has been repeatedly asking him why there is no famous praise for the god Eros (177a2-
c4), and Phaedrus then offers a praise of his own.  Socrates’ response, when contrasted 
with his palinode, is disenchanting.15  Now, as we have seen from our interpretation of 
the Phaedrus and a preliminary interpretation of Socrates’ Symposium speech, Socrates 
regards the less enchanting treatment of eros as the more truthful one, but he also regards 
erotic enchantment as a useful beginning in a genuine education.  In this case, it makes 
sense that Socrates would offer the relatively unerotic Phaedrus the greatest praise of eros 
of which he is capable in order to arouse Phaedrus’ concern with eros, before presenting 
the harsher truth.  By this account, Socrates’ palinode may be the source of Phaedrus’ 
request for the praise of eros in the Symposium.16  Furthermore, I know of no reason why 
Phaedrus, whose long term association with sophists and doctors marks him as unlikely 
to be especially erotic or serious about piety,17 would have come to be concerned with a 
                                                          
15
 Cf. Strauss (2001, 18, 53, 248).  Strauss draws the opposite conclusion about the order of the Symposium 
and Phaedrus  based on a similar interpretation of Socrates’ speech in the Symposium.  Strauss apparently 
reasons that Phaedrus begins the Phaedrus without admiration of eros due to his hearing the speeches in the 
Symposium, and this presumably requires Socrates to lead Phaedrus to a somewhat more moderate view of 
eros, perhaps to undo the damage his speech has done.  This leaves unexplained why Phaedrus had come to 
be so concerned with eros in the first place, as none of his companions, the sophists, evidently were (177a2-
c4).  Furthermore, while I agree with Strauss about the  concern with “gain” that he detects in Phaedrus’ 
Symposium speech (2001, 55-56, 282), this seems to me to be the result of a lingering concern with gain 
that has become a problem for him since hearing Socrates’ palinode. 
16
 Cf. Lutz (1990, 23-55).  Lutz offers an interpretation of Phaedrus’ Symposium speech which presents 
Phaedrus as expressing admiration of lovers while doubting that there are such gods as could reward their 
sacrifices (see especially page 38).  Such a concern on Phaedrus’ part is a plausible response to the 
palinode, which makes prominent the lover’s willingness to sacrifice to the beloved while raising the 
question of the character of the gods. 
17
 On Phaedrus’ long term association with sophists, see Protagoras 315c, Phaedrus 265dff.; on the 
impious implications of such associations, see, for example, Phaedrus 229c6ff., and pages 132-133 above.  
Consider also Phaedrus’ exile for impiety (see Nails 2002, 232-234).  On Phaedrus’ long-term association 
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praise of the god Eros on the assumption that the Symposium comes first.  On this 
assumption, one must also explain why, if Phaedrus’ education is of concern to Socrates, 
he would proceed from the more to the less true teaching.  Finally, even if Socrates 
makes his Symposium speech without primarily considering Phaedrus’ education, how 
could he then expect Phaedrus to take him seriously when he suggests that Eros is a god 
in the Phaedrus (Phdr. 242d9), having already so openly taught the opposite (202b6-
202d7)?   
If, then, the Symposium occurs after the Phaedrus, we would expect to find some 
trace of Socrates’ earlier teaching in Phaedrus’ Symposium speech. Without undertaking a 
detailed analysis of Phaedrus’ speech,18 we can still see some traces of Socrates’ 
influence.  Phaedrus’ reference to eros as the cause of the greatest goods echoes Socrates’ 
description of divine madness (178c2-3, cf. Phdr. 244a6-7), and Phaedrus’ speech 
concludes with a reference to lovers having a god within themselves, repeating Socrates’ 
formulation from the palinode (180b4, Phdr. 255b6).  More substantively, Phaedrus 
praises lovers despite or because of the great sacrifices which, as he explicitly notes, their 
love demands of them (179b4ff.), and, as we recall, this willingness to sacrifice was 
fundamental to Socrates’ praise of eros in the palinode.  Furthermore, it is also likely to 
be this willingness that would most strike a nonlover who has been compelled by 
Socrates’ palinode to take lovers seriously (see especially pages 159-167 above).  It is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
with doctors, see Phaedrus 227a2-b1, 268a8-9, Symposium 176d5-7, 223b6-7, Protagoras 315c; on the 
unerotic implications of such an association see pages 120-122 above and Strauss (2001, 218-219).   
18
 See Lutz for such an analysis (1990, 23-55).  
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not, then, far-fetched to suppose that Phaedrus’ concern about eros and the praise he 
gives it in the Symposium are the result of his encounter with Socrates in the Phaedrus. 
When Socrates gave his palinode, he knew that Phaedrus would try to use it to 
provoke more speeches from others (Phdr. 228a5ff., 242a6-b5, 243d5-e2, 257b2-4).  
Socrates suggested that the primary addressee of his palinode, after Phaedrus, was Lysias 
(243d5-7, 257b2-4), and Plato never indicates what effect the palinode may have had on 
him (although cf. Phdr. 257c2-4), but by my hypothesis about the order of the dialogues, 
the Symposium presents something of the palinode’s effect more generally: Socrates is 
rewarded with a night of speeches on eros and the opportunity to make his own before a 
new audience.        
 
 
The Order of Socrates’ speech 
 
Socrates’ begins his Symposium speech by complementing the order in which 
Agathon had suggested one should speak and indicating his intent to speak in that order 
(199c3-6, cf. 195a1-5).19  According to that order, Socrates will first discuss what sort 
Eros is and then he will discuss his deeds.  Socrates later repeats that he is following this 
order (201d8-e2), and his speech roughly seems to follow it: first he indicates that Eros is 
a daimon, and then he indicates his use for human beings (cf. 204c5-204d2).  Yet a closer 
inspection reveals that Socrates’ indication of Eros’ character is inseparable from an 
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 Agathon says he will indicate Eros’ gifts, which Socrates replaces with Eros’ deeds, indicating again his 
speech’s harsh treatment of eros. 
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account of his deeds.  Thus, the very classification of Eros as a daimon is explained by 
reference to his power, or the role he plays as intermediary between gods and human 
beings (202d13ff.), and once Socrates has turned to the question of eros’ use, the question 
of what defines eros remains (204d5-6, 205a9-b2, 206b1-4).  Now, if eros were a god, as 
Socrates initially suggests and claims to have taken him to be (202b6-7), it would be 
possible to know his character, perhaps through conversation with him, independently of 
and prior to knowing his deeds; indeed, by such knowledge of his character one could 
then explain his deeds by tracing them to their cause (cf. 195a2-3).  But, at the very outset 
of the second part of his speech, the part occurring after the explicit discussion of Eros’ 
character, which should therefore concern Eros’ deeds, Socrates drops all pretense of 
treating eros as an independent being, whether a god or a daimon, and treats him as an 
aspect of living human beings (204d3-6).  In this case, eros would be inseparable from 
“his” deeds, taking Eros’ deeds to mean the erotic activities of human beings.  The 
speech’s division occurs after the conclusion is drawn that Eros is not a god (202d7), and 
thus it actually seems to be divided between a disproof of Eros’ divinity and an argument 
which shows of what use eros may be to human beings despite its lack of divinity.20  
Socrates’ statement of the order he should follow and his subsequent failure to follow it 
then highlights the fact that he alone of the Symposium speakers explicitly rejects the 
conventional view that eros is a god.  
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 Thus, the section of the speech following the conclusion that eros is not a god and prior to the question of 
his use for human beings (202d8-204c6) is already an attempt by Diotima to indicate eros’ use for human 
beings, which Socrates does not yet understand and which therefore requires the speech’s second part (cf. 
especially 202e2-203a8).  See Strauss (2001, 198). 
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There is an even more obvious division in Socrates’ speech: the division between 
his conversation with Agathon, with which the speech begins, and his speaking on his 
own.  When Socrates lets Agathon go and speaks on his own, he recounts his education 
under the tutelage of Diotima (201d1ff.).  This education consists in a series of 
conversations between Socrates and Diotima (cf. 207a5-6).  Thus Socrates’ whole speech 
consists in his conversation with Agathon on the one hand and his presentation of his 
conversations with Diotima on the other.  These two sets of conversations are united by 
Socrates’ beginning his account of his conversations with Diotima at the point where he 
had left off with Agathon (201d6-8).  That is, Socrates once held the same views as 
Agathon had, and Diotima had refuted Socrates as he had refuted Agathon (201e3-6).  
Thus, Socrates’ conversation with Agathon presents the first stage of his education under 
Diotima.21  Why then does Socrates divide his speech between his conversation with 
Agathon and those with Diotima?  Socrates’ conversation with Agathon is primarly a 
refutation of Agathon, and Socrates’ may have desired to make such a refutation publicly 
not only as part of his broader desire to compete with the poets that we have already 
discussed, but also to break any spell that Agathon’s beautiful speech, the speech given 
immediately prior to Socrates’, may have cast on the audience (cf. 198a1-7, b1-c5).  Then 
why introduce Diotima after having refuted Agathon?   
By presenting his education under Diotima, Socrates necessarily distances himself 
from its teaching: the views expressed are primarily those of Diotima.  Diotima is 
                                                          
21
 See Lutz (1998, 84). 
198 
 
apparently a fictional character,22 and Socrates attributes to her such wisdom as enables 
her to postpone a plague with sacrifices (201d3-5).  By giving Diotima such priestly 
qualities, he presents a speaker who can deny the conventional religious beliefs with 
greater propriety than could Socrates.  Thus, while Socrates leads Agathon up to the point 
from which the divinity of eros could be refuted (201c4-5), he leaves it to Diotima to 
draw the final conclusion (202d5).  Socrates’ presentation of his speech in the form of a 
series of conversations thus serves to hide his responsibility for his own teaching; he will 
tell the truth, but in fact he says little in his own name: his conversation with Agathon 
follows from the premises to which Agathon agrees (200e7-9, 201d6-7), premises which, 
as we shall see, Socrates no longer shares, and his conversations with Diotima show 
primarily her views and his youthful objections to these views.23  Still, Socrates says at 
the conclusion of his speech that he is persuaded by Diotima’s teaching, whereas he 
makes clear at numerous points throughout her teaching that he had not yet been 
persuaded by it.  The teaching as a whole, or its final part, may therefore be regarded as 
satisfactory to the mature Socrates, but Socrates presumably includes the earlier stages of 
his education to show how they lead to or prepared him for the final stage.  Thus, we 
must examine each earlier part of the education, trying to see how it by itself is still 
incomplete and thereby points to the rest.  
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 See Nussbaum (1986, 177); Nehamas and Woodruff (1995, xii-xiii, 45).  Cf. Dover (1980, 137). 
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 See Lutz (1998, 84). 
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Socrates’ Refutation of Agathon  
 
 The most prominent purpose of Socrates’ initial conversation with Agathon is his 
refutation of Agathon.  Agathon’s speech had asserted both that Eros is beautiful and 
good and that Eros loves beauty (195a7, 197b3-5, 8-9), and Socrates shows that Agathon 
holds that to love something implies desiring that thing and to desire is to lack what is 
desired (200a2-b3, e2-9).  It follows quite simply then that Eros lacks beauty, and as 
Socrates shows, since Agathon also regards the good things as beautiful, eros lacks the 
good things (201a2-c5).24  Thus Agathon contradicts himself.  Yet Socrates’ presentation 
of this rather straightforward argument is not quite so simple.  In the middle of the 
argument, after indicating the “wondrous necessity” that one desire only what one lacks 
(200a8-b3), Socrates notes an apparent exception to this necessity (200b4-5, 9ff.), which 
forces him to indicate more precisely what he means by desire.  This more precise 
determination, in turn, permits Socrates to introduce quietly a definition of eros according 
to which eros would not necessarily simply lack its object (200d8-10).  Agathon’s 
refutation accordingly depends on his own obliviousness to the character of eros to which 
Socrates is pointing.  Thus we may say that the most manifest refutation of Agathon 
conceals a subtler criticism of his understanding of eros. 
 Socrates’ more precise determination of what he means by desire stems from the 
following consideration.  Someone possessing such desirable qualities as strength, speed, 
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 This is Socrates’ first indication of the relation between beauty and goodness, which will become the 
primary question as the speech progresses.  Socrates does not simply take for granted the relation suggested 
here, but makes sure that Agathon agrees to it (201c2-3).  Also, Socrates’ formulation allows that there may 
be beauties which are bad, while requiring of any good thing that it also be beautiful.  
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health, or wealth might suppose that despite possessing these qualities he also desires 
them (200b9-d7).  Socrates then undertakes to correct such a person by drawing a 
distinction between desiring (epithumeo) and wishing (boulomai); according to this 
distinction, one may not desire what one already has, for one necessarily has it,25 but one 
may wish to have in the future what one already has in the present (200c3-d6).   That is, 
Socrates denies that one may desire to possess in the future what one already has, but 
allows that one may wish for it.  A desire must be for what is currently lacked, and 
Socrates’ distinction is thus between a current lack and a lack that is only expected.  The 
distinction between desire and wish therefore has its basis in the forethought on which the 
expectation of a lack depends; desires may be felt simply from the lack of something, but 
wish requires reflection on one’s condition.   
 After distinguishing between desire and wish, Socrates offers a definition of eros 
which includes both.  He says, “then this is to love that, what is not yet available for him, 
nor what he has, these things [goods such as health, wealth, and strength] being secured 
and present for him in the future” (200d7-10, cf. 200c5-d6).  It is a difficult statement to 
interpret, but it clearly suggests a complexity in the object or objects of eros: eros 
includes both a desire for what is not yet present and the security of such goods as may 
already be present.  It is true that Socrates goes on to treat eros together with desire as if 
both were simply of what one lacks (200e2-5), but this serves rather to complete his 
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 Socrates argues that one cannot desire what one has because it is necessary to have it, “whether one 
wishes or not” (200c3-5), suggesting that one can wish not to have what one necessarily has, and thereby 
implying, as he later seems to confirm (cf. 205a1-7 with 206a9-10), that wishes may be for the impossible 
(cf. Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics 1111b22-23). 
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refutation of Agathon.  As we shall see, eros is a complex phenomenon including both 
desire and wish. 
 Although Agathon agrees to Socrates’ suggestion that eros contains both simple 
desire and the more reflective wish (200e1), he does not object when Socrates concludes 
that eros is simply of what one lacks (200e7-201a1), and we therefore can see that 
Agathon overlooks the reflective element in eros to which Socrates has been pointing.  
This oversight on Agathon’s part is presumably connected to the error which Socrates 
will later suggest attends his thesis about eros, a thesis that Socrates once shared, i.e., that 
eros is of the beautiful.  For here, Socrates suggests that eros includes a desire for beauty 
(201a9-10), but also that it seeks to guarantee the permanent possession of such good 
things as one already has, and later Socrates or his Diotima will suggest that eros is not 
exactly of beauty but of begetting in the beautiful; according to this definition, the desire 
for beauty would only be a part of the phenomenon of eros (206e2-5, cf. 206e7-207a4).  
Now, in overlooking the reflective aspect of eros, Agathon draws the conclusion that eros 
simply lacks beautiful and good things, but it is not clear that Socrates shares this 
conclusion (cf. 201e7).  Indeed, since wish depends on some reflection on one’s 
condition, it entails some self-knowledge and is presumably educable in a way that mere 
desires are not, and it would seem to be for such self-knowledge and educability of eros 
as permits a lover to ascend the ladder of love that Socrates ultimately regards eros as a 
good possession for human beings, if not an unqualifiedly good one.  Therefore, by 
simply identifying eros with the desire for beauty, Agathon overlooks the contribution 
that eros may offer to the attainment of the human good.   
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Eros as the Intermediate 
 
 Socrates’ argument against the conclusion which has just been drawn, that eros is 
neither good nor beautiful, begins with the classification of eros as an intermediate being.  
Eros is intermediate, first of all, between beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness 
(202b2-5), then between mortal and immortal (202d11), and finally between wisdom and 
ignorance (204b4-5).  That Eros is such an intermediate is the first lesson that Socrates 
presents himself receiving as he turns his speech explicitly to his education under 
Diotima.  Having been shown that Eros is neither beautiful nor good as he just showed 
Agathon, Socrates asks Diotima if she does not therefore regard Eros as ugly and bad 
(201e8-9).  Such a view follows if one regards anything lacking goodness and beauty as 
bad and ugly, and Diotima first leads Socrates to affirm emphatically that this is his view 
(201e10-202a1).  It seems that Socrates’ longing for the good and beautiful is such that it 
leaves him not only unsatisfied by but contemptuous of anything lacking the goodness 
and beauty he desires.  We shall receive confirmation later that Socrates’ erotic concern 
for the beautiful and good may lead to disregard of the more qualifiedly good and 
beautiful things available to us. 
 Diotima apparently convinces Socrates that Eros need not be bad and ugly by the 
analogy she offers according to which correct opinion, because it obtains truth without 
supporting itself with reason, is in between wisdom or knowledge and ignorance (202a2-
10). That is, she shows Socrates something that attains something of what he desires 
(truth) but not so fully as he would most wish to attain it.  While this convinces Socrates 
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that Eros need not be bad and ugly, it does not convince him that Eros is an intermediate.  
For he responds to Diotima’s suggestion of the intermediate character of true opinion, 
perhaps encouraged by Diotima’s apparent endorsement of opinion,26 by saying that all 
believe Eros to be a great god (202b6-7).  Then, when she has shown him that opinion is 
not simply to be trusted, and that he does not believe that Eros is a god (202b8-d7), 
Socrates persists in trying to find out what Eros is (202d8ff.), and he evidently remains 
sufficiently unsure of its intermediate status that once the part of the conversation which 
is to indicate Eros’ sort or character is complete, he still wonders of what use Eros might 
be to human beings (204c7).  As we could have anticipated from the above account of 
Socrates’ dialogue with Agathon, Eros’ status as an intermediate does not mean that Eros 
is between the beautiful and ugly and the good and the bad simply by simply being none 
of these, rather, Eros is intermediate since he is lacking a complete or final good or has 
some defect while still being useful, and in this qualified sense, good.  In fact, Diotima 
has already indicated, if in an obscure manner, Eros’ use, when she answered Socrates’ 
question as to Eros’ power as a daimon, the class to which she says Eros belongs after 
showing that he is not a god (202d13-203a8). 
 As already mentioned, the argument that Eros is not a god follows easily from the 
conclusions Socrates was led to draw when he was refuted as Agathon had been, but the 
manner in which Diotima shows Socrates that Eros is not a god makes clear exactly 
which of his beliefs prevent Socrates from holding on to his belief that Eros is a god.27  
Diotima shows Socrates that his conviction that Eros desires and therefore lacks beautiful 
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and good things, and his conviction that gods, being happy, possess beautiful and good 
things, together render it impossible to maintain his belief that eros is a god (202c6-d7).  
That is, Socrates maintains his belief in the attributes conventionally ascribed to Eros and 
he maintains his belief in the perfection ascribed to the gods, and therefore he must give 
up his belief that Eros is a god.  Neither Diotima nor Socrates explain why Socrates must 
retain the particular opinions which he does, but we may wonder if any other response 
could be consistent with religious belief.  If Socrates denied the perfection of the gods, 
could he still hold such imperfect gods as worthy of worship or even of being called gods 
(cf. 202c7-8)?  And if he denied the deeds conventionally ascribed to Eros, what, if 
anything, could “Eros” still mean to him when he believed “Eros” to be a god?  As 
indicated above, by recalling Agathon’s earlier suggestion that the other gods also desire 
beauty (201a4-5, 197b3-5), we can see the implications of the considerations Diotima 
raises for conventional piety in general. 
 These implications manifest themselves in Socrates’ speech almost immediately.  
First, when Diotima tells Socrates that Eros is a daimon, she explains the need for 
daimones to act as intermediaries between gods and human beings, by noting that gods 
do not mingle with human beings (203a1-2); we infer that gods would not so mingle 
because of their perfection.28  If we consider, however, that this perfection requires that 
gods not desire, and therefore that they desire nothing of or for human beings, then it is 
hard to see why gods would care for human prayers or offerings or have any 
commandments or requitals for humans, regardless of Eros’ activity as an intermediate 
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(cf. 202e3-5).  Diotima then confirms that she has followed out this reasoning by the 
story she tells next of Eros’ birth.   
 According to this story, Eros descends from Resource, the god, and Poverty or 
Need (Penia) (203c5, b2-3).  It is clear that Need is not a goddess (203b2-4), and, as her 
name suggests, she is distinguished by her poverty (203b4, 7-8, c6-d3), which seems to 
mark her as a mortal.  Whatever she may be, it is necessary for Resource to act very 
much unlike a true god, getting drunk and falling asleep in Zeus’ garden, for Need to 
produce a child with him (203b5-c1).29  It seems to be necessary that eros descend from 
both Need and Resource, because otherwise Eros would seem to be simply impoverished 
and therefore incapable of fulfilling his role as intermediary (cf. 203c5ff.), but Diotima 
undermines the understanding of Need as pure poverty by her description of Need’s 
activity.  According to Diotima, Need “contriving because of her own lack of means to 
make a child from Resource, lay down beside him and conceived Eros” (203b7-c1).  
Need turns out to be quite resourceful, and it is unclear what role, if any, Resource 
actually plays in Eros’ origin; Need merely lies down beside him.  Diotima’s story of 
Eros’ birth therefore suggests not only that it is not possible for an imperfect being like 
Eros to descend from a god, but also that mere Need, since she is aware of her neediness, 
may suffice as a parent of Eros.  Thus, when Diotima lists Eros’ traits, she refers to Eros’ 
having his mother’s nature (203d3), but she never says he has his father’s nature,30 
referring only to some of Eros’ traits, traits which emphasize his resourcefulness but 
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 We shall see later why Diotima does refer to Eros’ coming back to life “by means of the nature of his 
father” (203e3). 
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could believably stem from his mother, according to Diotima’s description of her,31 as 
being in accord with his father (203d4-8).  It is therefore possible that Eros has entirely 
mortal origins.32   
 Thus, the proof that Eros is not a god proves to be the beginning of a development 
at whose conclusion eros comes to be treated merely as a characteristic or activity of 
human beings.  That is, after Diotima has explained Eros’ character and origin, we find 
the following passage.  Diotima asks Socrates “in what respect is Eros of beautiful 
things” (204d4)?  Perhaps Socrates by now can no longer understand the question, 
referring as it appears to do to Eros as an independent being; in any event, Diotima 
rephrases it, saying, “but this way is clearer: the one loving the beautiful loves—, what 
does he love?” (204d5-6).  Diotima no longer treats eros as a being, whether a god or a 
daimon, which itself loves; instead she treats eros as the longing of human lovers,33 and 
eros is treated in this way for the remainder of the speech.  According to Diotima’s proof 
that eros is not a god, it is impossible for immortals to mix and therefore, it would seem, 
to reveal themselves to human beings.  In this case, a question arises as to the origin of 
human belief in such gods as would reveal themselves.  A strictly human origin of the 
gods must be discovered.  Diotima accordingly answers this question by pointing to eros; 
Diotima’s description of eros after she has proved that it is not a god, that is, her 
description of eros’ daimonic power, suggests that eros is the human longing which 
provides for such belief in the gods as provides a basis for “all divination…and the art of 
                                                          
31
 See Strauss (2001, 194, 227). 
32
 Cf. Strauss (2001, 193-195). 
33
 Cf. Strauss (2001, 199). 
207 
 
the priests, of those concerning sacrifices, rites, enchantments, and the whole of 
divination and sorcery” (202e7-203a1).  In this case, Diotima’s earlier indication that eros 
is neither mortal nor immortal but intermediate between the two can only mean that eros 
is responsible for such beliefs as humans have in immortals (202d8-11, 203d8-e1).  For, 
however many times eros may die and come back to life, as Diotima asserts it does 
(203e1-3), these deaths and rebirths are of a human’s longing, and therefore eros is 
ultimately as mortal as each of the beings of which it is an attribute or activity.   
 Taking eros as a human longing, we can also begin to interpret Diotima’s 
suggestion about eros’ relation to Aphrodite.  Diotima claims that Eros was born on 
Aphrodite’s birthday (203c1-3), and, since we are taking eros to be a human longing we 
seem to be entitled to treat Aphrodite similarly, taking her to represent aphrodisia, or 
sexual pleasure.  Diotima gives two reasons that Eros is a follower of Aphrodite: first, he 
is born on her birthday, and secondly, he is concerned with the beautiful and she is 
beautiful (203c1-4).  Eros’ connection with sexual pleasure is therefore in the first place 
accidental:34 the onset of sexual desire (which brings with it the anticipation of sexual 
pleasure) happens to provide an opportunity for our need to become aware of itself, and 
this response to our neediness is eros (cf. 206c3-4, 209b2-3).  Secondly, the beauty of 
sexual pleasure or, more likely, the beauty of the beloved with whom one seeks such 
pleasure plays a crucial role, as we shall have eventually to explain, in permitting us to 
acknowledge our neediness, and the manner in which it permits this acknowledgment 
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determines much of the character of the erotic experience (cf. 206c4-5, 209b3-4).35  Thus 
eros is hardly identical to sexual desire, and Diotima emphasizes rather eros’ role in 
leading us to the gods (cf. Phdr. 250e1ff., 246d6-7).   
 In this section of the speech, however, Diotima also calls attention to another role 
of eros, a role which Socrates could more unqualifiedly regard as useful, i.e., a 
philosophic role.  The traits Diotima ascribes to eros seem to be not merely those 
appropriate to a description of resourceful neediness; they also seem to describe Socrates, 
in particular: Eros is poor, tough, shoeless, desirous of and well-provided with practical 
wisdom, plotting to obtain the beautiful and the good (203c6-d7, cf. 174a3-4, 213b9-c5, 
e3-4, 220a1ff., 223a6-9).36  And eros’ always being at home with need reminds of 
Socrates’ famous self-knowledge, i.e., his awareness of his ignorance (cf. Apology 21b-
23c).  Eros is between wisdom and ignorance, and we learn that this too is where 
philosophers dwell (203e5-204a4).  Finally, we are told that eros is a philosopher (203d7, 
204b2, 4).   
 When Diotima claims that Eros is a philosopher, it is in response to Socrates’ 
question, “who are the philosophers?” (204a8-9).  It is not immediately clear why 
Socrates asks this question here, in the midst of a treatment of eros’ character, but it 
comes immediately after Diotima’s claim, which Socrates repeats in asking the question, 
that philosophers are neither wise nor ignorant, but aware of their ignorance (204a1-9).  
When we recall Diotima’s earlier suggestion that it is correct opinion that is between 
wisdom and ignorance (202a2-9), it appears that Socrates wonders how such knowledge 
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of ignorance as characterizes philosophers differs from any other correct opinion, for 
surely some have correct opinions without being philosophers.  Diotima’s response, 
however, does nothing to remedy this confusion, for she does not distinguish the 
philosophers, instead claiming that Eros is one of them and repeating the formula that 
philosophy is between wisdom and ignorance (204b1-5).37 Diotima does, however, give a 
reason for Eros’ being a philosopher, and this reason indicates something of the 
connection between eros and philosophy.  She says, “for wisdom is of the most beautiful 
things, and Eros is love concerning the beautiful, so that it is necessary for Eros to be a 
philosopher” (204b2-4).  This could seem to mean that because wisdom is among the 
most beautiful things, and because Eros loves beauty, one form of eros must be eros of 
wisdom, i.e., philosophy.38  But it would not be necessary that eros be a philosopher if 
wisdom were only one of the most beautiful things.  We therefore should interpret the 
sentence to mean that wisdom is of or about the most beautiful things.  In this case, Eros 
would seek to obtain wisdom, i.e., to philosophize, because Eros is not merely concerned 
with beauty, but, as Diotima also tells us in the passage, its object, the beloved, is the 
truly beautiful (to toi onti kalon), and therefore eros would need wisdom about beauty in 
order to distinguish true from merely apparent beauties (cf. 212a3-5).  With eros must 
come something of the philosophic concern to discover the truly beautiful. 
 Diotima’s discussion of eros’ character does not fail, however, to raise a question 
as to the extent to which eros may be philosophic.  Diotima allows that wisdom is 
possible for human beings (204a1, 203a4-6), and indeed, she seems to point to such 
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wisdom as the mature Socrates claims to possess in her discussion of eros’ daimonic 
power.  That is, while deprecating all other wisdom as vulgar, Diotima praises the one 
who is wise concerning the daimonic realm as a daimonic man (203a4-6).  These 
daimonic men are not those whose art works through the action of the daimones, as that 
of the priests does (cf. 202e7-8 with 203a5).  Socrates’ claim to possess knowledge of 
eros apparently then refers to his possession of precisely this daimonic wisdom (177d7-8, 
198d1-2).39 Unless one wishes to deny that Socrates is a philosopher, it seems one must 
admit that philosophers may be wise in some matters while only being aware of their 
ignorance about others.  Indeed the ladder of love, by inserting philosophy at the point 
where one sees the beauty of the sciences and something of the truth about beauty 
(210c6-d6), seems to suggest that philosophy is characterized by the possession of some 
wisdom about beauty.  On the other hand, Diotima’s characterization of eros as such a 
thoroughgoing intermediate would seem to speak against eros’ ever attaining wisdom 
(203e3-5).  That is, while Diotima brings out eros’ awareness of its neediness as a 
philosophic aspect of eros, her indication of eros’ failure to attain wisdom seems to mark 
eros’ awareness of its need as an incomplete awareness.  Furthermore, Diotima suggests 
that eros is not only such as to arise when one believes that one is in need, but also that 
eros only arises when the resources needed for its fulfillment appear to be available; she 
says that Eros lives when he has resources (203e2).  Since, however, eros is by nature 
never fulfilled (203c6, d3, 203e3-5), we must wonder if those resources which give eros 
life are genuine resources; they are never sufficient resources to fill his need.  Diotima 
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would seem to confirm that they are not genuine resources, at least not all of them, when 
she says that after Eros dies (apparently from lack of resources), he then comes back to 
life again “by means of the nature of his father” (203e2-3).  For Eros’ father, we recall, 
was a fictitious god, and, while it makes sense that the belief in such a god could provide 
eros the encouragement needed to flourish, i.e., that the assistance of a such a god would 
permit eros’ fulfillment, Diotima and Socrates have argued that such a god is impossible.  
And Diotima confirms that the erotic need is ultimately for such a god by concluding this 
section of the speech saying that what Socrates believed eros to be was in fact the object 
of eros, for Socrates took eros to be not only “beautiful, graceful, perfect, and blessed” 
but also a caring god (204c1-5, cf. 201e3-5, 202b6-7). 
 Diotima’s refusal in this section of the speech to distinguish the philosophers from 
others with correct opinion is therefore in keeping with her presentation of Eros as a 
philosopher,40 for eros is only ambiguously philosophic.  As the awareness of a need and 
therefore a form of self-knowledge, eros is philosophic.  On the other hand, eros is an 
incomplete awareness of a need because it comes with the irrational hope for the need’s 
fulfillment, and it is therefore an incomplete awareness because it is not aware of the 
irremediable character of the need.  Thus, Diotima says not only that eros is a philosopher 
but also that he is a “terrible sorcerer, druggist, and sophist” (203e8).  Diotima’s 
indication of the incompleteness of the erotic awareness of need is therefore the first step 
towards explaining eros’ other role, that of linking men to the gods.  It is only the first 
step because Diotima will have to indicate not only the human need for caring gods but 
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also what makes credible such gods as are in the final analysis impossible.  To anticipate, 
we may expect that what remains unexplained, eros’ link to aphrodisia and to beauty, 
will play a crucial role in completing the account.   
  
Before turning to the next section of Socrates’ speech in which eros’ connection 
to the beautiful and the good becomes the theme, let us first see what we can understand 
of Agathon’s initial mistake, a mistake that Diotima has now indicated both Socrates and 
the many also make (203c6-7, 204c1-3), according to which eros is mistaken for its 
object, the beautiful beloved.  That the many should make such a mistake could seem to 
need little explanation, for Diotima indicates that it is characteristic of the ignorant to be 
unaware of their own insufficiency, and therefore also that of their eros, despite their 
being neither beautiful nor good (204a4-6).  But even this is strange, for should not the 
lack of the good, as opposed e.g., to the lack of knowledge of the answer to a 
mathematical question, be felt regardless of one’s ignorance (cf. 211d1-2)?  Some further 
explanation of this ignorance is necessary.  We have seen that eros, despite its power to 
open us to our need, may also be such a source of ignorance.  For it is characteristic of 
eros to arise together with the promise that its fulfillment is available, and although this 
means that eros could not supply us with a sense of complete self-sufficiency, its arousal 
implies also a greater sense of sufficiency than is truly warranted.  In other words, it is in 
keeping with erotic longing that the vast gulf separating lover and beloved appears 
smaller to the lover than it really is.  Furthermore, because she suggests that eros, which 
is a response to a need, only arises when the prospect of its fulfillment seems to be 
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available, Diotima implies that prior to eros’ arousal this need is unfelt.  But, of course, 
this need must be somewhat felt, however little that feeling may be acknowledged, as 
Diotima later confirms (205a5-8, 206c1-3, 209a8-c3).41  In this case, when eros does 
arise with its promise of fulfillment, it brings lovers closer (in their imagination) than 
they have ever been to what they have long needed.  It would therefore be no surprise if 
lovers then attribute to eros something of its fulfillment and consider eros beautiful and 
good.   
Now, in attributing something of eros’ fulfillment to eros, one overlooks or sees 
inadequately the need to which eros is a response.  This oversight was the more subtle 
error of Agathon to which Socrates pointed in his conversation with him (see page 201 
above).  In that discussion, Agathon’s failure to see this need permitted him to hold not 
only that eros is beautiful and good but also that eros is neither beautiful nor good.  It 
permitted him to do so because it meant that he did not see the true goodness of eros, 
when he took eros to be the mere desire for beauty.  Thus, when Socrates called attention 
to the lack of beauty characteristic of desire, Agathon had no further defense of eros 
(201c6-7).  It would seem that eros’ capacity to conceal from lovers the need to which it 
is itself a response leaves lovers to waver regarding the goodness of eros, holding it to be 
simply good when they are under its spell, and when their eros wanes, inclining them 
towards a view according to which eros simply lacks goodness.  We shall see below the 
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difficulty that the young Socrates, whose eros, as Diotima eventually tells us, is not yet 
purified (211d5-8), has in coming to see how a longing for beauty could be good.  
 
Eros for Beauty and the Good   
 
 From the outset of the next section of the speech, in which Diotima sets out to 
explain the goodness of eros, the question of eros’ connection to the good is prominent.  
Diotima, taking for the time being Socrates’ view that eros is simply of beauty (204d2-3, 
cf. 206e2-5), shows Socrates his confusion attending this view.  First, she asks Socrates 
what the one loving beauty loves, and when he answers “that beauty come to be for him,” 
she points out that the answer needs further explanation: what is it that one obtains in 
obtaining the beautiful things (204d5-9)?  Socrates acknowledges that more explanation 
is needed, but he cannot provide it (204d10-11); he believes we love beautiful things for 
some additional reason, i.e., that we do not simply love them merely for the sake of 
having them, but he cannot say why.  Diotima then makes the mystery surrounding 
beauty greater by her next question, for she substitutes the good for the beautiful and 
shows Socrates that he can answer to his own satisfaction why we love good things: it is 
by possessing good things that we are happy, and happiness seems to be the complete or 
final answer to the question of why we love (204e1-205a4).  Whereas the connection 
between good things and happiness is clear to Socrates, he sees no necessity that the 
happy attain beauty (cf. 202c10-11, but cf. also c7-8).  Furthermore, since Socrates 
regards happiness as the complete answer to the question of why we wish for anything, 
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his failure to see the connection between happiness and beauty leaves the love of beauty 
mysterious.    
 Thus, while Socrates does not regard beauty as necessary for happiness or 
therefore the love of beauty as a part or form of the pursuit of happiness, he is also 
inclined to view all love as love of the good.  Diotima brings this out next by attaining 
Socrates’ agreement that eros and the wish for happiness is common and that all seek the 
good for themselves always (205a5-8).  While one could hold that all seek the good for 
themselves always and also that some sometimes also love things that are not goods or 
are not loved as goods, as Socrates seems to regard beautiful things, Socrates does not 
take this position.  For when Diotima suggests next, hypothetically, that all always love 
the same things, Socrates does not object (205a9-b1).  As we shall have to explain 
eventually, Socrates’ belief in the prevalence of the wish for happiness obscures from 
him the belief he also has that love of beauty is not a part or kind of the love of good 
things.  Therefore, Socrates is at a loss when Diotima asks him why we only call some 
human beings lovers (205a9-b3), for this is a question he could at least have begun to 
answer if he recalled the difference suggested just before between the relations of 
beautiful and good things to happiness.       
 Rather than calling Socrates’ attention to his conflicting opinions about the eros 
for beautiful things, Diotima responds to Socrates’ perplexity by telling him not to 
wonder and then offering an explanation of our usage of the term “love” (eros), 
according to which we cut off one part of the whole eros for good things and happiness 
and give to this portion the name of the whole, while giving other names to the other 
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parts (205b4-5, d1-8).  Diotima likens this usage of eros to that of poiesis (poetry or 
making); according to Diotima, the whole cause for the going from non-being into being 
of anything is poiesis, so that the works by all the arts are makings (poeseis), and all the 
craftsmen of these are makers or poets (poietai), although only those concerned with 
music and meter are called poets (205b7-9).   
Diotima’s definition of poetry is odd, as her very explanation of it suggests, for 
she claims first that the whole cause of anything coming into being is poetry, but then she 
limits poetry to the works of craftsmen.  Surely she cannot mean that those beings that 
are not generated by humans are generated by divine craftsmen, given her earlier disproof 
of such gods as would have any need to make anything.  Diotima could have simply 
referred to all human production and noted that only some forms of this are called poetry.  
By doing so, she would have called attention not so much to the generating aspect of 
human production as its purposive character according to which the beings it brings into 
existence are understood to exist for some purpose.  Instead, Diotima simply refers to the 
way human production produces beings, but, by so doing, she tacitly points to what may 
be the source of poetry’s distinct status among human productions.  For such beings as 
poetry produces may have a very different status from both those generated by the other 
arts and those generated by natural processes.  The products of poetry may be taken to be 
not so much beings as imitations of beings; poems are certainly not merely the sounds of 
music and meter or the colored shapes of letters drawn on paper (cf. Republic 597d11-
e8).  In other words, poetry may be a form of making which, in a sense, does not produce 
beings.  In this case, Diotima’s example may be one in which she gives to a whole class 
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the name of an activity that does not really belong to that class.  We have seen and shall 
see further that there is reason to doubt that all pursuit of the good should be called eros.   
 Regardless of how we ought to interpret Diotima’s example of poetry, we must 
note that Socrates has more confidence in Diotima’s account of the usage of poetry than 
he does in her analogous explanation of eros, as his responses show (cf. 205c3, 10 with 
d9).  Diotima’s claim is that “all desire for good things and being happy is the greatest 
and deceitful eros for everyone” (205d1-3), but this very formulation suggests that she is 
conflating unlike things.  In keeping with the distinction Socrates had drawn in his 
conversation with Agathon between wish and desire (200b4-d6), Diotima had just 
referred to our “wish” for happiness (205a2-7), thereby indicating the element of self-
reflection entailed by the longing for happiness as opposed to any mere desire for a good 
thing, but she now refers to our desire for happiness.  It was presumably also this self-
reflective character of wish which justified Diotima’s earlier suggestion that happiness 
was an answer to the question of why one wishes which only seemed to be complete 
(205a3), for if the wish for happiness depends on self-reflection, a further explanation of 
this wish can be made by reference to our rational nature which gives rise to such a wish.  
Furthermore, it is presumably this element of self-reflection which also justifies 
Diotima’s present description of the eros for happiness as “deceitful”, for, as we have 
seen, such self-awareness as arises along with eros, which awareness informs the hopes 
for happiness of the erotic, is an incomplete awareness.  Diotima therefore ignores the 
distinction between wish and desire, so that she can say the eros of those we call lovers is 
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merely one kind of eros, while those who pursue the good in money-making, love of 
exercise, or philosophy have other kinds of eros (205d3-8).  
 Now Socrates has some reservations about this view of eros, although he is still 
inclined to hold it, and therefore, when Diotima proceeds next to strengthen even further 
her claim that all eros is of the good, she attains Socrates’ emphatic approval (206a2).  
Dropping his mask, Socrates the speaker now has his Diotima argue against 
Aristophanes’ apparent teaching, that lovers love their own other half, by arguing that we 
do not love our own things, as our own, since we are willing to give these up, as we are 
willing to undergo even amputations, if our own things seem harmful (205d10-e5).  Now 
this example shows, at most, that we prefer what is good for ourselves to what is merely 
our own, not, as Diotima concludes, that each does not cherish his own things (205e5-6).  
Indeed, one may wonder if the sense of loss accompanying the surrender of what is one’s 
own for the sake of something better can be fully explained without reference to an 
independent delight we take in our own things.  Now, by denying that humans have eros 
for something other than the good, as she now makes perfectly explicit (205e7-206a1), 
Diotima presents eros as thoroughly rational.  That is, eros is aimed only at what is good 
for human beings, and despite the young Socrates’ failure to see the connection between 
eros for beauty and happiness or the human good, such a rationalized depiction of eros 
proves too much for him to resist. 
 This rationalization of eros has, to be sure, some powerful attractions.  In the first 
place, it presents human beings as having a relatively simple nature; we have one basic 
desire which explains all pursuits.  Of course, one still needs to explain why, given that 
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humans all want only the good, humans pursue the good in such diverse ways as money-
making, eros in its ordinary sense, and philosophy, but, at first sight, Diotima’s account is 
attractive for the intelligibility it attributes to human actions.  For a young man interested 
in philosophy, as Socrates evidently was (204a8-9), this may be a powerful attraction.  
Secondly, by claiming that humans desire the good and only the good, that is, by 
affirming the simplicity of human nature, Diotima’s account minimizes the problem of 
satisfaction, for Diotima denies the possibility that one desire both what is good and 
something else, perhaps one’s own things, which could be incompatible with the good.  
For, if such a conflict among desires were possible, one would still be unsatisfied or 
incompletely satisfied even while choosing what is good.  Diotima has already referred to 
the general tendency to deny one’s own insufficiency (204a4-6), and her account’s 
minimization of the problem of satisfaction accords with this tendency.42  Now, there is 
one specific problem for human happiness that Socrates is facing, for he has an eros 
whose object is somehow beauty, a beauty whose connection to happiness remains 
obscure to him, and, as we eventually find out, it is a beauty which may require him to 
forgo many apparently good things (211d3-8).  There is therefore some reason to fear that 
our eros for beauty even opposes our own good, and Socrates’ attraction to Diotima’s 
account of eros may be above all due to her account’s denial that eros for beauty poses 
such a problem.   
 Whatever the reason, Diotima brings out that Socrates is very taken by her view 
of eros.  She then adds two qualifications to the claim that eros is of the good, namely, 
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that humans love the good for themselves and that they want to possess the good for all 
time (206a6-9).  These two qualifications show why forethought and therefore reflection 
on one’s condition is an essential element of the wish for happiness.  Having obtained 
Socrates’ agreement to the qualifications (206a8, 10, 13), Diotima asks Socrates, since 
eros is always of this, by what way of seeking and by what deed do those we call lovers 
distinguish themselves (206b1-4)?  Earlier, Diotima had asked Socrates why only some 
are called lovers (205a9-b2), and, in acknowledging that he shared this question (205b3), 
Socrates tacitly acknowledged the well-known fact that there is a distinct class of human 
beings called lovers.  Socrates would have known of such a class because he 
distinguished them by their characteristic activities, but now, after Diotima has claimed 
that all eros is of the good for oneself for all time, he is unable even to begin to name 
these activities (206b5-6).  Presumably Socrates could have referred to the typical erotic 
deeds, and therefore his incapacity to answer suggests that he (still) does not see the 
connection between eros as ordinarily understood, i.e., eros that is somehow of beautiful 
things, and eros as he takes it to be for all human beings, as the longing for the 
sempiternal possession of the good.  
 Diotima therefore will explain eros to Socrates (206b7), and her explanation will 
proceed on the assumption that eros simply is the longing for the sempiternal possession 
of the good (206e7-207a4, 207c7-d2, 208b5-6, c2-4).  Now, as we have already had 
occasion to suggest, there is reason to doubt that eros can simply be explained in this 
manner, and this suggestion will be confirmed by close scrutiny of Diotima’s 
forthcoming account.  Furthermore, Diotima has given some evidence and will continue 
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to give evidence that she knows her procedure is misleading.  Why, then, does she 
proceed in this fashion?  Or, to ask what amounts to the same question, why has she been 
at pains, since the speech turned to question of eros’ use, to secure this basis, i.e., the 
premise that all eros is for sempiternal possession of the good, for her subsequent 
explanation of eros? 
 In the first place, we have seen that by proceeding as she does, Diotima may 
present eros as more rational than it is and that Socrates is quite drawn to this 
rationalization of eros.  Diotima’s procedure therefore makes it seem possible for one 
such as Socrates, who manifests a strong concern for his own good, to hold his own eros 
in higher regard than he might otherwise have held it.  And Diotima may have wished to 
help him hold eros in higher regard both because she does not yet know if he is suited to 
know the whole truth about eros (209e5-210a2), and because she evidently thinks the 
erotic experience may be of considerable service to an education (cf. 211b7-d1); by 
presenting eros as she does, Diotima may make it easier for Socrates to permit himself an 
erotic experience.  At the same time, Diotima’s procedure has an advantage for 
conveying the truth about eros.  Diotima has drawn out from Socrates that he does 
believe all eros is for the good, and, by attempting to think through this opinion and 
explain what we call eros on its basis, Diotima can show Socrates, if he can perceive the 
inadequacy of her account, the inadequacy of his own opinion, as he might not have done 
if Diotima merely offered a different account of eros.  Now, Socrates also holds eros to 
be of beautiful things, the attainment of which has an obscure relation to happiness or 
one’s good.  If Diotima offered Socrates an account of eros for beauty and simply omitted 
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raising the question of one’s good, then Socrates would not have had to confront the 
question of this eros’ relation to happiness.  Thus, Diotima proceeds so that such 
dissatisfaction as Socrates may feel with her account cannot but raise the question of 
eros’ goodness; Diotima’s procedure compels Socrates to hold eros up to the standard of 
the good.  We may add that it was Socrates’ own question about the use of eros for 
human beings that initiated this discussion and first showed the necessity that eros be 
held up to this standard.   
 
Eros as Begetting in the Beautiful 
 
 Thus, Diotima now tells Socrates what eros’ object is: eros is of “begetting in the 
beautiful” (206b7-8, cf. e5).  Socrates’ dissatisfaction with this answer is not hard to 
discern.  He immediately responds that this answer is in need of divination and that he 
does not understand (206b9-10); and Diotima’s subsequent attempt to explain this “more 
clearly” will not prove to satisfy him (206c1-e6).  Indeed, from this point until the 
speech’s conclusion, Socrates’ responses all indicate, to one degree or another, his 
dissatisfaction with Diotima’s account of eros (206b9-10, e6, 207c1, c5-7, 208b7-9).43  
Yet at the speech’s conclusion, Socrates says that he is persuaded by Diotima’s teaching 
(212b1-2).  Socrates therefore suggests that the speech’s concluding sections, to which he 
never responds and therefore never voices discontent, supplement or modify the teaching 
of the preceding sections in a way that he regards as essential to the understanding of 
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eros.44  Thus, Socrates’ indications of his youthful incomprehension of Diotima’s 
teaching prove to serve a most important role: they highlight the inadequacy or 
incompleteness of what Diotima presents as complete accounts of eros.45  
 What is dissatisfying in Diotima’s first answer?  Diotima calls attention to her 
modification of Socrates’ view, saying that eros is not simply of beauty but of begetting 
in the beautiful (206e2-5).  According to Diotima, all human beings are pregnant, in body 
and soul; when we reach a certain age (puberty), our nature desires to beget; and it is 
possible to beget only in the beautiful (206c1-5).  Now Diotima says that begetting is the 
being-together of men and women (206c5-6), and while it makes sense that we desire this 
being-together upon reaching puberty, it is unclear how this being-together relates to 
pregnancy in body and soul or even what such pregnancy, especially that of the soul, a 
pregnancy which Diotima will later confirm predates puberty (209c3), might mean.46  
Diotima does offer an explanation of how lovers come to mistake their true aim, 
begetting, for the beautiful beloved in which they beget: because lovers can only beget in 
the beautiful, the beautiful beloved provides lovers release from their labor pains, and this 
arouses the seriousness of lovers about beauty (206d7-e1).  But at this point, it is entirely 
unclear why beauty is a necessary means to begetting.  Diotima tells us that both 
conception and generation are the immortal thing in a mortal animal and the divine thing, 
                                                          
44
 Cf. Strauss (2001, 223). 
45
 Seen in this light, Diotima’s suggestions that Socrates ought not wonder may be seen as tests to see if 
Socrates can be satisfied with an incomplete account (205b4, 207c8-9, 208b4-5, cf. 208b7); Socrates’ 
continued questioning shows that he has passed these tests. 
46
 At 206e5 and again at 209c3, Diotima refers to both begetting and generating as the objects of eros, and 
she therefore appears to distinguish between the begetting that is the being-together of men and women and 
the generation which can occur with the being-together.  Still, her teaching seems rather to conflate these 
and to present eros as aiming at the objects which are generated by or through eros. 
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that generation can only occur with what accords with it, and that beauty accords with the 
divine while ugliness does not accord (206c6-d2), but it remains unclear why beauty 
accords or what accordance with the divine might mean.  Diotima only adds, cryptically, 
that “Beauty is Fate and Eileithuia for generation” (206d2-3).47  We shall have to wait to 
interpret this line.   
Now, even if we grant Diotima’s mysterious claim that eros is of begetting in the 
beautiful, it is unclear how this claim shows that eros is the pursuit of one’s own good for 
all time, as Diotima asserts that it does (206d7-207a4).  That is, she repeats that 
generation is immortal for a mortal and then adds “it is necessary to desire immortality 
with the good from the things being agreed, if eros is of the good being for oneself 
always.  It is necessary from this speech that eros also be of immortality” (206e8-207a4).  
Evidently, the demand that eros be of sempiternal possession of the good forces Diotima 
to look to eros’ productive capacity in order to explain eros, but, even if the products of 
eros are somehow immortal, a question remains, as Diotima’s very formulation shows: 
does the immortality which is available through generation also provide for one’s own 
good?  Diotima only affirms that generation is immortal.  Still, despite the many 
questions that Diotima’s first explanation of eros leaves unanswered, we should not 
overlook how it begins to confirm our interpretation of the treatment of eros’ 
intermediate character.  There, eros was presented as a response to a need, a response that 
arises with the onset of sexual desire and that has a mysterious connection to beauty. 
Diotima’s present account suggests that eros somehow fulfills the wish for immortal 
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possession of the good while indicating again that eros arises with the onset of sexual 
desire and maintains a mysterious connection to beauty. 
 
Before continuing his account of Diotima’s explanation of eros as begetting in the 
beautiful, Socrates indicates a break in his presentation.  He says, “all these things she 
used to teach me, whenever she would make speeches concerning erotic matters, and one 
time she asked me…” (207a5-6).  The prior conversation with Diotima thus proves to be 
a collection of conversations with her, namely all those exchanges concerning erotic 
matters.  We are thus compelled to ask whether the remaining sections also concern 
erotic matters.  Obviously they do (cf. 209e5), but, as we shall see, there is reason to 
wonder if the remainder is strictly limited to a discussion of eros; that is, the first section 
of the last part of the speech, which deals with eros and the desire to beget among the 
beasts (207a7-c1), may well be considered sub-erotic, and the speech’s concluding 
section, the ladder of love, appears to transcend eros at a certain stage (210c6ff.).48  
Evidently, Diotima believes that in order for Socrates, who has not yet understood the 
earlier teaching about eros (207c7), to fully understand eros, she must make a new 
beginning (cf. 207c2-4). 
We should not, however, overlook the continuity between this section and the 
previous one.  In her preceding account of eros as begetting in the beautiful, Diotima had 
referred to pregnancy of body and soul, but her limitation of eros there to heterosexual 
eros (206c5-6) and her failure to explain what might be meant by pregnancy of soul 
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inclines one to think primarily of eros as child-begetting.49  Then, in this section of the 
speech, Diotima begins by raising the question of the cause of the eros and desire to 
generate children among the beasts (207a6-b2), and she suggests that this eros is to be 
explained by “what we have agreed upon many times,” which, as she puts it here, is that 
“the mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be always and immortal” (207c9-d2).  
Diotima thus gives the impression that she is merely further explaining her previous 
account. 
Her present account has, however, some significant differences from the previous 
one.  Eros was said to be of begetting in the beautiful, and while Diotima here refers 
again to the desire to generate, there is no mention of beauty in the entire passage.  This 
omission of beauty accords with the turn to the “eros” of the beasts, whose pursuit of the 
most apparently suitable mate we do not regard as a pursuit of beauty.  Furthermore, in 
the present account, it is not exactly generation which Diotima suggests animals seek; 
they seek rather those activities which serve generation: mixing with one another and 
nurturing the young (207b1-2).50  Diotima thus draws our attention to the natural 
inclinations that serve what we may call “the mortal nature’s” purpose: procreation.  
Nature gives animals these inclinations in order to perpetuate the species.  Diotima 
accordingly explains these inclinations neither as an animal’s concern for its own 
happiness nor even as an animal’s concern for immortality, but as the mortal nature’s 
seeking as far as possible to be immortal, which it does by “always leaving behind 
another young one in place of the old” (207d1-3).  Along with omitting beauty in this 
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passage, Diotima makes no mention of gods or divinity except as a contrast with the quite 
limited immortality available to the mortal nature (208a7-b1, b4).  Furthermore, she calls 
attention to the great hazard these natural inclinations bring for the animals that possess 
them; animals are led “to fight, the weaker against the stronger, and to die for [their 
progeny], being racked by hunger so as to rear them, and doing everything else” (207b3-
6).  Animals are led to give up their lives and, if not their happiness, their well-being for 
the sake of the natural impulse to procreate.  It would appear to be this aspect of the 
natural urge to procreate, i.e., the way it compels animals to give up much for another’s 
good, that justifies Diotima’s reference to the beasts’ erotic disposition as a sickness 
(207a9).51  
Diotima thus draws Socrates’ attention to the natural desire to procreate, the urge 
for which humans become conscious of at puberty, and to the dangerousness of this urge, 
in accordance with which, so far from providing one the good for all time, it leads one to 
give up one’s good for another younger being like oneself.  Thus, Diotima also softens 
this teaching by assimilating death to life, portraying all of the latter as a natural process 
of leaving behind another like oneself.  That is, Diotima next claims that no attribute of 
any animal ever lasts—they are all always changing, with new attributes replacing the old 
(207d4-8, 208a7-b1); seen this way, the death an animal undergoes for its young is no 
greater change than that undergone by each animal at every moment.52  We are always 
dying as much as we will when we literally die.  But Diotima spells out everything which 
would have to be changing this way for this position to be true, and the change to which 
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she draws the greatest attention points us to the account’s shortcoming.  Diotima says that 
“much stranger” than the constant change in our body or our soul’s dispositions is that 
the sciences suffer the same (207e5-208a3), and she offers evidence in this case saying, 
“for what is called study is because there is a departure of knowledge; for forgetting is the 
departure of science, and study, introducing anew a fresh memory in place of the 
departed, preserves the science, so that it seems to be the same” (208a3-7).  But, for what 
is remembered to seem to be the same as what was forgotten, there must be something 
which remembers and compares what is remembered to what was known before.  
Therefore, remembering entails a continuity of awareness tying one’s memories together, 
but, as Socrates’ denial of the immortality of the soul implies, with death will come the 
end of this continuity; after death there will be nothing which can remember what has 
already been experienced.  Actual death, through the obliteration of the continuity of 
thought which holds our diverse experiences together throughout life, far surpasses the 
changes we undergo at every other moment.   
Of course, Diotima’s presentation primarily points away from such dark thoughts, 
for her account encourages us to overlook the loss of our selves that is our death, and she 
therefore makes it easier to accept her suggestion that eros simply is the urge to procreate.  
Socrates, however, perhaps wondering what has happened to beauty and the divine in her 
account, to say nothing of the wish to possess the good for oneself for all time, is 
incredulous.  He makes his last remark within the speech here, and this remark indicates 
as much or more doubt in Diotima’s teaching than he expresses at any other point, asking 
if things are truly as she described them (208b7-9).  As we have noted, at the speech’s 
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conclusion, Socrates says that he has been persuaded, and therefore our attention is drawn 
to what the remainder of the speech offers that the previous section lacked. 
Diotima, however, emphasizes the continuity between the forthcoming section 
and the previous ones.  That is, Diotima responds to Socrates’ doubts by affirming her 
previous argument’s truth and then turning to explain ambition or love of honor 
(philotimia) along the same lines.  According to Diotima, the ambitious are “ready to run 
all risks still more than over children, to expend money, to toil in any kind of toils, and to 
die for” another, all in order to obtain “immortal fame for all time” (208c5-d2).  Diotima 
then cites cases of famous lovers and parents who have died for their beloveds and 
children, claiming their love needed the added compensation of fame in order to motivate 
their sacrifices (208d2-7).  She then adds that “all do everything they do for the sake of 
immortal virtue and such a glorious reputation, and, as much as they are better, so much 
more do they do it” (208d7-e1).  This formulation allows virtue as well as fame to 
motivate sacrifice, and the statement’s final clause concedes that humans have more 
motives than concern with immortal virtue and fame, just as the previous statement 
seemed to require only that fame was a necessary addition to the concern lovers felt for 
beloveds and children not that it was their sole motive.  Still, Diotima says next, in 
explanation of the love of fame, “for they love (erosin) the immortal” (208e1), and this 
statement, by its suggestion that the object of eros is fame, because fame is immortal, and 
by its omission of any reference to one’s possessing this immortality for oneself—to say 
nothing of happiness—cannot but raise a question when contrasted with Diotima’s next 
sentence.  There, Diotima tells us that those who are pregnant in body and who therefore 
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turn to the generation of children “suppose” that they thereby procure “immortality, 
memory, and happiness for themselves for all the future” (208e1-5).  For anyone aware of 
his wish for happiness, the discrepancy between the immortal fame the ambitious may 
receive, which is of course of no good to them once they are dead, and the immortal 
happiness those pregnant in body hope to receive is glaring.  Even noting that Diotima, 
by qualifying what those pregnant in body receive as what “they suppose”, implies that 
such immortal happiness will not be attained, we must still explain how begetting 
children can inspire such confidence.  More broadly stated, Diotima’s formulation forces 
us to confront the discrepancy between the immortality that the two products of eros, 
children and fame, may supply, and the immortal happiness which Diotima had claimed 
at the outset was eros’ object (205d1-3, 206a11-12, 206e7-207a2). 
 Perhaps, however, we can best explain this difficulty after first explaining 
another.  While it makes sense that Diotima turns to child-begetting in her explanation of 
eros, i.e., in her explanation of the deeds for which we call some lovers (cf. 206b1-8), it is 
far less clear why the pursuit of fame is brought up in this context.  Surely some have 
pursued fame without the motivation of a specific beloved.53  Why, then, does Diotima 
present the generation of fame as a consequence of eros?  In her description, those 
pregnant in soul, i.e., the ones who will generate fame, give birth only after first reaching 
puberty and finding someone beautiful, in both body and soul, in which to beget (209b1-
c3).  The need for beauty in the beloved’s body confirms that sexual attraction as well as 
concern for the soul are required for generating the virtue for which one may hope to 
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become famous.  Furthermore, Diotima’s description of the begetting of virtue, whose 
aim she suggested was fame, suggests that the virtue is in fact for the beautiful beloved.  
That is, Diotima suggests that those pregnant in soul beget virtue in an effort to educate 
their beloveds (209b7-c2).  Diotima’s suggestion of the connection between the 
generation of fame or virtue and love of a beautiful human being thus compels us above 
all to consider again the meaning of Diotima’s claim, a claim she repeats here (209b3-4), 
that beauty is a necessary means for begetting.  Is beauty merely a means to begetting and 
why is it a necessary means? 
 We have seen since Diotima’s first mention of the need for beauty, that begetting 
requires much of lovers.  Both forms of begetting, childbirth and ambition, require the 
willingness of lovers to give up everything, their lives and their own good, for the sake of 
their children or fame.  While animals seem to have no need for beauty, humans do; that 
is, beauty makes begetting possible for such animals as can reflect on their condition and 
thereby wish to possess the good for all time.  We can now begin to interpret Diotima’s 
suggestion that “Beauty” acts as a goddess presiding over generation (206d2-3): beauty 
acts as a goddess by providing, in a manner we shall have to explain further, such 
encouragement as permits lovers to risk their lives while begetting;54 that is, beauty 
somehow provides lovers such encouragement as a goddess would.   Therefore, in 
presenting the objects of eros as children and fame, Diotima presents two desires as 
included in the erotic experience which do not simply seem to be for our good.  The 
desires for children and fame would seem rather to reflect our love of our own things, our 
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offspring; Diotima says at the conclusion of her treatment of child-begetting, just before 
her turn to fame-begetting, “do not wonder if everything by nature honors its own 
offshoot” (208b4-5).  There seems to be a natural concern or affection for what seems 
akin to oneself, and by pointing this out, Diotima tacitly acknowledges that all desire is 
not for one’s own good (cf. 205d1-3, e5-206a1).  Yet Diotima also shows that humans do 
not act on these desires while regarding them as bad for themselves (cf. 205e1-5), for she 
argues that we seek to beget only when we can do so in the beautiful, that is, when we 
can also hope to procure our own good.  Bearing in mind the discrepancy between the 
desires to beget and the desire for one’s own good, a new question arises: are the desires 
to beget merely an unfortunate fact of our situation in the face of which we seek refuge in 
the beautiful, or do these desires contribute not only to our need for beauty but also to the 
hopes we experience in the presence of beauty? 
 By indicating that we only seek a beautiful beloved after puberty, Diotima 
suggests that sexual desire is a necessary prerequisite for our erotic concern with beauty.  
Sexual desire entices us with a powerful pleasure that requires us to put aside, at least for 
a time, considerations of our own good.  With the onset of sexual desire, then, one may 
be led to question the connection between happiness and rational considerations of one’s 
own good; one may begin to hope for a happiness beyond that available to those narrowly 
concerned with their self-interest, and one is thereby prepared for devotion to something 
beautiful.  Furthermore, Diotima describes the pleasure which one anticipates in the 
satisfaction of sexual desire as one of intense delight and dissolution (206d4), and the 
anticipation of such a pleasure may support the hopes beauty permits, for, in the thought 
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of delighted dissolution one would experience a taste of the happiness without concern 
for mortality that beauty seems to promise.55  
 Diotima’s indications about the necessity that lovers possess a concern with virtue 
are less clear.  She seems to allow that some may be pregnant only in body, but there is 
reason to believe that those pregnant in body, whose hope for happiness has become a 
puzzle to us (208e1-5), share some of the concern for virtue characteristic of those 
pregnant in soul.  Diotima’s description of the beloved as a “human being” confirms that 
heterosexual eros may also accompany pregnancy in soul (209b7, cf. 208d2-3), and 
although Diotima has presented those pregnant in body as if they are simply in a different 
class from those pregnant in soul (208e1-3),56 it is hard to imagine any human couple that 
is so devoid of soul-pregnancy as not to engage in any of the virtue-begetting that 
Diotima describes.  For, as we have indicated, those pregnant in soul are concerned with 
virtue because of their concern to educate their beloveds (209b7-c4), and it is hard to 
imagine any lover who lacked all concern for the beloved’s education.  Perhaps there are 
some people that we call lovers who lack all concern for virtue, but, in agreement with 
Socrates’ teaching in the Phaedrus, it seems to me that such lovers will pay a price in 
terms of what beauty may offer them (cf. Phdr. 250e1ff.).   
The price will consist not only, as it could seem that Diotima suggests, in the 
inferiority of such children as merely bodily pregnancy can produce, children, that is, 
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which are less immortal, less beautiful, and, as independent human beings, less one’s 
own than the fame-inspiring productions of those concerned with virtue (209c5-7).57  For 
Diotima also indicates that the products of those preeminent generators of virtue, the 
great statesmen, have inspired the production of many temples for those great statesmen 
(209e3-4), and, while these statesmen were most likely themselves aware that they were 
not gods, Diotima indicates that the beautiful laws these men leave us are such as to 
inspire the belief that they are of divine origin.  Such laws require our dedication, and by 
noting our inclination to treat beautiful things which demand our dedication as being of 
divine origin, Diotima hints at how beauty may inspire the hope that it does in the face of 
mortality.  In a way that is described in Socrates’ palinode (see pages 159-167 above),58 
devotion to beauty arouses our hopes for the gods, for gods through whose care the 
sacrifices eros demands of lovers may turn out to be, as lovers believe, not harmful.59  In 
dedication to a beautiful beloved, one experiences delight while disregarding one’s own 
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good, and this state of delightful self-forgetting encourages one to hope that this 
dedication is also good for oneself.  The hope eros thus arouses implies belief in the 
existence of caring gods that may provide one with immortality.  Now, lovers who turn to 
their beloveds with a concern for virtue as opposed to mere sexual desire see their 
beloveds’ well-being not as a mere means to begetting or pleasure, but as the end for 
which virtue is required.  That is, the concern for virtue permits lovers to be dedicated to 
their beautiful beloveds rather than to use them as a means for begetting.  The concern for 
virtue permits this most obviously because it makes the beloved the object of the lover’s 
service, in his attempt to educate the beloved, but also, as we may add based on the 
indications of the Phaedrus (Phdr. 250e1ff.), because a concern for virtue permits lovers 
to understand themselves as the kind of being that can and ought be dedicated to another.   
Only for a lover concerned with virtue can the beloved’s beauty offer such complete 
hopes as justify Diotima’s depiction of Beauty as a goddess (206d2-3). 
  
Diotima’s answer to the question of the deed characteristic of those we call lovers 
(cf. 206b1-8) thus proves to be a complex analysis of eros which shows the basic 
elements of the erotic experience: the desire to beget in body and soul, concerns for virtue 
and beauty, and the wish for happiness.  She does not put these elements together for us, 
as Socrates’ presents them in his depiction of the erotic experience in the Phaedrus, but 
we should note that her analysis agrees with that depiction, especially in regard to the 
important role played by beauty.  The desire to beget, both in body and in soul, by 
requiring the neglect of our own good, increases our need for beauty, while sexual desire, 
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in anticipating the pleasure of its satisfaction provides an idea of the happiness for which 
beauty permits us to hope, and the concern with virtue permits and requires the lover’s 
dedication to the beloved, which is the source of the lover’s greatest hopes.  On its 
surface, Diotima’s manner of presentation leaves the role of beauty mysterious, but, by 
turning to the two products of eros, children and fame, and suggesting their insufficiency 
to provide the happiness we also seek, while calling attention to the sacrifices these two 
desires may demand of us, and noting that beauty permits us to make these sacrifices, her 
procedure serves to highlight the hopes that dedication to a beautiful beloved arouses.  
Therefore, the suggestion drawn from the discussion of eros’ intermediate character can 
now be explained, for Diotima has indicated how the onset of sexual desire provides an 
occasion for the arousal of a response to our need, i.e., our need for immortality: namely 
through presenting lovers with the prospect of dedication to a beautiful beloved which 
arouses our hopes for immortality. With the onset of sexual desire and the thoughts of 
how it might be fulfilled with a beautiful beloved would come such hopes as permit eros 
to arise, and when one then falls deeply in love those hopes may attain their fullest 
manifestation (cf. Phdr. 251a7-b1, 253e5-6, with 252a1-b1).  Thus we can see also how 
eros is a combination of both wish born of reflection on our mortal condition and a desire 
for a beautiful human being (see pages 200-201 above).  
We can now explain the difficulty Socrates had in seeing the connection between 
beauty and happiness, for lovers such as Socrates describes himself as having been 
(211d3-8) do not turn to beauty out of a consideration of their own good.  The case is 
more nearly the opposite: lovers turn to beauty in dedication to it, with willingness to 
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sacrifice on its behalf.  Diotima does suggest that it is out of the dedication that beauty 
inspires that lovers may finally feel hopeful that they will ultimately obtain their own 
happiness, but this means that in order for lovers to become so hopeful, they must first 
forget considerations of their own good.   
This is not to say that the lover forgets about his good altogether.  Diotima 
suggested that Need generates Eros, and we interpret this to mean that we have a need for 
immortal happiness that precedes eros.  This is a need of which we can become 
somewhat aware, as in our awareness of our hopes once eros arises, and Diotima further 
draws out of Socrates that he has these hopes.  The concern for one’s own good is never 
entirely given up: lovers do not love their beautiful beloveds for the sake of their own 
good, but they also insist that their eros is good for themselves.  But then, if beauty is 
able to inspire such hopes as it does through the dedication it inspires, that is, through the 
delight lovers feel in their willingness to sacrifice all for their beloved, calling attention to 
the hope that accompanies this dedication and thus showing the limits to the dedication 
would undermine the hopes that stem from the dedication.  Therefore, in drawing 
Socrates’ attention to the connection between his wish for happiness and his concern for 
beauty, as her speech seems likely to do once Socrates reflects upon it, Diotima 
undermines the basis for the hopes that Socrates, the lover (211d3-8), placed in beauty.  
While Socrates in the Phaedrus offers a fuller presentation of the experience of eros, 
Diotima’s analysis of eros subjects eros to greater scrutiny.  
In this way, we may now understand what we also observed: Socrates’ belief in 
the prevalence of the wish for happiness obscures his sense that the love of beauty is not 
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merely one form of the love of the good (cf. 204d5-205b3).  The claim that all always 
wish for the good things does not rule out that some also love beautiful things for their 
beauty and not for their goodness, but it does rule out one’s loving beautiful things 
without also taking one’s own good into consideration.  The claim therefore rules out a 
lover’s complete self-forgetting in devotion to a beautiful beloved, and this is what the 
young erotic Socrates would have taken love of beauty to imply (cf. 211d3-8).  Diotima’s 
procedure therefore draws attention to the hope for one’s own good that attends the love 
of beauty, and, by doing so, she indicates that it is only the incomplete awareness of the 
character of one’s love for beauty that permits eros to arouse these hopes.  It would seem 
to follow, and I believe the ladder of love will confirm that it does, that if a lover came to 
see the character of his love for beauty fully, he would be freed thereby from the 
mistaken hope that beauty may provide the good it seems to promise. 
 
The Ladder of Love 
 
 We cannot tell what conclusions the young Socrates drew in response to 
Diotima’s teaching up to this point, for he makes no response after Diotima finishes her 
discussion of eros for fame before she turns to the speech’s final section, the revelation of 
the highest mysteries regarding eros (210a1ff.), or what we have called the ladder of love 
(cf. 211c3).  It would not be surprising, however, if a young lover such as Socrates 
presents himself as having been did not put the teaching of the preceding sections 
together, as we, with the luxury of re-reading each line, and with our attention trained by 
the prior study of the Phaedrus, have attempted to do.  Thus, Diotima must continue her 
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speech and draw more explicit attention to what we have made the heart of our 
interpretation of the previous section, i.e., the role a concern with beauty plays in eros.  
According to her explicit teaching in the previous section, beauty was a mere means for 
begetting, but in the present section, concern for beauty is what motivates the lover’s 
ascent.60  Indeed, in a way which I believe confirms our previous interpretation, Diotima 
presents a lover becoming ever more aware of his concern for beauty and through this 
increased awareness he is finally freed of eros. 
 Diotima now describes an ascent at the outset of which one is led or leads oneself 
to beautiful bodies, 61 with one of which one falls in love (210a7), and at the conclusion 
of which the successful initiate sees the beautiful itself or knows what beauty is (211c8-
d3).  This ascent is described as a ladder on which one ascends from one kind of beauty 
to the next as a series of steps, using and leaving behind the previous for the sake of the 
next, higher beauty (211c3). In Diotima’s description of the ascent,62 there are three main 
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 Cf. Strauss (2001, 213). 
61
 Diotima begins by suggesting that one is led (by another person) in this erotic ascent (210a6-7), but she 
later makes explicit that one may also lead oneself (211b7-c1).  Why then does she first present the ascent 
as if it requires a leader? Later in the account, when describing the turn from the beauty of practices to that 
of the sciences, Diotima switches to the active “to lead” (agagein) (210c6-7), evidently indicating that 
anyone who reaches this point no longer needs a leader.  Diotima may begin by suggesting that a leader is 
needed in order to highlight the independence that one gains when one has completed the study of the 
beauty of laws and practices.  As we shall see, there is further reason to believe that the attainment of this 
stage is accompanied by a gain in independence. 
62
 Diotima’s later listing of the stages differs from what she describes.  Between the beauty of one body and 
that of all bodies she inserts the beauty of two bodies; she omits mention of the beauty of souls and laws 
(211c3-d1).   As Strauss notes, these changes emphasize the importance of the body (2001, 237-238), 
which will prove to be essential to eros.  But the addition of two bodies also seems to make Diotima’s 
description of the ascent appear to have greater continuity between its steps than it does, in which case we 
may wonder if Diotima has not altered her account so as to make the ascent appear more gradual than it is.  
If this has been Diotima’s purpose, we can also understand her omission of souls and laws along similar 
lines, for omitting the suggestion that the beauty of souls and laws are the rungs of a ladder which one 
leaves behind as one ascends permits one to see a greater similarity between those at the higher levels of 
the ladder and those below than her earlier account suggests there is. 
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stages prior to the sight of the beautiful itself.63  First, one loves one body, and then, 
having given birth to beautiful speeches, one comes to see the relation between one’s 
beloved’s beauty and the beauty of other bodies, and one sets oneself down as a lover of 
all beautiful bodies (210a5-b5).  This is the first stage.  Next, believing the beauty of soul 
more worthy of honor than that of body, one loves someone with a fitting soul.  This 
beloved must have at least a little bodily beauty, but he is loved for his soul, and this love 
compels the lover to view the beauty of laws and practices out of a desire to educate the 
beloved (210b6-c4).  This is the second stage.  After seeing the beauty of laws and 
practices,64 one turns to the beauty of the sciences (210c6-7).  At this stage, the last stage 
before the sight of the beautiful itself, there is no longer any mention of eros; one looks 
upon the beauty of the sciences but one evidently does not love it.  Finally, Diotima 
indicates no change in one’s understanding of beauty, such as she indicates within the 
two previous stages (210a7-b6, c5-6), from the beginning of this stage to the final sight of 
the beautiful itself; she suggests that only a period of strengthening, viewing the beauty 
of the sciences, is needed before one finally catches sight of the beauty of this highest 
science (210d6-e1).  There is no mention of eros for the beautiful itself. 
 As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, Diotima’s use of eros in the ladder 
of love limits eros to love of another human being, and is therefore consistent with our 
suggestion that her claims in the preceding sections that eros was of begetting in the 
beautiful (206b7-8, e5), or the immortal (207a3-4, 208b5-6, 208e1), or the good for 
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 There are developments within each stage, but I take the main stages to be marked by the use of the 
phrase, “after these things” or “after [the things of the previous stage]” (210b6, c6). 
64
 Diotima omits mention of laws when she suggests one turns from practices to the sciences.  This 
omission is in keeping with the suggestion of note 64 that Diotima does not wish to draw too much 
attention to the critique of law implied by her account. 
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oneself for all time (205a5-b2, d1-3, e7-206a1, a11-12, 207a2-3), were misleading 
statements meant ultimately to show the discrepancy between the products produced by 
eros and the hope accompanying it.  Now, the object of eros is affirmed to be the 
beautiful beloved to whom lovers can be dedicated, and, in accordance with our previous 
account, full knowledge of the character of beauty is accompanied by a lack of eros.  As 
indicated in the introduction, full knowledge of the character of beauty, such as is 
acquired by one who attains the final rung of the ladder, entails no longer imagining the 
beautiful itself, that is the divine source of beauty, as the kind of god who could help 
lovers attain the happiness for which they hope (211a5-b1, 211b2-3, e1-4).  But if we 
interpret the final stage of the ladder of love as confirming our suggestion that freedom 
from eros comes from knowledge of beauty, we must ask why Diotima drops eros from 
her account before this stage, when one turns from the beauty of laws and practices to 
that of the sciences.  As we have noted, Diotima presents the transition from viewing the 
beauty of the sciences to that of the science of the beautiful itself without indicating a 
change in one’s thoughts about beauty, but she still suggests some development. It is 
plausible that one could see the character of beauty sufficiently to undermine one’s eros 
without yet having complete clarity about what beauty is, but then it is unclear why one 
would first be studying other sciences and only later complete one’s investigation of 
beauty.  Diotima does not give any indication that the subject matter of the sciences 
viewed in the penultimate stage is a prerequisite for knowledge of beauty, and, as it 
seems to me, a lover or former lover who has begun to learn enough about beauty to 
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trouble his eros is not likely to turn seriously to any other study in place of that of the 
beautiful.  Let us then examine the ascent more closely to see if we can explain it. 
 At the first stage, one loves one beautiful body and then generates beautiful 
speeches (210a7-8).  Presumably, the speeches generated are love speeches concerning 
the beauty of the beloved (cf. Lysis 204c-d, 205b-d).  In speaking about the beloved’s 
beauty, the lover distinguishes beauty from the body to which it belongs, and thus the 
lover is able to note that the beauty of any body is related to that of any other, and that “if 
it is necessary to pursue beauty in shape (eidei), it is much mindlessness not to believe 
the beauty on all bodies is one and the same, and considering this, he sets himself down 
as a lover of all the beautiful bodies” (210a8-b5).  The recognition of the first beloved’s 
beauty as beauty permits the lover to see the beloved’s beauty as a member of the same 
class as the beauty of all other bodies.  This awareness breaks the hold that the beloved’s 
beauty has on the lover, and the lover now believes the extreme love of one body is 
something “small” (210b5-6).  It is small because it requires the neglect of the beauty of 
the other bodies.  That is, this lover still finds the pursuit of beautiful bodies necessary, 
but, having become aware that beauty is what is worthy of his pursuit, he counts himself 
a lover of all beautiful bodies.  At this point, while the lover’s increased understanding of 
beauty does lessen his attraction to his particular beloved it does not put an end to his 
love of beauty; if anything, it makes the lover more aware that this is what he loves. 
 It is then, after coming to see that beauty is what merits his concern, and thus 
considering that there are higher forms of beauty than that of the body, that the lover 
turns to beauty of soul (210b6-7).  At this stage, the final stage containing eros, the lover 
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loves someone with a fitting soul.  Diotima still adds that beauty of body, at least a touch 
of it, is necessary (210b8-c1), confirming that eros requires sexual attraction, but the 
concern for the beloved’s soul is primary.  Therefore, this lover begets and seeks such 
speeches as make the young (and therefore the beloved) better (210c1-3).  This reminds 
of Diotima’s description of the love of those pregnant in soul (209b5-c3), but here, in her 
portrayal of a lover who ascends the ladder of love, she adds that this lover “seeks” the 
needed speeches, whereas she said the lover described earlier is “immediately furnished” 
with speeches (209b8).  In order to ascend, the lover’s care for the beloved must be 
sufficiently great to compel him to admit his ignorance and to seek what would truly 
benefit his beloved.65  Seeking to make the beloved better, the lover is now “compelled” 
to view the beauty of laws and practices (210c3-4).  Whatever attraction the lover may 
feel for the law is secondary to his attraction to his beloved; it is eros’ capacity to arouse 
the lover’s interest in law, spurring his investigation of it, that provides for the crucial 
step from the erotic to the philosophic life.   
What is the result of the lover’s investigation?  Looking at the beauty of laws and 
practices, the lover “sees that it is all akin to itself, in order that he may believe the beauty 
concerning the body to be something small” (210c4-6).  This appears to be the crucial 
step, for after this, the (former) lover turns to the beauty of the sciences, and eros drops 
out of the account (210c6ff.).  We are not told, however, by what common characteristic 
the lover recognizes the kinship of the beauty of diverse laws and practices.  We are told 
that the lover comes to see that beauty concerning the body is something small, and we 
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 In this regard, we are reminded of the followers of Zeus in Socrates’ palinode (Phdr. 252e1-253b1).  
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saw that beauty of body was still of some concern to the lover at the outset of this step.  
Therefore, Diotima’s remark about the smallness of this beauty could indicate that the 
lover is prepared for the end of his eros, since, as we have seen, eros includes sexual 
attraction.  Yet Diotima only says that the beauty concerning the body is small, not that it 
is unattractive.  Also, Diotima refers now to the beauty “concerning” the body, whereas 
before she spoke of the beauty “of” or “on” bodies (cf. 210c5 with b1-5); the class of 
beauty concerning or pertaining to the body seems to be a broader class.  Given that 
Diotima is describing a turn from the beauty of laws and practices to that of the sciences, 
we are led to wonder whether the beauty of laws and practices does not pertain to the 
body.66  Surely at least many laws and practices aim at the good of the body.  If the 
beautiful laws and practices do not aim at the body’s benefit, then they must aim at that 
of the soul, and Diotima will ultimately indicate that there is only one practice, if we can 
call it that, which is needed for the soul’s perfection, namely, the knowledge of beauty 
(211d1-212a5).  Thus, Diotima seems to imply that the beauty pertaining to the body that 
one comes to think small includes that of the beneficial laws and practices.  It makes 
sense that a lover who sought these laws and practices for the sake of improving his 
beloved’s soul would come to think their beauty “small” upon seeing that they in fact 
were concerned with the body, but, to one who has not yet seen true beauty, there may 
still appear to be beautiful laws and practices which benefit the soul.  What would 
motivate the lover’s turn away from these, and what would prepare his realization that 
many of the beautiful laws and practices in fact aim at the body’s good?   
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 Cf. Strauss (2001, 85-86, 94); cf. Rep. 518d9-e2.    
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Diotima tells us that the lover comes to see that the beauty of laws and practices is 
all of one kind (210c4-5), and, although she does not offer an explicit definition of this 
kind, she does mention one characteristic that all the laws and practices possess: they are 
all sought in order to make the young better.  The lover is therefore studying the beautiful 
laws and practices with a view to their goodness as well as their beauty.  That is, he 
investigates the beautiful laws and practices while subjecting them, more or less 
consciously, to the standard of the human good.  We may then presume that the lover’s 
attraction to the law is not free of the hope that the law be good for both his beloved and 
himself, and as we have already noted, this attraction to law, the belief in its goodness, is 
similar in character to the lover’s view of his love (see pages 233-235 above).  But, as we 
have also noted, the lover must be “compelled” to look at the laws and practices, and 
therefore his attraction to law lacks the natural force characteristic of eros.  Lacking such 
forceful attraction to law, the lover will be more likely to make the question of the 
goodness of law explicit to himself, and in his attempt to answer this question, he will be 
less inclined to accept an inadequate account of his attraction to law, an account 
analogous to those that Diotima had tried to offer Socrates with regard to eros, which 
would cover over the hopes that the concern for law permits by reference to some other 
pleasure or benefit that follows from lawful obedience.   The lover is therefore likely, if 
his inquiry is thorough, to come to acknowledge his hope that the law be good, but with 
the lover’s acknowledgement of this hope would come the undermining of its basis.  And 
the greater awareness of his concern for his own good that accompanies the lover’s 
completed investigation of the beautiful laws and practices would necessarily also have 
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an effect on his eros, provoking an inquiry of eros whose outcome would be similar to 
that of the study of law.  Therefore it is the awareness that he had sought the beautiful 
laws and practices as something beneficial, i.e., the awareness of his concern to improve 
his beloved and himself by means of these beautiful laws and practices, that proves to be 
the first step in an investigation of law whose ultimate result would be the lover’s 
freedom from eros. We may add that for someone for whom the charm of beautiful laws 
and practices has been dispelled the aim of many laws to provide for the bodily welfare 
of fellow citizens may be easier to admit, and admitting this, to consider their beauty 
“small”. 
Diotima therefore presents the next stage in such a manner as to draw attention to 
the concern for the good characteristic of the previous stage.  That is, she says of the one 
viewing the sciences that he will no longer “as a servant, cherish the beauty of one little 
boy, or some human being, or one practice, being a base and petty slave” (210d1-3), and 
she thereby presents the lover’s dedication to his beloved, i.e., the concern with the 
beloved’s benefit, in a negative light, calling it servile and slavish.  She then completes 
the contrast with the lover of the previous step by referring to the speeches of the one 
who now views the beauty of the sciences as “beautiful and magnificent” (210d5), 
making no reference to their being beneficial.  These speeches surely are also beneficial, 
at least in so far as making them or hearing those of another strengthens one for the final 
sight of the beautiful itself,67 and therefore Diotima’s omission of the benefit of these 
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 Another peculiarity in Diotima’s listing of the steps of the ladder of love may further suggest that the 
sciences are beneficial.  She says that a lover ascends “from the beautiful bodies to the beautiful practices, 
and from the practices to the beautiful learnings, and from the learnings to that beautiful learning” that is of 
the beautiful itself (211c4-7).  In each case she refers to the step on which one is entering as beautiful, but 
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speeches may be taken as serving the purpose of calling attention to the concern with the 
good characteristic of the previous stage, the last stage containing eros.  In this way, 
Diotima supports our interpretation of the previous section, according to which the 
awareness of one’s concern for the good would undermine erotic devotion. 
Perhaps we may also now explain why Diotima has added the final rung to the 
ladder, despite our suggestion that eros would cease when one attains knowledge of the 
beauty one seeks, and therefore that the knowledge attained at the final rung should be 
attained at the outset of the turn to the sciences.  Diotima’s intention of highlighting the 
concern with the good characteristic of the second stage has led her to present at the third, 
where she first mentions philosophy (210d6), a depiction of the concern for the sciences 
that is limited to their beauty.  Now one who has undertaken the investigation of the 
beauty of laws and practices described at the second stage, will have had, sooner or later, 
to raise the scientific question, “what is beauty?” and he will thereby gain a glimpse of 
the beauty of the sciences.  Furthermore, we may add, due to Diotima’s suggestion that 
the turn to the sciences is accompanied by freedom from eros, that the freedom from eros 
gained by completing the investigation of the beautiful is a necessary prerequisite for the 
full appreciation of the sciences, because with freedom from eros would come freedom 
from the irrationality characteristic of lovers, which they display when they contradict 
themselves about the goodness of beauty (cf. 201b9-c9, 204d5-205b3).  For this is an 
irrationality on which lovers’ hopes depend, and which would therefore render lovers 
                                                                                                                                                                             
only in the case of the bodies, when she says, “from the beautiful bodies,” does she indicate that the step is 
beautiful upon departure.  Perhaps this means that while bodies, practices, and learning all have some 
beauty, only bodies are properly appreciated in terms of their beauty; practices and learnings are to be 
judged by their goodness, although one might come to learn this only after first being attracted by their 
beauty.    
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resistant to reason or science.  But at the level of the third stage, there is no indication that 
one beholding the beauty of the sciences is motivated by anything beyond beauty, and 
Diotima’s whole account thus far has indicated the predominance of the human concern 
with the good.  Diotima thus adds the fourth and final level, restoring this concern with 
the good, and correcting the misimpression that her presentation of the third stage could 
have engendered.  She does so by claiming, in however a rhetorical manner,68 that it is at 
this highest level, in knowing what beauty is, that life is truly worth living for a human 
being (211c8-d3).  That is, Diotima’s speech, which has been dedicated to showing the 
inevitable priority that we give to the good, concludes by presenting the beautiful itself as 
this good and presenting this good as attained through philosophy.  The ladder thus 
presents the ascent from an impure erotic concern with beauty to a purified philosophic 
concern for beauty which is also the concern for the good. 
 
Chapter Three: Conclusion 
 
 In concluding his speech, Socrates leaves it an open question whether his speech 
was a praise of eros (212b8-c3), yet he says that, having been persuaded by Diotima’s 
teaching, he tries to persuade others that they will not easily find a better helper for 
human nature than eros (212b2-4).  The reason for this is indicated in his speech.  
Socrates’ teaching about eros is a harsh teaching, but it is so because of the harshness of 
the situation in which he believes we live.  Our situation, even in the best of 
circumstances, is one which we are inclined to forget.  What we wish for by nature 
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appears impossible to attain, and we are therefore disinclined to admit our deepest 
wishes.  Eros thus proves a helper for human nature; encouraging our hopes, it relieves 
us, if only temporarily, of the burden of our condition, but it thereby also opens us to 
ourselves, ultimately to the acknowledgement of our deepest longing.  For one such as 
myself, however, who has not yet the right to claim to have seen the beautiful itself and 
to have experienced the happiness Diotima suggests may be thereby attained, what I 
believe myself to have understood of Socrates’ teaching could seem but a bitter pill.  In 
this situation too there is hope.  For those like myself have the examples of Socrates as 
portrayed by Plato and Plato as we imagine him to have lived through reading his works; 
and in their lives and such glimpses as we may get into their confrontation with the 
difficulty that we also face, we find what we take to be living human perfection: full, 
happy human beings longing to know the world as it is.  Beside such hope, we have the 
pleasure of even the limited clarity we have thus far attained and the longing to possess 
and therefore the need to know what is truly good, for ourselves and for our friends.   
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Conclusion 
 
 This study began with a consideration of the treatment of eros in Plato’s Laws 
from which I drew the hypothesis that Plato’s understanding of eros was one reason that 
the best city he would describe for all practical purposes, the city whose founding he 
describes in the Laws, would be illiberal by our contemporary standards.  This means, 
among other things, that the city should seek to regulate its citizens’ erotic lives by means 
of praise and blame instantiated in its laws.  In other words, man’s erotic nature calls for 
and even supports life in a strict pious community such as Plato describes.  The 
subsequent chapters have presented evidence from Socrates’ treatment of eros in the 
Republic, Phaedrus, and Symposium, which, in each case, supports this thesis.  The 
Republic, the most political of the dialogues studied, offers the most direct confirmation.  
It confirms the thesis through its suggestion that eros is a fundamental impediment to 
philosophic rule.  For philosophic rule was seen to entail the acceptance by the city’s 
military class, the guardians, of a theology which denies the existence of providential 
gods, and our study showed that the eros of the non-philosophers, including therefore the 
great majority of the guardian class, was bound to belief in such providential gods.  Thus, 
the Republic suggests that the erotic nature of human beings will lead all, except the very 
rare philosophers, to believe in providential gods and insist on their acknowledgement, in 
one way or another, by the political rulers.  If the difficulty such a nature would pose to 
our contemporary liberal ideals is not sufficiently clear, we may add that with 
providential gods comes the concern for virtue by which the thorough regulation of 
citizen life is justified in the Laws (see pages 3, 50-56 above).  This is not to say that eros 
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demands the specific laws Plato outlines in his Laws, but only that his understanding of 
eros is one reason that he would support those and similar regulations. 
 Socrates’ treatments of eros in the Phaedrus and Symposium then confirm the link 
between eros and religious belief suggested in the Republic, and they do so while 
deepening our understanding of that link, presenting eros as bound to religious belief as 
to its source.  That is, Socrates presents eros in these dialogues as the source of religious 
belief.  Furthermore, the Phaedrus especially, through its presentations of the experience 
of falling in love, suggests not only that eros is such as to lead to religious belief, but also 
that a strict pious community such as Plato describes in the Laws offers advantages for 
eros.  In the Phaedrus we find that the fullest experience of eros, such as Socrates 
attributes to the “new initiate,” depends on shame, awe, justice, and concern for the gods 
(cf. Phdr. 250e1ff.).  Such moral restraint not only helps a couple’s bond endure after the 
peak of erotic passion has passed, but also helps lovers fall in love in the first place, 
providing would-be lovers with a belief that they are the sort of beings that ought to be 
dedicated to another, and supporting the hopefulness characteristic of dedication.  This is 
not to say that eros flourishes under all strict or illiberal legal codes (cf. Laws 839a3-b3), 
but only that a community whose laws direct its citizens towards virtue, providing them 
with the awe characteristic of such illiberal regimes as Plato endorses, offers eros helpful 
support, in this respect.  
 Finally, by understanding the link between eros and religious belief, we also 
found we could understand the second major conclusion of our study: namely, Plato’s 
suggestion that philosophers are not erotic in the strictest sense of the term.  For, if eros 
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in its full sense is bound to such religious belief as Plato regards as irrational, the 
philosopher, as the one who lives the life of reason, living, that is, in full accord with 
reason (cf. Rep. 582d13, Phdr. 249b6-c8), would need to be free of eros.  Then, by 
understanding the unerotic character of philosophy, we can finally understand more 
deeply the problem which guided our study, i.e., Socrates’ ambiguous treatment of eros 
in both praise and blame.  For, viewed from the highest perspective, the perspective of 
what Plato regards as the best way of life, viewed, that is, from the philosophic 
perspective, eros is defective.  The erotic experience as Socrates describes it is 
accompanied by irrationality, and thus cannot be wholeheartedly affirmed by the 
philosopher, but because eros is also conducive to leading us towards the philosophic life, 
as Socrates also argues, it can be regarded as a qualified good.  Even from the highest 
point of view eros is superior to the lack of eros of an unerotic non-philosopher. 
  
It may be of some help to briefly retrace the path we have traversed from the 
Republic, through the Phaedrus, to the Symposium, by which we reached the conclusions 
mentioned above.  In our study of the Republic, we began with book five and the question 
of why Socrates proposes the communism of the family.  Through close scrutiny of 
Socrates’ arguments there, it appeared that neither the eugenics program nor the unity of 
the city are the deepest motive for the communism of the family; rather Socrates seeks 
simply to destroy the family without substituting some new bond attaching the guardians 
to one another.1  To understand why Socrates would seek to destroy the family, we turned 
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 See pages 26-39 above. 
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back to the education of the guardians, noting the similarity between the self-sufficiency 
towards which Socrates would educate the guardians and the destruction of the family, as 
both would render the guardians more independent of one another.  The self-sufficiency 
Socrates endorses then also turns out not to be for the sake of what he alleges, the virtue 
of the guardians, nor does it seem that making the guardians care less for one another 
would help them serve the city better.2  Then, noting that book three’s discussion of self-
sufficiency comes in the context of Socrates’ treatment of mourning, we turned to book 
ten’s treatment of mourning, where we found mourning linked to irrational religious 
belief.  In Plato’s view, the tears of the decent come with and thereby show and 
strengthen their hopes for assistance from the gods, and the communism of the family 
thus finally comes to sight as a way of destroying those attachments among the guardians 
which inevitably give rise to mourning.3  If Socrates could free the guardians of such 
attachment, as he knows he cannot, he would prepare the guardians for their genuine 
acceptance of the theology he outlines in book two, the theology necessary to make 
philosophic rule possible.4 
The studies of the Phaedrus and Symposium then, each in its own way, confirm 
the Republic’s suggestion of a connection between eros and religious belief, and they do 
so while deepening the suggestion, indicating that eros is bound to religious belief as its 
source.  The Phaedrus does this primarily through the palinode’s indication that the 
beloved’s beauty is the cause of the growth of the soul’s wings, the purpose of which is to 
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 See pages 39-48 above. 
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 See pages 48-62 above. 
4
 See pages 63-66 above. 
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lead the soul to the gods.  That is, Socrates presents in the palinode the experience of 
falling in love, and he highlights the growth of religious beliefs characteristic of that 
experience.5  The palinode’s indications about the intellectual limits attending the 
religious beliefs of lovers, especially when paired with the indication of the superior 
rationality of the one who has ceased loving offered in the conclusion of Socrates’ first 
speech, then further suggest that a philosopher would necessarily no longer be erotic in 
the full sense.6  The unflattering light this consideration sheds on eros is then somewhat 
mitigated if we recall the nonlovers attracted to Lysias’ speech, the speech with which the 
dialogue began, for the deficiency of these nonlovers highlights the genuine superiority 
of lovers.  The nonlovers who are attracted to Lysias’ speech are reluctant to admit to 
themselves their dissatisfaction with limiting themselves to the mere pursuit of their own 
interest,7 whereas lovers can more fully admit to themselves what they most deeply 
desire, and in this respect lovers are superior even from the point of view of philosophy. 
Finally, our study of the Symposium confirms both the suggestion that eros is a 
source of religious belief and that philosophers are not erotic.  Socrates begins with a 
proof that eros is not a god and ends his speech with the suggestion that the philosopher 
is purified of eros and no longer sees the highest being as a god, implying that all other 
lovers will so regard the highest being.8  In the Symposium, Socrates does not present us 
with the phenomenon of falling in love as he did in the Phaedrus, rather, he complements 
the Phaedrus’ presentation with an analysis of the phenomenon, an analysis that helps 
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 See pages 125-128, 169-174 above. 
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 See pages 100-102 above. 
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 See pages 184-186 above. 
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explain why human beings, i.e., rational animals, would be erotic.  Eros in the first place 
consists in the combination of a desire for a beautiful human being and a wish born of 
reflection on our mortal condition, a wish that is usually deeply buried but which 
becomes manifest together with sexual desire.9  Since the wish in question thus tends to 
resist being brought fully into the light of day, and therefore one may doubt of its 
prevalence, Socrates must continue his analysis, as he may also have otherwise wished to 
do, distinguishing three kinds of love: love of one’s own, love of the good, and love of 
beauty.  These three kinds of love or concern are all present in eros for another human 
being, and Socrates draws particular attention to the primacy of the love of the good.10  
This primacy is shown by our unwillingness, even when consciously moved by love of 
something other than our good, to believe that what we are doing is not also good for us.  
The presence then of this love of the good together with the love of beauty characteristic 
of a dedicated lover confirms that the erotic wish is indeed present and even flourishes in 
the form of hopes in the heart of a lover.11  Furthermore, by pointing to these hopes as the 
outcome of the combination of love of beauty and love of the good, Socrates both 
completes his account of how religious beliefs may originate in the experience of eros, 
and confirms the irrationality of this experience. 
 
But then is Plato’s thesis that eros in the fullest sense is necessarily bound to 
irrational religious beliefs not contradicted by manifest facts?  Are there not plenty of 
                                                          
9
 See pages 201-203, 212-213 above. 
10
 See pages 214-238 above. 
11
 See pages 233-235 above. 
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atheists today who deny the existence of such a connection between their eros and 
religious belief?  If we could take witnesses at their word, if the avowed atheists who 
claim to love could be trusted to know themselves, then Plato’s thesis about eros would 
be disproven.  But the difficulty of assessing what people really believe as opposed to 
what they say would seem to be the first lesson Plato teaches every reader of his 
dialogues, if common sense and experience have not taught it already.  
We may assess the adequacy of Plato’s teaching by asking ourselves how well 
that teaching accords with our experience, our experience of ourselves and of others we 
know.  Beyond this, we could question the avowed atheists who claim to love.  We may 
ask if the hope and delight such lovers admit they take in falling in love admits of a 
complete articulation that does not imply the existence of caring gods: do these lovers not 
rest assured about attachments for which only caring gods could permit assurance?  
Furthermore, we may note that one has no small reason to conceal one’s hopes from 
oneself if acknowledging them means coming to question the possibility of their 
fulfillment.  Finally, we may ask whether the eros of these lovers who are lacking or less 
conscious of religious hopes does not suffer, whether these lovers do not display a 
hesitancy and fearfulness in admitting what they really desire of their beloveds, a 
hesitancy and fearfulness which can be explained by their reluctance to own up to their 
hopes?  Who among us has never wished to pray, perhaps only with regret if he could 
not?  And who has not, on another occasion, possessed by the thought of his beloved, felt 
as far as could be from the need to pray, as if his prayers were already answered?12 
                                                          
12
 See pages 212-213 above. 
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Beyond these and similar questions, I know of no way to settle the matter, and 
since there is no reason to believe that both parties to such conversations will agree on the 
proper interpretation of the conversations,—indeed Plato believes almost no one can 
consistently agree with him—it seems the matter will only be settled by each of us on our 
own, between our own hearts and minds.  Still, to return to our introduction, supposing 
Plato’s understanding of eros is correct, what follows for politics? 
Certainly nothing revolutionary follows.  In teaching us the defectiveness of even 
the best regime in the Republic, Plato surely teaches that noting an imperfection in our 
own community is no reason to seek its upheaval, especially in a community in which the 
serious reading and discussion of Plato is still possible.  By insisting that we regard as 
good or truly desirable only what is in the first place possible (see page 27 above), Plato 
surely indicates that any suggestions for reform must take their bearings from what is 
presently possible (cf. Laws 709a-712a, 739a-e), and we have offered no such analysis of 
the character of the contemporary situation as would permit us reasonably to suggest any 
changes to our regime.  Still, since the investigation of what is possible would begin with 
an analysis of the present situation, the most immediate effect of Plato’s teaching could 
be to help those of us who follow it to understand the present.  I can only offer here some 
tentative suggestions; I present them not as definite suggestions but as problems which 
this study of eros may help us consider more deeply. 
In particular, we may note that our current liberal order has gone some distance 
towards Plato’s best regime, apparently providing for the freedom of reason, if not its 
rule, and we have gone this distance without making the sacrifices Plato requires of his 
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guardians in the Republic.13  But if Plato’s understanding is correct, we should ask 
exactly how far we have come, suspecting that the attainment of true freedom of mind 
may not be so easy for a political community.  Is there really such freedom of thought in 
the liberal West as the relative absence of its legal persecution might lead us to believe?  
Furthermore, to the extent that we have moved towards Plato’s best regime, Plato’s 
analysis of eros would suggest that this movement has not been without a cost.  If we 
have not destroyed the family, have we not perhaps weakened it instead, forcing 
ourselves to bury some of our natural longings? And if these longings are natural, we 
would expect them to return, perhaps in new and veiled forms, which Plato’s analysis of 
eros could help us to understand more adequately.  If Plato’s analysis of mourning helps 
us understand our grief, there is reason to suspect his analysis of eros could elucidate 
other aspects of our lives.  Finally, if Plato is correct, and the resistance to freedom of 
thought is natural, if humans are happier in a community whose horizon is delimited by 
sacred awe, and if such limitation proves ultimately more conducive to the attainment of 
the human peak, philosophy, then to the extent that we have not fulfilled and could not 
fulfill the dream of a society permitting complete freedom of thought, Plato’s analysis of 
eros can help us to cease regretting that fact.  In short, our study of eros suggests that we 
should raise the question of whether ours is a community that is and should be dedicated 
to leading its members towards virtue and all that virtue may entail.  It should go without 
saying that in raising such questions we need not forget the tremendous advantages that 
our current order provides, for we only seek to make some of our fellows awake to what 
                                                          
13
 See Bruell (1994, 281-282). 
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may be deficiencies in our order, human longings that may be neglected or repressed, the 
awareness of which could permit more responsible considerations of how to respond to 
those longings. 
 
Such speculations as to the practical consequences of Plato’s teaching about eros, 
however, must take second place to the truly urgent question of assessing the truth of 
Plato’s position.  Where we left off in the Symposium, Aristophanes was about to respond 
to Socrates’ speech, presumably to disagree with something in it (Symp. 212c4-6), and 
while Aristophanes is interrupted, and we therefore do not get to hear his response, it 
would seem that Plato suggests that we consider what Aristophanes might have found 
dissatisfying  in Socrates’ speech.  Therefore, Plato would seem to suggest that one way 
we should test the adequacy of Socrates’ account of eros is through another study, a study 
of what Aristophanes says not only in the Symposium, but also in his own plays, to see if 
there is some element of eros that Socrates has overlooked or misinterpreted.  
To judge by Aristophanes’ Symposium speech, however, Aristophanes’ view of 
eros is not informed by a terribly pious outlook (cf. Symp. 190cff.), and it is the 
consideration of a pious outlook that raises for us an even more urgent question.  We 
have suggested again and again that eros is bound to irrational religious belief, and while 
some readers may be likely to find the thesis that man is by nature a religious being 
congenial to their faith, these readers may be expected to ask on what basis Socrates 
could claim to know that these beliefs are always irrational.  It would seem that those of 
us who have assented to Socrates’ view of these religious beliefs have assumed in each 
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instance the truth of his natural theology.  That is, in book two of the Republic,14 in the 
indication of the Phaedrus that the lover who learns the truth about the gods does so by 
investigating his own views, especially that of justice,15 and in the Symposium’s 
reasoning about the character of gods based on the human understanding of perfection,16 
Socrates seems to have assumed that God must be intelligible on the basis of human 
reason alone.  And therefore it would seem to be on this assumption that those of us who 
have followed him have regarded the religious beliefs of lovers as irrational.  It is true 
that this natural theology is supplemented by an account of the origin of religious belief 
in the experience of eros, but it is not clear whether or in what way the rational analysis 
of that experience would contribute to the vindication of our assumption.  To provide a 
satisfactory natural account of the origin of religious belief would be to rebut the claim 
that man’s faith in the supernatural cannot be accounted for on a natural basis, but to do 
this is not to prove that the natural account is true.  We must then return to our study of 
Plato in order to gain a surer grasp of the basis on which he believed his theology 
justified.  To the believers, we believe this should be a welcome return, one which offers 
both them and us the opportunity to understand ourselves better, a return after which we 
hope to profit even more from our conversations with them.  To those who clamor for us 
to give up the investigation, perhaps in the belief that our question admits no adequate 
solution, we must admit our inability to heed their advice, an inability that will last at 
least until we are shown how it is possible to live as a human being without concern for 
                                                          
14
 See pages 64-65 above. 
15
 See pages 169-174 above. 
16
 See pages 203-204 above. 
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the true answer to this question, that is, until we are shown how to live with nothing more 
than the prejudices with which we happen to find ourselves, regarding these as no more 
than prejudices.                    
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